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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF MIGRATION TO LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS 
 
This dissertation explores how migration responds to economic conditions, 
particularly differences in responsiveness for various segments of the population.  After a 
brief introduction and motivation of my work in Chapter One, Chapter Two estimates the 
responsiveness of households’ interstate migration to origin state labor market conditions 
and surrounding state labor market conditions.  Each percentage point increase in origin 
state unemployment insurance claims leads to a 3.2 percent increase in household’s 
propensity to migrate interstate and each percentage point increase in the unemployment 
insurance claims rate of surrounding states reduces interstate migration propensity by 5.2 
percent.  I then examine how this responsiveness varies by demographics and how it has 
changed over time.  I determine that the responsiveness of migration to labor market 
conditions is weaker for several groups at high poverty risk, including less educated, non-
employed and rural households and households with children present.  I also show that 
between the early 1980s and mid 1990s labor market conditions became a smaller factor 
in household migration decisions, but since then labor market conditions have gained in 
importance.   
While Chapter Two examines short-run migration responsiveness, Chapter Three 
explores the size of the long-run outflow (or inflow) of skilled labor occurring in local 
areas in response to economic conditions, amenities and other area characteristics.  I 
estimate the extent of this brain gain and brain drain within localities in the United States 
between the early 1990s and late 2000s, describing both absolute changes (percentage 
growth in the stock of educated individuals) and relative changes (growth in the share of 
educated individuals).  For each of three measures of brain gain estimated, I show 
substantially more positive flows of educated individuals towards local areas with strong 
initial economic conditions.  I also show that non-metropolitan areas are more likely to 
experience all three measures of brain drain.  I present evidence that nonmetropolitan 
areas’ inability to attract and retain educated individuals stems primarily from labor 
market disparities including the urban-rural wage differential.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The following two chapters consider migration’s responsiveness to economic 
conditions and other area characteristics, focusing on how individual characteristics 
affect this responsiveness.  Both of these chapters particularly emphasize education’s 
effect on migration’s responsiveness to economic conditions.  In Chapter Two the unit of 
analysis is the household (head) and I examine: 1) the effect of short-run changes in 
origin and surrounding state labor market conditions on households’ propensity to 
migrate, 2) how demographic characteristics, including education, influence the relative 
importance of labor markets in the migration decision, and 3) how the effect of labor 
market conditions on migration has changed over time.  An important finding in this 
chapter—and what helps motivate Chapter Three—is that labor markets play a larger role 
in the migration decisions of more educated households.  Coupled with educated labor’s 
high base migration rates, this suggests that, over time, spatial differentials in labor 
market conditions within the United States could lead to sizeable net flows of educated 
labor from depressed areas to thriving areas.  In light of my findings in Chapter Two, 
Chapter Three then examines the issue from the perspective of local areas (counties and 
groups of less populous counties).  To what extent do local area characteristics, including 
economic conditions, determine whether an area attracts and retains human capital over a 
period of almost two decades? 
Chapter Two uses three different measures of state labor market conditions—the 
unemployment insurance claims rate, unemployment rate, and employment growth rate—
with few qualitative differences in the results.  I find that a percentage point increase in 
the origin unemployment insurance claims rate of the median household increases their 
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propensity to migrate interstate by 3.2 percent.  Likewise a percentage point increase in 
the unemployment insurance claims rate in surrounding states (within a 1,000 mile 
radius) decreases migration propensity by 5.2 percent.  The relative importance of labor 
markets in influencing migration decisions fell between 1982 and the mid-late 1990s, but 
increased from the late 1990s through 2012.  This responsiveness also varies 
considerably according to demographic characteristics.  Household heads who are college 
educated, labor force participants, metropolitan and those without children present are 
especially responsive to labor market conditions.  Interestingly the household 
characteristics associated with lower responsiveness also imply higher poverty risk.  
Chapter Three shows that the differential responsiveness of more and less educated 
individuals has lasting effects on the distribution of human capital in the United States.  
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a typical county with a one percentage point 
higher unemployment rate and a one percentage point higher poverty rate in the early 
1990s would have 3.2 percent fewer 30-something high school graduates in the late 
2000s.  Similarly such counties could expect the share of individuals with high school 
diplomas and college degrees to both increase by 0.4 percentage points less over the 
period among the cohorts being tracked.  Nonmetropolitan areas similarly struggle to 
attract and retain human capital. 
The propensity of households to migrate in response to labor market conditions—
and any changes in this propensity—may affect the efficiency of national labor markets 
by affecting the likelihood that labor is located where it can be most productively 
employed.  A perceived strength of U.S. labor markets is their flexibility (Partridge, et al., 
2012); migration’s responsiveness to labor market incentives is an important aspect of 
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this flexibility.  The demographic differences in migration’s responsiveness found in this 
dissertation—high poverty groups having only a weak tendency to move out of poor 
labor markets and towards thriving ones—should be of concern to policy-makers in 
economically depressed states, counties and cities.  On top of slow or non-existent 
growth of tax bases due to a weak economy and net outmigration, detrimental 
demographic shifts may cause short-run and long-run harm to public finances in these 
places.  Differential migration responses to labor market conditions may also contribute 
to long-term divergence in economic growth and productivity.  Although there is 
disagreement among economists about the relative importance of the various mechanisms 
underlying human capital externalities, large net flows of educated labor across labor 
markets certainly affect the existing residents of both brain gain areas and brain drain 
areas in some way.  A better understanding of exactly how human capital spillovers arise 
is necessary before judging the efficiency of these net flows of human capital.  Although 
the particular policy implications of the following chapters are not obvious, the findings 
in this dissertation may be informative for understanding the benefits and costs of place-
based policies, tax deductions for moving expenses, and education subsidies in rural and 
depressed areas. 
The recent economic literature is broadly in agreement that migration responds to 
both general labor market conditions and the particular economic incentives faced by 
individuals (Saks and Wozniak, 2011; Wozniak, 2010; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Kennan 
and Walker, 2011; Sasser, 2010).  Therefore I look at the general effect of labor market 
conditions on migration as a starting point for my study, not as a unique contribution.  
There has been considerably less research differentiating between the responsiveness of 
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various groups.  Wozniak (2010) shows using Census data that among individuals with 
five to eight years of potential experience, their state of residence is more sensitive to 
state labor market conditions at the implied time of labor market entry (based on Mincer 
Equation) if the individual is college-educated.  By looking at changes in residence state 
over a twelve month period (and by not assuming that one’s birth state was their state of 
residence at the time of labor market entry), I more directly estimate differences in 
migration’s responsiveness to current labor market conditions by educational status.  I 
also am able to identify previously unidentified differences in responsiveness along other 
demographic characteristics: labor force participation, presence of children, and 
metropolitan status.  While previous research (Partridge et al., 2012) showed labor 
demand shifts led to smaller net population shifts in the early 2000s (2000-2007) than in 
the 1990s, I show that the relative role of (general) labor market conditions in 
determining household migration decisions increased in the 2000s.  So while my 
dissertation is silent on what caused the secular decline in interstate migration in the 
1990s and 2000s, it shows that the primary reason for the decline is not a reduced 
responsiveness to labor market conditions.  Finally, the third chapter contributes to our 
understanding of the determinants of brain gain and brain drain within the United States 
by tracking specific cohorts over time.  Previous research looking at the determinants of 
areas’ human capital accumulation has often looked at changes in educational attainment 
among the population as a whole (Artz, 2003; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Berry and 
Glaeser, 2005) rather than tracking changes over time among specific cohorts.  Such a 
strategy may conflate net inmigration of educated labor with either: 1) reductions over  
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time in the net outmigration of educated labor or 2) improvements in the educational 
system leading to higher rates of high school graduation and college attainment. 
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2 WHICH LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS AFFECT MIGRATION AND 
WHOSE MIGRATION IS AFFECTED?  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Almost 53 percent of all working-age households migrating to a different state 
between 2011 and 2012 cited work-related factors as the main reason for their move.1  It 
should come as little surprise then that migrants are more likely to move from areas with 
poor labor market conditions to areas with strong labor market conditions.  The size of 
migration’s responsiveness to state labor market conditions—and whose migration 
responds—has important implications on public policy.  Free mobility of labor is 
generally regarded as efficiency-enhancing: workers move from regions with a surplus of 
labor to regions where labor is in more demand (Marston, 1985).  Reductions in barriers 
to migration, such as tax deductions for moving expenses, are then defended as 
promoting labor market efficiency.  But if factors other than labor market conditions 
prompt most moves, such policies may just subsidize consumption of area amenities over 
consumption of other goods and services without having leading to a more efficient 
allocation of labor.  Migration’s responsiveness to labor market conditions may also be 
relevant when considering the merits of place-based policies.  Place-based policies, 
which direct federal funds toward economic development in the neediest areas, are one 
set of tools policy makers use to reduce inequality.  Such policies could be misguided if 
they substantially counteract migration’s natural response to spatial differences in labor 
market conditions.  This chapter shows that low poverty groups are more likely to 
                                                            
1 Author’s tabulation based on household heads age 18-65 surveyed in the 2012 Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (the March CPS).  Employment related factors 
include: New job or job transfer, to look for work or lost job, to be closer to work/for easier commute, 
retired, and other job related reasons. 
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migrate in response to labor market conditions.  This result suggests the possibility that if 
place-based policies improve general economic conditions in an area (rather than 
targeting job growth among groups at high poverty risk), they may have a particularly 
large effect on the migration of low-poverty groups. 
Also, if labor market conditions drive the migration of skilled workers more than 
unskilled workers, then states whose employment prospects are historically the bleakest 
may wind up with an even less employable workforce than if no differentials in 
responsiveness existed.  Therefore, beyond potentially influencing the effectiveness of 
place-based policies, differences in demographic groups’ migration response to economic 
conditions may also prolong or compound chronic labor market differentials across 
states.  The loss of a state’s skilled and high-income workforce and the retention of the 
high poverty population could also cause additional strain on the budgets of state 
governments facing tight labor markets.  
 In this chapter I show that demographics do lead to stark differences in 
households’ migration response to transitory changes in labor market conditions.  In 
general, the migration of groups at highest poverty risk is the least responsive to labor 
market conditions.  Researchers have previously identified a positive relationship 
between educational attainment and responsiveness of migration to labor market 
conditions (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Wozniak, 2010).  This essay, though, is the first I 
am aware of to verify this result using yearly microdata.2  Using a household level 
migration model of migration and controlling for year-to-year changes in unemployment, 
                                                            
2 Bound and Holzer (2000) looked at how differences in MSA labor demand affect the net population 
changes of different subpopulations.  Wozniak (2010) finds that workers with some higher education are 
more likely to be located in a state which had high labor demand when they entered the labor market, 
controlling for state of birth. 
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I determine how much educational attainment affects the responsiveness of migration to 
differentials in labor market conditions.  I also find that non-employment, children in the 
household, and living in nonmetropolitan areas all reduce migration’s responsiveness to 
labor market conditions.  Inability or unwillingness to relocate to strong labor markets 
may therefore be another factor contributing to high poverty among household heads who 
experience employment gaps, are less educated, live in rural areas, or have children.  
Surprisingly, the economics literature has been relatively silent on this issue.  Finally, I 
also present evidence that household migration propensity became less responsive to 
labor market conditions through the 1980s and into the 1990s, but increased thereafter. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Most research on labor markets’ influence on internal migration addresses (at 
least) one of three general questions.3  First, considerable research explores how 
migration into and out of a state (or other geographic unit) responds to local labor market 
conditions—typically defined by some measure of unemployment, employment growth, 
real wages, industry specific wages, shocks to labor demand, or a combination of similar 
variables—or to differentials in labor market conditions (Blanchard et al., 1992; Bound 
and Holzer, 2000; Greenwood and Hunt, 1984; Hughes and McCormick, 1989; Kennan 
and Walker, 2011; Partridge and Rickman, 2006; Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989; 
Wozniak, 2010).  Second, some of the literature estimates migration’s response to 
changes in national labor markets (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989; Saks and Wozniak, 
2011).  Third, some researchers examine how migration is affected by labor policies and 
                                                            
3 A complementary literature looks at the effect of migration on labor markets.  Many of these papers seek 
to determine the effectiveness of migration in bringing spatial equilibrium when heterogeneous shocks 
occur across labor markets (Blanchard et al., 1992; Partridge and Rickman, 2006).  
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institutional features of labor markets, including welfare policies (Gelbach, 2004; 
Kaestner et al., 2003; McKinnish, 2005), regional transfers (Obstfeld and Peri, 1998), 
state tax policies (Conway and Rork, 2012; Coomes and Hoyt, 2008; Young and Varner, 
2011), and unemployment insurance benefits (Day and Winer, 2006), to name a few.  
This chapter focuses primarily on the first category of research, the responsiveness of 
migration to local labor market conditions in origin, destination, and other surrounding 
states, and briefly addresses the effect of national conditions on migration.  
Most early research concluded that migration is only slightly—if at all—more 
likely to occur from high unemployment areas to low unemployment areas (Gallaway, et 
al., 1967; Rogers, 1967; Wadycki, 1974).  Another common feature of early papers was 
the finding that even when researchers found that inmigration decreased with local 
unemployment (as expected), outmigration unexpectedly decreased with local 
unemployment (Greenwood, 1975).  Lansing and Mueller (1967) claimed that early 
studies found that area unemployment has a perverse effect on outmigration because high 
unemployment is most prominent among less educated, less skilled workforces, but such 
workers also tend to be less mobile.  With greater controlling for the demographics of an 
area, and more widely available individual and household level data, more recent 
research typically finds unemployment significantly affects outmigration and inmigration 
in the expected directions (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Greenwood and Hunt, 1989; Saks 
and Wozniak, 2011; Sasser, 2010.)  The results in this chapter are based on three decades 
of micro data, allowing for detailed household controls. 
Research examining the procyclicality of migration with respect to aggregate 
labor market conditions typically finds that improvements in national conditions are 
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associated with higher migration (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989; Saks and Wozniak, 
2011), though until recently studies (particularly in the U.S.) have been limited by the 
availability of microdata or sufficient longitudinal data to draw strong conclusions.  
Moreover, the recent secular decline in interstate migration (falling from an annual rate of 
3.5% to 1.5% between 1982 and 2012)4 further complicates researchers’ task of 
deciphering the influence of aggregate labor market conditions on migration, particularly 
when relying on macrodata.  In perhaps the most exhaustive attempt yet to examine the 
relationship between the aggregate business cycle and migration, Saks and Wozniak 
(2011) conclude that migration is indeed procyclical.  However, using household level 
data from the March Current Population Survey, their estimates imply that the 
procyclicality of interstate migration applies only to household heads aged 18-35. 
Relatively little is known about demographic differentials in migration’s elasticity 
with respect to labor market conditions.  Bound and Holzer (2000) demonstrate that the 
growth rate of the college-educated population in a MSA between 1980 and 1990 was 
more responsive to changes in MSA labor demand than the growth rate of the high 
school-educated.  Similarly they show that the growth rate of the young populations in a 
MSA appear to be especially sensitive to changes in labor demand.  They find 
inconclusive evidence regarding the responsiveness of blacks.  Wozniak (2010) shows 
that individuals’ current state of residence is more responsive to initial state labor market 
conditions (at the time of labor market entry) if the individual is college-educated.  Saks 
and Wozniak (2011) find that the migration of blacks, women, labor force participants, 
and college-educated are more responsive to changes in the national business cycle, 
                                                            
4 Author’s tabulations based on household heads aged 18 to 65 in the March CPS.  Imputed observations 
are dropped, based on the findings of Kaplan, and Schulhoger-Wohl (2010). 
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ceteris paribus, but they do not test for differential responsiveness to local labor market 
conditions.  I am unaware of research which examines how family structure (marital 
status and presence of children) or metropolitan status affects the responsiveness of 
migration to local labor market conditions.   
There has also been limited research explicitly examining how migration’s 
responsiveness to labor market conditions has changed over time.  Partridge et al. (2012) 
find that county population growth (a proxy for net migration) became significantly less 
responsive to shocks in labor demand (based on predicted employment growth rates for a 
county’s industrial composition) between the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2007.  With 
dramatically lower migration rates in the latter period, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
labor demand shocks (or any other impetus to move) exhibit reduced effects on 
population growth.  Households are much less likely to migrate than they were in 1990.  
This could be because people are not as responsive to labor market incentives to move, 
because people are not as responsive to non-labor market incentives to move, or because 
the incentives to move have declined (i.e. the benefits of moving have declined relative to 
the costs).  For instance, any non-labor factor that increased the costs of moving during 
this period may have reduced internal migration, making it appear that household 
migration became less responsive to labor market conditions.  Besides changes in 
migration’s responsiveness to labor market conditions, several other theories have been 
put forth that might explain the decline in migration.5  The findings of Partridge et al. 
certainly do not imply that labor market conditions are a less important factor in 
households’ migration decision than they were in 1990.  By looking at the effect of labor 
                                                            
5 Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2013), for instance, present evidence that migration rates fell largely 
because labor markets have become less heterogeneous in returns to occupations and because of 
improvements in information and communication technology.   
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market conditions on household’s (log) propensity to migrate, this chapter will explore 
how the importance of labor market conditions in the migration decision has changed 
relative to other factors in the migration decision. 
 
2.3 Model and Empirical Strategy 
Recently some researchers—notably Kennan and Walker (2011)—have modeled 
the household migration decision using a structural approach, though reduced form 
modeling remains the dominant approach in literature examining the effect of labor 
markets on migration (Molloy et al., 2013; Partridge et al., 2012; Saks and Wozniak, 
2011; Sasser, 2010; Wozniak, 2010).  This essay also adopts a reduced form model of 
migration.  Modern economic literature examining the effect of labor market conditions 
(henceforth LMCs) on migration generally assumes, explicitly or implicitly, that 
individuals or households make migration decisions to maximize utility.  Household 𝑖’s 
expected utility in some locale, 𝑠, is a function of  real after-tax income (𝑌𝑖,𝑠), transitory 
labor market conditions (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑠), moving costs (𝐶𝑖,𝑠), state attributes (𝐴𝑖,𝑠), and 
household characteristics (𝑋𝑖): 
 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑠 = 𝐸[𝑈(𝑌𝑖,𝑠(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑠, 𝑋𝑖) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑠(𝑋𝑖), 𝐴𝑖,𝑠(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑠), 𝑋𝑖)]    (2.1) 
𝐴𝑖,𝑠 represents household 𝑖’s valuation of fixed characteristics of state labor markets and 
measurable amenities like climate, average commute time, school quality, and proximity 
to water and recreation.  𝐴𝑖,𝑠 also includes amenities that are typically unobservable such 
as family, social networks and scenic quality.  I postulate that transitory changes in LMCs 
affect a locale’s amenity value, because of their effect on governments’ budgets and 
hence their ability to fund programs that enhance residents’ quality of life.  Letting the 
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subscript 𝑜 denote household 𝑖’s origin state, I assume that 𝐶𝑖𝑜 = 0.  If 𝑠 ≠ 𝑜, then 𝐶𝑖𝑠 >
0 and 𝐶𝑖𝑠 increases with 𝑠’s distance from the origin.  Transitory increases in local 
unemployment are also associated with transitory decreases in real income, because 
workers face a higher probability of not having labor income and because the wages of 
workers tend to decrease in slack labor markets.  This chapter utilizes three measures of 
LMCs: unemployment insurance claims rates (UI claims rate for short), unemployment 
rates, and employment growth rates.  
Household migration is observed as a binary variable.  Let 𝑀𝑖 = 1 if household 𝑖 
moves across state borders during a 12 month period, and let 𝑀𝑖 = 0 otherwise.  Suppose 
𝑠∗ represents the most attractive potential destination for a household considering a 
move: 
 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑠∗ = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑠]    for all 𝑠 ≠ 𝑜    (2.2) 
Household 𝑖’s migration decision, then, is based on whether the latent variable 𝑀𝑖
∗ > 0:   
 𝑀𝑖
∗ = 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑠∗ − 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑜 (2.3a) 
 
𝑀𝑖 = {
0    if 𝑀𝑖
∗ ≤ 0 
1    if 𝑀𝑖
∗ > 0
 
(2.3b) 
Based on this framework, the household outmigration decision can be modeled 
approximately by the general equation shown in (2.4).   
 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜 , 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜, 𝐴𝑖,𝑜, 𝐴𝑖,−𝑜, 𝐶𝑖,−𝑜, 𝑋𝑖)    (2.4) 
𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜 refers to labor market conditions in all states besides the origin which are relevant 
to the migration decision.  In cross-sectional analyses of household migration researchers 
face the task of controlling for all relevant amenity variables and for the cost of migration 
between various states.  However when longitudinal or panel data is available, as in this 
14 
essay, it is possible to simply include state dummies, if one assumes that the amenity 
value and moving costs of different states do not vary considerably over the sample 
period.6 
Consistent with theory, most recent evidence indicates the propensity of 
households to migrate increases as origin LMCs deteriorate or as potential destinations’ 
LMCs improve.  In modeling the effect of LMCs on migration, an important, unresolved 
question is which non-origin states’ LMCs are actually relevant to the household 
migration decision, especially given the concentration of interstate moves to nearby 
states.  Some past empirical work allows for LMCs in closer states to be more important 
to the migration decision (Hughes and McCormick, 1989; Saks and Wozniak, 2011), 
typically controlling for potential destinations’ LMCs using a gravity model or by 
applying weights based only on distance.  I explicitly test for the effects of LMCs at 
different distances from the origin.  I model the household migration decision using a 
logistic (logit) model, so it is assumed that household 𝑖’s propensity to migrate across 
state lines is equal to: 
𝑃(𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝒁) = 𝑃(𝑀𝑖,𝑡
∗ > 0|𝒁) =
exp(𝒁𝜷)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝒁𝜷)
(2.5) 
Household interstate migration, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡, takes a value of one if migration occurs, zero
otherwise.  The latent propensity variable, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
∗ , is unbound and equals:
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝒁𝜷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜏𝑡 + 𝜎𝑜 + 𝜖𝑖𝑜𝑡 (2.6) 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
∗  describes the propensity of household 𝑖 to outmigrate from state 𝑜 between years 𝑡
and 𝑡 + 1.  The term 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 denotes the UI claims rate, unemployment rate, or
6 Even if this assumption is invalid, it is possible to allow for state specific time trends that capture changes 
in amenities and moving costs over time.  State-specific time trends were tried but excluded for parsimony 
because they had little effect on results when they were added to the model. 
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employment growth rate in household 𝑖’s origin state 𝑜 in year 𝑡.  The term 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 
describes the (population-weighted) average of the UI claims rate, unemployment rate, or 
employment growth rate of states within some distance of the origin state (excluding the 
origin state).  Several variations on the spatial specification of 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 are considered, 
though I use a radius of 1,000 miles in my preferred specification.  The term 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 includes 
various individual (household head) characteristics largely corresponding to the 
individual controls used by Saks and Wozniak (2011), including gender, education, race, 
employment status, metropolitan status, marital status, presence of children and a cubic in 
age.7  In the specification that uses employment growth as the measure of LMCs, I also 
include controls for population growth in the origin and in surrounding states.  The 
concern is that even population growth that is not caused by shocks to labor demand will 
still lead to employment growth.  By controlling for population growth, I differentiate 
between shocks to labor supply and shocks to labor demand.  Finally, origin state 
dummies, denoted by 𝜎𝑜, are included in every specification and a cubic in year is 
included in the preferred specification.  I also consider alternative controls for year.   
The baseline model in (2.6) resembles the final model in Saks and Wozniak 
(2011) with two primary differences8 which in part reflect the different objectives of our 
essays—Saks and Wozniak seek to identify the effect of national LMCs on migration 
propensity, while this chapter primarily focuses on the effect of relative area LMCs on 
migration.  First, Saks and Wozniak control for aggregate U.S. LMCs, whereas I 
separately estimate the effects of non-destination LMCs at various distances from the 
                                                            
7 I also considered including an index of state and national home prices, but these controls proved 
inconsequential in the model.  They were therefore omitted for parsimony. 
8 Two other differences should be noted: Saks and Wozniak (2011) employ a linear probability model (not 
a logit) and instead of taking the natural logarithm of UI claims rates, they normalize UI claims rates to 
have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. 
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origin.  Second, Saks and Wozniak control for migrants’ destination state LMCs, whereas 
I control for origin state LMCs.9  Explicitly controlling for both origin and destination 
LMCs proves problematic within this model.  Depending on the year, upwards of 98% of 
households do not move to another state within a 12 month span, so measures of origin 
and (actual) destination LMCs are identical for most households.  Multicollinearity 
therefore becomes a major problem if origin and destination LMCs are both included.  I 
include origin LMCs (instead of destination LMCs) because potential migrants have 
better information about LMCs in the origin than anywhere else and because potential 
destinations’ LMCs are partially controlled for in (2.6) with 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡.  The effects of the 
actual destination and potential destinations are not, however, separated in this model.  
As a result, the significance of 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 may depend on its ability to capture the LMCs of 
actual destination states.  I will present evidence in subsection 2.5.3 that 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 is a 
good proxy for destination state conditions. 
Within the framework of (2.6), if the relevant labor market conditions are being 
captured by 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡, it is also possible to test whether migration is 
procyclical with respect to aggregate LMCs by summing the coefficients on 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 and 
𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 (i.e. 𝛽1 + 𝛽2).  Procyclical migration implies that a uniform increase in national 
unemployment should reduce households’ propensity to migrate, so 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 should be 
negative when LMCs are measured with the UI claims rate or the unemployment rate.  
                                                            
9 In unreported results I find that use of origin state characteristics instead of destination state 
characteristics affects estimates of the procyclicality of migration with respect to the national labor market.  
However, including origin state characteristics also comes at a cost.  Ten years of potential observations 
must be dropped (1964-71, 1976 and 1981) because until 1982 the CPS did not ask migrants where they 
lived one year prior.  Individual outmigration data is missing altogether in the years 1972-1975 and 1977-
1980, so these years are not used by Saks and Wozniak (2011).  In a replication of Saks and Wozniak, I 
show that the results are not substantially altered by the omission of pre-1982 data.  Data limitations in this 
paper are alleviated somewhat because three additional years of data have come available (2010-2012) that 
were not used by Saks and Wozniak (2011).   
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Similarly, procyclical migration would imply that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 should be positive when 
LMCs are measured with employment growth.  
 I then extend the model described by (2.6) to allow for the possibility that LMCs’ 
effects vary by household characteristics and by year.  Equation (2.7) describes this 
regression. 
 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜏𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽5(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) × 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜎𝑜 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑜,𝑡 
 
(2.7) 
Equation (2.7) models household migration as a function of differentials in LMCs (origin 
state conditions relative to surrounding states), household characteristics, year, 
interactions between LMC differentials and household characteristics, interactions 
between LMC differentials and year, and origin state indicators.  If a particular 
demographic subgroup is especially likely to migrate interstate when origin LMCs are 
weak relative to their states’ neighbors, this will be revealed by significantly positive 
(negative) values in 𝛽4 when LMCs are a measure of unemployment (employment).  The 
coefficient 𝛽4 measures each group’s LMC-driven migration: how important are LMCs in 
the migration decision (relative to non-labor factors)?  Groups with high labor force 
attachment and those facing large potential economic gains to migration theoretically 
should have more LMC-driven migration.  Conversely, low levels of LMC-driven 
migration might be expected, for example, among groups who are especially reliant on 
family and social networks and who therefore face higher social costs of migration.  
Finally, if migration’s responsiveness to LMCs has changed over time, this will be 
captured in the coefficients on the interactions of LMCs with year (𝛽5).   
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 Each of the measures of LMCs used control for general changes in state labor 
demand and cannot be used to distinguish between different causes of shifts in labor 
demand, nor can the measures help distinguish between labor demand shocks that 
differentially affect different types of labor.  Technological innovation, labor supply 
shocks, changes in consumer tastes and changes in the prices of production inputs will 
have different impacts on the demand for an individual’s labor depending on their 
education, experience, industry and occupation.  It cannot necessarily be assumed, then, 
that any differences in responsiveness to general labor market conditions that are 
observed across groups imply that the groups differ in their responsiveness to the 
particular labor market incentives that they face.  Because of heterogeneity in demand for 
different types of labor, some states may have strong employment opportunities for 
certain subpopulations despite a weak overall economy.  However there is reason to 
suspect that the measures of unemployment better capture the labor market opportunities 
of high poverty groups, because skilled labor is less prone to unemployment than 
unskilled labor.10  Thus, if anything, it is likely that there is a bias towards finding higher 
responsiveness among less educated and other high poverty groups.11 
 The final model employed in this paper allows me to separate the effects of LMCs 
                                                            
10 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, high school dropouts in 2013 had an unemployment rate of 
11.0%, high school graduates had 7.5% unemployment, individuals with an associate’s degree had 5.4% 
unemployment, individuals with a bachelor’s degree had 4.0% unemployment, individuals with a master’s 
degree had 3.4% unemployment, and individuals with a professional degree or doctoral degree had 2.3% 
unemployment. 
11 A concern unique to the measure of UI claims is that states with generous unemployment insurance 
might also have more generous welfare systems.  Could an apparent diminished responsiveness among  
high poverty groups arise because increases in UI claims coincide with increases in welfare generosity that 
are in actuality what prevent high-poverty groups from out-migrating?  Although I cannot rule out this 
effect entirely, I think it is unlikely that this is driving my results.  The most obvious reason is that the 
results that follow are largely consistent across the three measures of LMCs, and such a concern does not 
apply to the unemployment rate and employment growth rate.  Second, since the UI claims rate measures 
the rate of initial claimants, many common changes to UI rules, such as extending UI benefits for 
additional weeks, would not effect this measure.  Finally, any persistent difference in UI rules such as 
higher replacement rates would be captured by the state dummies. 
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in the destination state from the effects of LMCs of other surrounding states.  The model 
closely corresponds to (2.6) but instead of predicting whether any interstate move will 
occur, it predicts whether a household will move into a specific state, 𝑑. 
 𝑀𝑖,𝑑,𝑡
∗ = 𝒁𝜷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑜 
+𝑡 + 𝑡2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡    
(2.8) 
The dependent variable, 𝑀𝑖,𝑑,𝑡
∗ , describes households’ propensity to move to state 𝑑.  
Because of the small number of migrants to most states observed in the CPS, I limit the 
number of potential destination states being considered to the 12 most common 
destinations in my sample.  Each of these 12 regressions model migration into one 
particular state.  The only difference in independent variables between (2.6) and (2.8) is 
the inclusion of 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 in (2.8).
12  This variable captures the effect of a state’s LMCs on 
the propensity of households to migrate to that state.  Thus, in this model, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 
describe, respectively, the push effect of origin LMCs and the pull effect of destination 
LMCs, while 𝛽3 describes the effect of other states’ LMCs on migration to 𝑑.  Note that 
households from state 𝑑 and households from states with fewer than 20 observed 
migrants to 𝑑 over the period 1982-2012 are omitted from the regression modeling 
migration into state 𝑑.13  This implies non-random sampling of households in each state’s 
regression, with heavier sampling from nearby states and more populous states.  As a 
result, the coefficients may be biased estimates of the population parameters.  The 
direction of any potential bias is not obvious.  Nonetheless, the relative sizes of 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 
and the regressions’ sensitivity to the inclusion of 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 will be instructive 
                                                            
12 Note also that by design (2.8) controls for trends in flows to particular states whereas (2.6) only captures 
migration trends within the nation as a whole. 
13 The migration regressions to each state 𝑑 include households from an average of 8.1 other states.  All 
others must be omitted due to an insufficient number of observed moves to state 𝑑.  
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in determining: 1) the relative extent to which the labor markets in 𝑑 and −𝑜 affect the 
migration decision and 2) whether 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 acts as an adequate proxy for 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 in (2.6) 
and (2.7).   
 In addition to reporting results from regressions for each destination state, I also 
report results of a logistic regression in which each of these destination state-specific 
regressions are pooled together into one regression. 
 𝑀𝑖,𝑑,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝜎𝑜 + 𝜎𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑡
2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡    
(2.9) 
The unit of observation in this pooled regression is not the household, but the household-
potential destination state interaction.14  This pooled regression includes each distinct 
household—whether they moved or not—as up to 12 different observations (once for 
each potential destination state).  An observation takes the value of one if the household 
moved to 𝑑, a value of zero otherwise, but 𝑑 takes each of 12 values for different 
observations.  Two additional controls are necessary in (2.9) to control for heterogeneity 
in moving costs between states: a dummy for the potential destination state being 
considered and the log of the distance between the household’s origin state and the 
potential destination state.  These controls would be superfluous in (2.8) where a single 
potential destination is considered in each regression.  Since the potential destination 
state is designated a priori for each observation (independent of the household’s eventual 
migration decision) a clear distinction is made between the labor markets of the origin 
                                                            
14 Since each household can only move to a maximum of one state, each household-potential destination 
state observation is not independent of all other observations.  Ideally this would be remedied by clustering 
standard errors by household, but it is not feasible to run regressions with more than a million clusters.  
Instead I continue to cluster standard errors by origin state.  Because all variables based on this regression 
are either highly statistically significant or not remotely significant (see Table 2.7), qualitative results likely 
would not be affected by the violation of independent observations. 
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state, the potential destination state, and “other” surrounding states.  In contrast, since 
over 98% of the sample lives in the same state at the end of the period as they did at the 
beginning, if 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 was added to (2.6), origin and destination LMCs would be identical 
for most observations, thereby creating collinearity problems.  By allowing for the 
inclusion of both 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡, (2.9) provides a test of whether only origin and 
destination states’ LMCs affect household interstate migration propensity, or whether 
LMCs in other surrounding states have some additional effect on households’ migration 
decisions.  Knowing whether “other” states affect migration flows may offer insights into 
the mechanism through which labor markets influence migration and can inform future 
modeling of the effects of LMCs on migration.   
 
2.4 Data 
All household level data comes from the 1982-2012 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement of the Current Population Survey (the March CPS).  Household data are 
restricted to heads between the ages of 18 and 65.15  Each state’s UI claims rate is defined 
as the ratio of the number of initial claimants in a year to the sum of public employment 
and covered private employment.  Initial claimants and covered private employment data 
are available from the Department of Labor in the Unemployment Insurance Financial 
Data Handbook.  State unemployment rates, employment growth rates, and (civilian non-
institutionalized) population growth rates are reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
By measuring how many people are claiming unemployment for the first time in a 
period, initial UI claims rates may measure current conditions for potential migrant job 
                                                            
15 Furthermore I drop observations where the origin or destination state is imputed to a household. 
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seekers better than unemployment rates, which measure the stock of unemployed workers 
rather than the flow into or out of unemployment at a point in time.  Employment growth, 
similarly captures the flow into and out of employment.  However, unlike employment 
growth and unemployment rates, UI claims rates have the added advantage that they are 
based on the state in which a job was lost.  Thus, the initial UI claims rate is unaffected 
by whether someone who loses their job subsequently migrates (making it less 
susceptible to endogeneity concerns).  For these reasons, the preferred specifications in 
this paper will utilize the initial UI claims rates as the measure of LMCs, though I also 
explore how migration is affected by unemployment rates and employment growth.16 
The March CPS asks households about any changes in residence between March 
of year 𝑡 − 1 and March of year 𝑡, so it is difficult to pinpoint the exact timing of the 
LMCs that were most relevant to the move, though it seems sensible to allow for some 
lag between a change in LMCs and a resulting move.  Monthly and quarterly state UI 
claims data are not available, so I predict migration in the March CPS as a function of the 
average of the UI claims rate in year 𝑡 − 1 and year 𝑡 − 2.17  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports monthly estimates of state unemployment rates and employment levels.  
To predict moves between March of 𝑡 − 1 and March of 𝑡, I use estimates of employment 
growth between March of 𝑡 − 2 and March of 𝑡 − 1.  I use a somewhat later measure of 
unemployment—March of 𝑡 − 1—since the current share of unemployed workers is the 
result of several lags of accessions and separations.   
                                                            
16 Some states may have persistently high unemployment rates and high unemployment insurance claims 
rates.  The risk of unemployment in such states may be balanced by other considerations such as high 
wages or state amenities.  Therefore outmigration from a state would not necessarily be associated with 
high unemployment, but with increases in unemployment.  However, it is not necessary to model LMCs 
using changes in the unemployment rate or the UI claims rate because persistent differences in the level of 
unemployment across states will be captured by the state dummies.  
17 Results were insensitive to variations in the weighting of UI claims in 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2. 
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When constructing 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 , state weights were determined based on 2000 Census 
data on state populations and distances between state centers of population (e.g. to 
determine the states within a 1000 mile radius of the household’s origin).  Distances 
between states are based on estimates of the latitudes and longitudes of each state’s 
population center in the 2000 Census’s State Centers of Population dataset.   
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of household characteristics, disaggregated 
by migrant status (non-migrant, intrastate-intercounty migrant and interstate migrant).  
This table reveals several well-known statistical differences between migrants and non-
migrants.  Compared to non-migrants, interstate migrants between 1982 and 2012 were 
on average 7.5 years younger, 80% more likely to be unemployed and 44% more likely to 
have a college degree.  Migrants were also more likely to be white, unmarried and to 
have no children present.  As expected, interstate migrants’ destination states had better 
LMCs (whether measured with UI claims rate, unemployment rate, or employment 
growth) than their origin states.18   
 Figure 2.1 describes the proportion of household heads aged 18-65 migrating 
across various distances and jurisdiction lines and how these migration rates have 
changed over time.  Notice the large drop in all definitions of household mobility in the 
last 30 years.  Short and long distance migration experienced comparable steady declines, 
with every category of moves falling by more than 50% over the period 1982-2012.  
Figure 2.1 also shows that most moves cover relatively short distances.  Between 1982 
and 2012, roughly one third of all moves crossed county lines.  The figure then shows 
                                                            
18 Note that initial UI claims rates and interstate migration rates both trended down since 1982, so there are 
relatively more interstate migrants in the early part of the period 1982-2012, which also tended to have high 
UI claims.  This has the effect of inflating the average UI claims rates of interstate migrants relative to non-
migrants. 
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that of those crossing county lines each year, fewer than half crossed state borders.  
While about half of all of the  
48×47
2
 pairs of state population centers (excluding Alaska 
and Hawaii) are more than 1,000 miles apart, only about a quarter of interstate moves in 
a typical year are between states separated by more than 1,000 miles, suggesting 
interstate migrants tend to migrate to nearby states.  In sum, fewer than 4% of all moves 
cover more than 1,000 miles. 
Table 2.2 shows that among 18-65 year old household heads in the March CPS, 
intrastate-intercounty migrants were about equally likely to cite housing factors and job-
related factors as the reason for moves between 1998 and 201219; interstate migrants were 
most likely to cite job-related factors.  Housing factors are cited as the primary reason for 
moving among 32.9% of household heads moving to a different county in the same state, 
among 16.7% of heads migrating to a bordering state, and among 6.1% of heads 
migrating to non-border states.  Job-related factors are cited as the primary reason for 
moving among 31.8% of household heads moving to a different county in the same state, 
among half of heads migrating to a bordering state, and among 57.7% of heads migrating 
to non-border states.  Family and “other” reasons together account for roughly one-third 
of each type of move.  The large share of interstate migrants moving for a new job, a 
transfer or to look for work reveals why differences in state LMCs have the potential to 
substantially affect interstate migration. 
Indeed, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show preliminary evidence that interstate migrants, on 
average, are more likely to move from states with poor LMCs towards states with better 
LMCs.  Figure 2.2 plots a time series of the U.S. UI claims rate over the period 1982-
                                                            
19 Respondents were not asked to report why they moved prior to 1998. 
 
 
25 
 
2012 (plotted against a time series of the interstate migration rate).  Figure 2.3 shows 
(again for 1982-2012) the UI claims rate in interstate migrants’ origin state, destination 
state, and surrounding states, minus the U.S. UI claims rate in the same year.  The graph 
shows that the average migrant’s destination UI claims rate is lower than their origin UI 
claims rate, and their destination UI claims rate is lower on average (by 0.31 percentage 
points) than the national UI claims rate.  This provides preliminary evidence, then, of 
movement toward states with strong LMCs.  However the graph also shows that interstate 
migrants are somewhat more likely to move from states with low unemployment, as 
origin UI claims rates are on average 0.12 percentage points below the national rate.  This 
is the type of asymmetric response to origin and destination LMCs that early research 
struggled to explain, but—consistent with the explanation of Lansing and Mueller (1967) 
described in section 2.2—this asymmetry is much smaller in the regressions of Section 
2.5 which include household controls and state dummies.  
Though job-related factors are important in migration and though there appears to 
be a tendency for migrants to move to states with lower UI claims, many migrants move 
“against the grain” either because of heterogeneity in demand for different types of labor 
(by education, industry, occupation, or unobservable worker qualities) or because they 
are moving for housing or family reasons.  To examine the state-level relationship 
between UI claims and migration rates, I plot state population growth against state UI 
claims rates (based on annual Census estimates) in Figure 2.4, where population growth 
acts as a proxy for net migration.20  Panels A, B and C show graphs for the periods 1982-
1992, 1993-2002, and 2003-2012, respectively.  For each of these periods, the years 
                                                            
20 Birth rates and death rates do not vary considerably across states, so differences in immigration will 
account for most of the difference between population change and net internal migration. 
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selected include one business cycle trough, one business cycle peak, and the midpoint 
between a trough and a peak. 21  In each graph displayed, at least a weak negative 
correlation exists between state UI claims and population growth, though an especially 
weak relationship exists in the early 2000s.  The graphs displayed are fairly 
representative of the period.  Figure 2.5 graphs the correlation between state UI claims 
rates and population growth for every year between 1982 and 2012, showing an average 
correlation of -0.23, with stronger negative relationships in the earliest years shown 
(1982-1988) and in the most recent years (2006-2012).  
Figure 2.4 also reveals regional trends in population growth that appear to be 
independent of LMCs.  Mountain West States like Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and 
Idaho, for example, exhibit consistently more rapid population growth than their UI 
claims rate would suggest (except in 2009-2010).  Conversely, Central Plains States like 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Kansas, and Iowa have persistently low population growth, 
regardless of UI claims rate.  Amenity differences, differences in state unemployment 
insurance rules, or persistent differences in real wages may contribute to these 
differences.  A priori, it is unclear whether these effects strengthen or weaken the 
negative correlation between state UI claims rate and population growth.  Therefore, 
Figure 2.6 aims to filter out relatively permanent differences in states’ ability to attract 
migrants.  Each state’s UI claims rate (for each year) is normalized relative to that state’s 
average over the 1982-2012 period; likewise each state’s population growth is 
normalized relative to that state’s average over the 1982-2012 period.  These standard 
normally distributed variables are then plotted against each other in Figure 2.6.  
                                                            
21 Identification of troughs and peaks are based on the latest announcement from the NBER’s Business 
Cycle Dating Committee (9/20/2010).  Note that the years 1990-1991 actually include both a trough and a 
peak. 
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Comparing the graphs of Figure 2.6 to those in Figure 2.4 shows that the negative 
correlation between the normalized UI claims rate and normalized population growth is 
stronger than the negative correlation between their un-normalized counterparts.  The 
correlation between normalized UI claims rate and normalized population growth 
between 1982 and 2012 is graphed in Figure 2.7.  The average correlation over the period 
is -0.42 (compared to 0.23 when the measures are not normalized).  These descriptive 
exercises support the notion that LMCs substantially affect interstate migration, 
particularly year to year variation in the propensity to migrate.  In the following section 
this is tested more rigorously. 
 
2.5 Results 
 Subsection 2.5.1 presents results based on the model in (2.6), estimating 
households’ propensity to migrate interstate as a function of origin LMCs, surrounding 
LMCs and household head characteristics.  Interstate migration occurs when a household 
head reports living in a different state 12 months prior.22  I examine the robustness of the 
results to alternative time controls (a quadratic in year, a cubic in year, and year 
dummies) and I defend the choice of spatial controls (LMCs of states within a 1,000 mile 
radius) in the preferred specification.  Section 2.5.2 describes results from (2.7) where 
LMCs are interacted with household head characteristics to determine the relative 
responsiveness of various groups’ migration to changes in LMCs and to determine how 
responsiveness has changed over time.  Section 2.5.3 describes the findings from 
                                                            
22 Ideally migration would be defined as a move to a different labor market, perhaps best described by 
MSAs or similar metropolitan boundaries.  Data limitations in the CPS preclude this.  Interstate moves tend 
to understate the number of moves across labor markets while intercounty moves would overstate the 
number of moves across labor markets (Molloy, et al., 2011). 
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regressions based on (2.8) and (2.9), which model household migration separately into 
each of 12 states popular destination states.  Based on the results of these 12 distinct 
regressions, I describe the effect of origin and destination conditions on households’ 
propensity to move to these states (2.8).  Then, I examine the effect of “other” (non-
origin, non-destination) LMCs using the pooled regression (across all 12 potential 
destination states) described by (2.9).   
 
2.5.1 Effect of Origin and Surrounding Labor Market Conditions 
 Table 2.3 displays the key results of the logistic regression based on (2.6), 
modeling the propensity to migrate interstate as a function of origin LMCs and the 
population weighted average of LMCs in states within 1000 miles of the origin.  Panel A 
shows results using state UI claims rates as the measure of LMCs, Panel B shows results 
using state unemployment rates and Panel C shows results using employment growth 
rates.  The highlighted column in the top panel represents the preferred specification 
where the time control is a cubic in year, the other columns control for time using a 
quadratic in year and using year dummies.  Because I employ a logistic model, regression 
coefficients have little intuitive meaning.  Therefore Table 2.3 and all subsequent tables 
report the semi-elasticity of household migration with respect to the explanatory variables 
(evaluated at median or modal values). 23  Below these elasticities I report standard errors.  
(Appendix Table A.1 presents full results of the regressions described in Table 2.3, 
including the effects of household characteristics, state and year on household migration 
propensity.)  Panel A of Table 2.3 shows that origin and surrounding states’ UI claims 
                                                            
23 The median/modal characteristics at which elasticities were evaluated are: employed, some college, 
unmarried, no children, 42 years old, male, white, metropolitan, resident of California in the year 2000. 
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rates each affect households’ propensity to migrate out of a state in the expected 
direction.  The preferred specification implies that for the median household, a one 
percentage point increase in the origin UI claims rate increases household migration 
propensity by 3.2 percent, ceteris paribus, while a one percentage point increase in 
surrounding states’ UI claims rates reduces households’ migration by 5.2 percent, ceteris 
paribus.  Estimates are comparable using the quadratic time controls, but the coefficient 
on 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 is substantially closer to zero and statistically insignificant when time 
dummies are used.  Including time dummies has a similar effect on the coefficient on 
𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 when measuring LMCs with the unemployment rate or employment growth rate.  
This seems to be because the year dummies capture the bulk of the between-year 
variation in national LMCs, which is highly correlated with the LMCs of one’s 
neighbors.  This problem grows less stark as 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 controls for a progressively smaller 
radius, as more within-year variation exists in 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡, thus limiting the extent to which 
the coefficients on the time dummies are confounded with the coefficients in 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡.  
(However, as I will show, narrower spatial definitions of relevant labor markets seem to 
miss some of the changes in surrounding LMCs that are relevant to potential migrants.)  
As reported in Appendix Table A.1, controls for household head characteristics generally 
take the expected sign (consistent with previous research) and are generally highly 
significant.  Higher interstate migration is associated with being male, educated, non-
black, non-Hispanic, young, unmarried, and childless. 
Note that in each of the panels of Table 2.3, column 2 implies that simultaneously 
increasing unemployment in a household’s origin state and in all surrounding states by 
one percentage point would have an insignificant effect on interstate migration.  That is, 
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since the sum 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is not significantly different from zero, I cannot reject the 
hypothesis that interstate migration would be unaffected by a uniform national increase in 
UI claims.  Although statistically insignificant, for each of the three panels the direction 
and size of the sum of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 does imply that there may be an economically 
meaningful increase in household migration when national LMCs improve.  In each case, 
a one percentage point decrease (increase) in unemployment (employment) is estimated 
to increase household migration propensity by about 2 percent.  Moreover, consistent 
with Saks and Wozniak (2011), if the sample is limited to sufficiently young household 
heads (ages 18-35) the resulting coefficients do suggest that interstate migration is 
procyclical with respect to national LMCs. 
Though in Table 2.3 I control only for the UI claims rate of the origin state and 
states within 1,000 miles, this particular classification of “relevant” labor markets is 
arbitrary.  Table 2.4 explores a few alternate specifications which control for different 
ranges of surrounding LMCs (see Table A.2 for full results.)  Otherwise these regressions 
are identical to column 2 of Panel C (the preferred specification).  Column 1 of each 
panel displays results of a regression including the UI claims rate at the origin (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡), 
the population-weighted average of the UI claims rate of states within some range of the 
origin (continue to refer to this as 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡), and the population-weighted average of the 
UI claims rate of states outside of that range (𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡 for short).  Column 2 of each panel 
excludes 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡.  Each panel classifies near states and distant states using a different 
range.  Panel A classifies surrounding states as those that share a border with the origin 
state, Panel B classifies surrounding states according to whether their center of 
population was (as of 2000) within 500 miles of the origin state’s center of population, 
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Panel C classifies states—as in Table 2.3—using a 1,000 mile radius, and Panel D 
controls only for the origin and national UI claims rate.  Note that in column 1 of Panels 
A and B, the coefficient on 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡 is substantially larger than the coefficient on 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡.  
Two things may explain this.  First, note from Figure 2.1 that moves to bordering states 
and moves to states within 500 miles comprise fewer than half of all interstate moves.  
Moreover, because relatively few pairs of states border one another or lie within 500 
miles of one another, the average UI claims rate in these groups is measured with more 
error than the average UI claims rate outside those ranges.  Therefore, in these 
specifications 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 may actually do a worse job than 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡 of approximating the 
typical LMCs in migrants’ potential destinations.   In contrast, Panel C shows that the 
effect of UI claims rates of states within 1000 miles dominates the effect of the more 
distant states’ UI claims rates.  It is also problematic for the specifications in Panel A that 
the coefficient on 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 is somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of the more distant 
states’ UI claims rates.  Results are much less sensitive in the preferred specification.  
When including 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡 in the model using the 1,000 mile designation (Panel C), the table 
implies that a percentage point increase in all UI claims rates decreases household 
migration propensity by 5.7%.  When excluding 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡, the same panel implies that a 
percentage point increase in all UI claims decreases household migration propensity by 
5.2%.  Note, though, that the inclusion of 𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑜,𝑡 does increase the collinearity in the 
model, as evidenced by the higher standard errors on 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡.
24  While this exercise 
lends support to the notion that the LMCs of the origin and states within 1000 miles of 
the origin largely capture the relevant factors in household migration, there is nothing 
                                                            
24 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 is less susceptible to collinearity than 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 because the former is not averaged across many 
states, therefore it exhibits much more variation within year. 
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magical about this particular radius, as findings were quite similar in unreported results 
when ranges of 800, 1,200, or 1,500 miles were used instead.  Indeed, in subsection 2.5.3 
I present suggestive evidence that only the origin and destination states’ LMCs matter in 
the migration decision.  Thus, 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 “works” in this model only by approximating the 
UI claims rate of migrants’ actual destinations (which are concentrated in nearby states).  
 
2.5.2 Effect of Demographics and Year on Elasticity of Migration 
 Given that household migration changes with origin and surrounding LMCs, it is 
of considerable interest whether the size of the response varies over time or varies with 
household characteristics.  Based on (2.7), I explore this with a series of regressions 
which model household migration as a function of LMC differentials (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 −
𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡), household characteristics, a cubic in year, state of origin, interactions of LMC 
differentials with household characteristics, and interactions of LMC differentials with 
the year cubic.  Coefficients on characteristic interactions with (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 
suggest differences across groups in the relative importance of LMCs in the migration 
decision.  Full results of this regression are reported in Appendix Table A.3.  The effects 
of demographics and year on responsiveness to LMCs are more succinctly summarized in 
Table 2.5.  For each of the characteristics listed (including year), I report the effect (at the 
median) of possessing that characteristic (or increasing it by one unit) on the semi-
elasticity of migration with respect to LMCs.  That is, I report estimates of 𝛽4 (and 𝛽5) in 
(2.7).  Column 1 displays results using UI claims rates as the measure of LMCs, column 
2 uses unemployment rates and column 3 uses employment growth.  A positive 
(negative) value in column 1 and column 2 (column 3) indicates that characteristic is 
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associated with a large, “correctly-signed” response to UI claims differentials (that is 
households with this characteristic are especially likely to migrate interstate when origin 
unemployment is high and surrounding unemployment is low.)  A negative (positive) 
value in column 1 and column 2 (column 3) indicates that characteristic is associated with 
an attenuated or perverse response to UI claims differentials.  I use the term “LMC-
driven migration” to refer to high responsiveness to these differentials.25   Results in each 
of the columns are generally qualitatively consistent with one another, and suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, households whose heads are employed, educated, childless, metropolitan, 
black, and young exhibit more LMC-driven migration than other households.  Results in 
each column also imply that LMC-driven migration declined in the early part of the 
period 1982-2012 before rebounding in later years. 
Groups with the most LMC-driven migration tend to be those with higher 
potential benefits to job-related migration and those with lower social costs to migration.  
It is certainly unsurprising that LMCs apparently drive the migration of employed 
household heads more than labor force nonparticipants, since the latter can only 
indirectly benefit from living in a state with a strong labor market.  It is more surprising 
that ceteris paribus, employed household heads would exhibit more LMC-driven 
migration than unemployed household heads.  However, note that employment status is 
measured after the potential move would have occurred.  The positive effect of 
employment (relative to unemployment) on responsiveness could be spurious, since 
employment is based on the week before the survey, after any potential moves could take 
                                                            
25 Implicit in this terminology is the idea that if interstate migration does not respond to differentials in 
LMCs, then the decision to move must be driven by other factors (amenities, family and social networks, 
etc). 
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place.26  Perhaps the larger responsiveness of employed relative to unemployed reflect 
that by moving to a state with stronger LMCs, people are more likely to find employment 
and less likely to become or remain unemployed.  A stronger case can be made that the 
labor force participation of the household head is unlikely to change based on whether or 
where the household chooses to migrate (at least in the short run).  Note that if the 
household heads are defined only by whether they are labor force participants, the 
interaction of labor force participation with LMC differentials implies that labor force 
participants are more responsive to LMCs than nonparticipants.   
Higher LMC-driven migration among more educated household heads may stem 
from higher labor force attachment or from less reliance on nearby family and social 
networks for support (financial assistance, child care, etc.).  Also, educated workers may 
have skills that are demanded by industries concentrated in particular parts of the country, 
leading to more variability in their earnings potential in various cities.  Seeking the right 
job in the right location may be especially important for educated workers in order to 
maximize their present earnings and their earnings trajectory.  Thus, the potential benefits 
of LMC-driven migration are higher for educated workers.  Households with children 
present, on the other hand, may face higher costs of LMC-driven migration if moving 
involves leaving the area of a child’s (divorced or unmarried) parent, grandparent or other 
close family members.  More generally, parents with children may be less willing to 
accept employment in another state because of the disruptive effect of moving on their 
children’s lives and education; the timing and destination of any move for these families 
will be dictated more by the children’s needs and less by area LMCs at a specific time.   
                                                            
26 Alternatively I could have used responses to whether an individual worked at any time in the last year, 
but that too would be influenced by current employment. 
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Residents of nonmetropolitan areas may exhibit an attenuated response to LMCs 
for several reasons.  With fewer high-paying jobs available in rural areas, the choice to 
live in such a locale may demonstrate a high valuation on amenities or proximity to 
family and other social networks.  It is also possible that the apparent attenuated response 
for nonmetropolitan households arises because state LMCs do not capture the LMCs of 
rural areas as precisely as the LMCs of the metropolitan areas.  A typical state may have 
two or three metropolitan areas which comprise the vast majority of the population.  
States’ UI claims rates, unemployment rates, and employment growth rates are largely 
determined in these metropolitan areas.  Moreover there is probably a stronger correlation 
between LMCs of distinct metropolitan areas in the same state than between a 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area in the same state because nonmetropolitan labor 
markets are less diverse and more susceptible to shocks to specific industries (e.g. 
agriculture, coal, forestry, etc.)  
It is not immediately obvious why the migration of blacks should be more 
responsive to LMCs.  One possibility is that employers with a “taste for discrimination” 
face higher costs if they pass over a qualified black candidate when local labor markets 
are tight than when local labor markets are slack (see Becker, 1971 for a discussion of the 
economics of discrimination.)  In this case, blacks would have especially high returns to 
LMC-driven migration.  Blacks are, however, 40% less likely than non-blacks to migrate 
interstate, ceteris paribus, so the difference between black and non-black migration is 
that blacks are less likely to migrate for non-labor reasons (not that they are more prone 
to migrate due to labor considerations.)  
In each of the columns of Table 2.5, the interactions with the age cubic suggest 
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that LMC-driven migration falls throughout early adulthood.  Panels A, B and C of 
Figure 2.8 plot the implied semi-elasticity of household migration with respect to each of 
the three measures of LMC differentials for household heads aged 18-65.27  All three 
graphs show high responsiveness for the youngest adults that declines into the 30s or 40s.  
The three measures of LMCs paint somewhat different pictures, though, for midlife and 
beyond.  Panel A of Figure 2.8 (UI claims) depicts an increase in responsiveness leading 
up to the retirement years, while the other graphs show more modest changes in 
responsiveness after age 30.28  Even 50 years ago economists realized that LMC-driven 
migration represents an investment in human capital (Sjaastad 1962).  Just as young 
adults invest more in education, they should also be more willing to incur moving costs in 
order to move to a better job, because they have a longer window to reap the returns on 
that investment.  Young adults may also have fewer familial obligations that keep them 
tied to a place, such as an aging parent or a child living with another parent.  
Panels A, B, and C of Figure 2.9 plot time-series of the implied semi elasticity of 
household migration with respect to LMC differentials based on the interactions with the 
cubic in time.  These graphs closely correspond with one another.  Each graph shows that 
differentials in LMCs played a large role in determining migration at the start of the 
period (1982), LMCs decreased in relative importance until the mid-late 1990s, and then 
increased through 2012.  Unlike Partridge et al. (2012) who showed that county 
population growth (a reasonable proxy for net migration) grew less responsive to local 
labor demand shocks between the 1990s and the 2000-2007 period, these graphs show 
                                                            
27 Semi-elasticities are evaluated at the median or mode of household characteristics and LMCs. 
28 One explanation for why the graphs do not show declines in responsiveness to LMCs later in life is that 
the graphs depict semi-elasticities at different ages for individuals with median and modal characteristics.  
The modal employment status is employed, so these graphs represent the semi-elasticity of migration at 
different ages among employed household heads only (ignoring retirees). 
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that household migration was at least as responsive in the latter period.  There are 
important differences in how our essays define responsiveness to LMCs.  Besides 
differences in the unit of observation (county vs. household), Partridge et al. (2012) 
consider how labor demand shocks affect levels of population growth whereas this paper 
reports percent changes in household migration propensity.  Given that overall migration 
rates fell considerably since the 1990s, it is possible for LMCs to now have a smaller 
absolute effect on net population growth, while simultaneously playing a larger role in 
determining household migration, relative to other factors.  In fact simple tabulations in 
the CPS of the primary reason for interstate moves show a decline in job-related moves 
but a larger decline in moves for all other reasons.  Between 1998-2000 (the first three 
years the March CPS asked migrants their reason for moving) and 2010-2012, job-related 
interstate moves fell 38%, while all other types of moves fell 47%.29  So, apparently 
while the number of people engaging in LMC-driven migration declined since the 1990s, 
the number of people migrating for all other reasons declined even more.  
 
2.5.3 Effect of Other Labor Markets 
Table 2.6 shows results of the model described by (2.8), estimating households’ 
propensity to move to particular destination states.  Recall that households are excluded 
from a regression if they originate in a state with fewer than 20 observed migrants to the 
destination state being modeled.  Because each person has a very small likelihood of 
actually migrating to a specific destination state in any given year, the standard error for 
each individual state regression is large, particularly for less common destinations.  So 
although I ran separate regressions for each potential destination state, I present results 
                                                            
29 Author’s calculations based on household heads aged 18-65. 
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only for the 12 destination states with at least 500,000 (non-excluded) potential migrants.  
As I show below, 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 has an insignificant effect on migration when 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 is 
included in the pooled model, so for the sake of parsimony I report individual state results 
only for a preferred specification which includes just 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡.  Coefficients 
on 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 are reported in columns 1 and 3, respectively, alongside their 
standard errors in columns 2 and 4 respectively.  The coefficient on 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 is significant 
and positive at the 10% level in 3 of 12 regressions; it is never significant and negative 
(perversely signed).  The coefficient on 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 is significant and negative in 4 out of 12 
state regressions and it is never significant and positive.  Coincidentally, in spite of large 
standard errors for the models of migration to each individual state, the estimate of the 
semi-elasticity of household migration with respect to 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡, averaged across these 12 
states (0.031) is almost identical to the semi-elasticity reported in the preferred 
specification in Table 2.3 (0.032).  Likewise the average semi-elasticity with respect to 
𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 for these 12 states is also very close to the estimate of the semi-elasticity with 
respect to 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 in the baseline model (-0.050 and -0.052 respectively).   
If 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 are included together in (2.8) there is more imprecision in 
the individual destination state regressions due to multicollinearity.  To increase precision 
in determining whether “other” states’ LMCs (besides origin and destination) affect 
migration, Table 2.7 reports results from (2.9), pooling observations from each of the 12 
state regressions.  Before describing the estimates, it is important to reiterate that most 
possible state-to-state combinations are not represented in this regression because of data 
limitations (too few households were observed moving between the states.)  Therefore 
the elasticities reported in Table 2.7 must be viewed with caution, as they may not be 
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representative of the United States.  Still, the table suggests that models of interstate 
migration are far more sensitive to the inclusion of 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 than to the inclusion of 
𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 and they also suggest that 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 serves as an adequate proxy for 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡.  The 
first two columns of Table 2.7 show that a one percentage point increase in origin UI 
claims rate increases the likelihood of a move to other states by about five percent and a 
one percentage point increase in the UI claims rate in a potential destination decreases the 
likelihood of a move to that state by just over seven percent.  These elasticities are almost 
identical whether 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 is included in the model or not, providing evidence that origin 
and destination LMCs satisfactorily capture the conditions relevant to the migration 
decision.  Column 1 shows that when 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 is included in the model, 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 has an 
insignificant effect on households’ propensity to move to the destination, with an 
estimated elasticity very close to zero.  This finding is relevant to the literature examining 
the procyclicality of migration with respect to aggregate LMCs.  Note that if the only 
LMCs that affect interstate migration are those of the origin and the destination, interstate 
migration can only be procyclical if it responds more to changes in destination LMCs 
than to changes in origin LMCs.  Column 3 estimates the model controlling for 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 
and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡, while excluding 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡.
 30  When I drop 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 from the model (column 
3), 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 acts as a good proxy for 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡; almost the whole effect of 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡 is 
swallowed up in the coefficient on 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡.  The coefficient on 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 is only slightly 
affected by the omission of 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑,𝑡.  This suggests that when data or model limitations 
preclude controlling for destination LMCs (as in subsections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2), including a 
measure of surrounding LMCs should roughly capture the conditions relevant to the 
                                                            
30 The demographic controls in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are identical to those in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. 
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household’s decision.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 Labor markets drive much interstate migration as households move in an effort to 
improve their employment prospects.  This paper investigated which labor market 
conditions matter in the household migration decision, how important they are, to whom 
they are important, and how that importance has changed over time.  I find that origin and 
destination state labor market conditions significantly influence household migration, but 
that “other” states’ labor market conditions are insignificant in the migration decision.  
“Other” surrounding states’ labor market conditions can, however, act as a decent proxy 
for destination labor market conditions when the latter is omitted.  In the baseline model 
with the preferred specification, I estimate that a percentage point increase in the origin 
state unemployment insurance claims rate leads to a 3.2 percent increase in household 
propensity to migrate interstate.  I estimate that a percentage point increase in the 
unemployment insurance claims rate of surrounding states reduces interstate migration 
propensity by 5.2 percent.  Since I find that “other state” labor market conditions have a 
small, insignificant effect on migration, any procyclicality of interstate migration with 
respect to national business cycle—which I find marginal evidence to corroborate—must 
arise because the pull effect of improvements in potential destinations’ labor market 
conditions dominates the decreased push effect when households’ origin conditions 
improve.   
 The migration of household heads with several characteristics that suggest small 
potential benefits to migration (including less educated and labor force nonparticipants) 
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or high social costs to migration (including children present and nonmetropolitan) are 
especially unresponsive to differentials in labor market conditions.  Importantly, these 
include several characteristics associated with high poverty risk.  One consequence of 
this low responsiveness to labor market conditions among high poverty groups is that a 
state experiencing a prolonged economic decline could also undergo a sizeable increase 
in the proportion of household heads that are uneducated, that have children and whose 
heads have employment gaps.  The high rates of outmigration of low-poverty groups 
could reduce a state government’s ability to remain solvent by reducing the tax base due 
to: 1) low rates of population growth and 2) declines in per-capita income and wealth due 
to this demographic shift.  The inability or unwillingness of high-poverty groups to 
escape from states with inferior employment opportunities may also affect our 
understanding of place-based policies.  This chapter suggests that whatever mechanism 
causes individuals to migrate away from states with a labor surplus to states with a labor 
shortage has a smaller effect on several high poverty groups.  Since high poverty groups 
move infrequently in response to labor market conditions, place-based policies that 
stimulate depressed local economies probably have a limited effect on the migration of 
high poverty groups out of depressed areas, but may help depressed areas attract and 
retain households at low poverty risk.  The welfare effects of such a redistribution of 
labor are unclear. 
 The economics literature increasingly differentiates between education-specific 
labor demand shocks.  A fruitful extension of this chapter would allow for heterogeneity 
in shocks to labor demand by educational attainment and for heterogeneity in shocks 
based on other demographic characteristics.  Also, while this chapter examines the 
 
 
42 
 
determinants of migration’s responsiveness to general labor market conditions, current 
research does little to address what effect migration has on households.  There has been 
some research to date that shows that migration tends to improve migrants’ lifetime 
earnings (Kennan and Walker, 2010; Kennan and Walker, 2011) and has either zero 
effect or a negative effect on short-run employment after controlling for selection into 
migration (Pekkala and Tervo, 2002).  There is a clear need for future research that 
determines how migration affects other outcomes such as health, leisure, income 
volatility, consumption, fertility, and children’s educational attainment.  This will 
improve our understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of policies that affect 
migration, such as the tax-deductibility of moving expenses and place-based policies that 
benefit depressed areas. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1  Summary Statistics  
 
VARIABLES Non-Migrants 
Intrastate-Intercounty 
Migrants Interstate Migrants 
Employed 0.779 0.789 0.745 
Unemployed 0.044 0.067 0.079 
Not in Labor Force 0.177 0.144 0.176 
Female 0.390 0.384 0.372 
Less than High School 0.153 0.126 0.109 
High School 0.324 0.303 0.260 
Some College 0.255 0.283 0.245 
College Degree or Higher 0.268 0.288 0.386 
Hispanic 0.129 0.090 0.082 
Black 0.115 0.088 0.083 
Married  0.602 0.447 0.507 
Children Present 0.460 0.383 0.394 
Nonmetropolitan 0.212 0.241 0.220 
Age 42.8 34.2 35.3 
Origin UI Claims 7.53% 7.60% 7.59% 
Destination UI Claims  7.53% 7.60% 7.45% 
UI Claims (1-1000 miles) 7.62% 7.86% 7.85% 
Origin Employ. Growth 0.52% 0.67% 0.66% 
Destination Employ. Growth 0.52% 0.67% 0.78% 
Employment Growth (1-1000 miles) 0.52% 0.66% 0.67% 
Origin Unem. Rate 6.41% 6.47% 6.50% 
Destination Unem. Rate 6.41% 6.47% 6.26% 
Unem. Rate (1-1000 miles) 6.51% 6.62% 6.59% 
    
*Observations 1,301,316 35,174 28,577 
Among household heads aged 18-65 in 1982-2012 March CPS data, excluding 1985 and 1995.  Observations are dropped if 
state of origin is imputed.  CPS weights are applied.  Intrastate-Intercounty migrants refers to households that live in a 
different county within the same state than they did 12 months prior.   
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Reasons for Moves: Intrastate-Intercounty Migrants, Contiguous State 
Migrants, Non-Contiguous State Migrants 
 
Type of Move Intrastate-Intercounty Contiguous State Non-Contiguous State 
Work Related 31.8% 49.9% 57.7% 
    New Job/Transfer 17.2% 35.4% 44.1% 
    Look for Work 2.2% 4.9% 4.9% 
    Commute 9.4% 4.3% 1.1% 
    Retire 0.6% 1.3% 1.6% 
    Other (Job-Related) 2.6% 4.1% 6.0% 
Housing 32.9% 16.7% 6.1% 
Family 25.0% 21.7% 21.0% 
Other 10.0% 11.7% 15.2% 
Authors tabulations based on household heads aged 18-65 in 1998-2012 March CPS data.  CPS weights are applied.   
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Table 2.3  Logistic Regressions of  Household Propensity to Move Interstate 
Panel A 
VARIABLES 
Interstate 
Moves 
Interstate 
Moves 
Interstate 
Moves 
Origin UI Claims % 0.035* 0.032* 0.035* 
(SE) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
UI Claims % (1-1000 mi) -0.059* -0.052* -0.016 
(SE) (0.011) (0.010) (0.024) 
Time Control Quadratic Cubic Year Dummies 
Observations 1,365,067 1,365,067 1,365,067 
Panel B 
VARIABLES 
Interstate 
Moves 
Interstate 
Moves 
Interstate 
Moves 
Origin Unemployment Rate % 0.016* 0.015* 0.019* 
(SE) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unemployment Rate % (1-1000 mi) -0.018* -0.033* 0.061* 
(SE) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) 
Time Control Quadratic Cubic Year Dummies 
Observations 1,365,067 1,365,067 1,365,067 
Panel C 
VARIABLES 
Interstate 
Moves 
Interstate 
Moves 
Interstate 
Moves 
Origin Employment Growth % -0.033* -0.031* -0.034* 
(SE) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Employment Growth % (1-1000 mi) 0.072* 0.057* -0.007 
(SE) (0.014) (0.013) (0.047) 
Origin Population Growth % 0.007 0.008 0.009 
(SE) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Population Growth % (1-1000 mi) -0.064 -0.030 0.011 
(SE) (0.043) (0.035) (0.049) 
Time Control Quadratic Cubic Year Dummies 
Observations 1,365,067 1,365,067 1,365,067 
Results based on household heads aged 18-65 in 1982-2012 March CPS data, excluding 1985 and 1995.  Reported values 
indicate the estimated change in (log) household migration propensity associated with a percentage point change in the UI 
claims/unemployment/employment growth rate, when evaluated at median/modal characteristics and median LMCs.  
Observations are dropped if state of origin is imputed.  UI Claims (1-1000 mi) is constructed by taking the population-
weighted average of UI claims rates of states within 1,000 miles of the household’s origin. Unemployment Rate (1-1000 mi) is 
constructed by taking the population-weighted average of unemployment rates of states within 1,000 miles of the household’s 
origin.  Employment Growth (1-1000 mi) is constructed by taking the population-weighted average of unemployment rates of 
states within 1,000 miles of the household’s origin. Additional controls include: four indicators for education, a cubic in age, a 
quadratic in year, and indicators for employed, unemployed, female, black, Hispanic, marital status, presence of children, 
metropolitan status and state of origin.  Standard errors are clustered by origin state.  Full results in Appendix Table A.1. 
* Significant at 5% level
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Table 2.4  Logistic Regressions of Household Propensity to Move Interstate, Alternative 
Spatial Specifications 
Panel A 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Interstate Move 
(2) 
Interstate Move 
Origin UI Claims % 0.038* 0.032* 
(SE) (0.009) (0.008) 
UI Claims (Border) % -0.017 -0.037* 
(SE) (0.008) (0.007) 
UI Claims (Non-Border) % -0.044*  
(SE) (0.012)  
Panel B 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Interstate Move 
(2) 
Interstate Move 
Origin UI Claims % 0.033* 0.031* 
(SE) (0.009) (0.009) 
UI Claims (1-500 mi.) % -0.018 -0.039* 
(SE) (0.011) (0.009) 
UI Claims (500+ mi.) % -0.037*  
(SE) (0.012)  
Panel C 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Interstate Move 
(2) 
Interstate Move 
Origin UI Claims % 0.033* 0.032* 
(SE) (0.009) (0.009) 
UI Claims (1-1000 mi.) % -0.036* -0.052* 
(SE) (0.015) (0.010) 
UI Claims (1001+ mi.) % -0.021ᶧ  
(SE) (0.013)  
Panel D 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
Interstate Move 
 
(2) 
Interstate Move 
Origin UI Claims %  0.036* 
(SE)  (0.009) 
National UI Claims %  -0.058* 
(SE)  (0.011) 
Results based on household heads aged 18-65 in 1982-2012 March CPS data, excluding 1985 and 1995.  Reported values 
indicate the estimated change in (log) household migration propensity associated with a percentage point change in the UI 
claims/unemployment/employment growth rate, when evaluated at median characteristics and median LMCs.  Observations 
are dropped if state of origin is imputed.   LMC (Border) and LMC (Non-Border) are constructed by taking the population-
weighted average of all bordering/non-bordering states’ LMCs.  LMC (1-1000 mi.) and LMC (1-500 mi.) are constructed by 
taking the log of the population-weighted average of the LMCs of states within 1000 and 500 miles, respectively, of the 
household’s origin.  LMC(1001+ mi.) and (501+ mi.) are constructed by taking the population-weighted average of LMCs of 
all states over 1000 miles and 500 miles, respectively, from the household’s origin.  Additional controls include: four 
indicators for education, a cubic in age, a cubic in year, and indicators for employed, unemployed, female, black, Hispanic, 
marital status, presence of children, metropolitan status and state of origin.  In each panel the number of observations is 
1,365,067.  Standard errors are clustered by origin state.  Full results from the regressions in column (2) are available in 
Appendix Table A.2. 
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Table 2.5  Effect of Household Characteristics on Responsiveness of Household 
Migration to Labor Market Differentials 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Interaction with Diff. 
UI Claims 
(2) 
Interaction with Diff. 
Unemployment Rate 
(3) 
Interaction with Diff. 
Employment Growth 
Employed 0.039* 0.060* -0.071* 
(SE) (0.007) (0.013) (0.022) 
Unemployed -0.040* -0.045* 0.125* 
(SE) (0.010) (0.017) (0.027) 
Less than HS -0.008 0.026ᶧ -0.006 
(SE) (0.009) (0.014) (0.028) 
Some College 0.026* 0.035* -0.002 
(SE) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) 
4 Year Degree 0.032* 0.048* -0.008 
(SE) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021) 
Married 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 
(SE) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
Child Present -0.021* -0.005 0.030* 
(SE) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) 
Age 0.005* -0.019ᶧ 0.043* 
(SE) (0.001) (0.011) (0.015) 
Age Squared × 100 -0.019* 0.048ᶧ -0.099* 
(SE) (0.005) (0.027) (0.037) 
Age Cubed × 10,000 -0.020* -0.037ᶧ 0.072* 
(SE) (0.005) (0.021) (0.030) 
Female -0.006 -0.004 0.041* 
(SE) (0.006) (0.011) (0.018) 
Hispanic 0.043* -0.020 -0.039 
(SE) (0.019) (0.020) (0.034) 
Black 0.045* 0.015 -0.092* 
(SE) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) 
Nonmetropolitan -0.068* -0.023 0.129* 
(SE) (0.017) (0.027) (0.032) 
Time -0.005 -0.011ᶧ 0.008 
(SE) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Time Squared × 100 0.026 0.034 0.009 
(SE) (0.036) (0.049) (0.060) 
Time Cubed × 10,000 -0.029 0.002 -0.135 
(SE) (0.077) (0.109) (0.130) 
Results based on household heads aged 18-65 in 1982-2012 March CPS data, excluding 1985 and 1995.  Observations are 
dropped if state of origin is imputed.  LMC(1-1000 mi) is constructed by taking the population-weighted average of LMCs 
of states within 1,000 miles of the household’s origin.  Each regression included the following independent variables: 
Difference between Origin LMC and LMC(1-1000 mi), all of the household head characteristics and time variables listed 
above, interactions of the difference between LMCs with household head characteristics and with the cubic in year and 
indicators for origin state.  Reported values indicate the coefficients on these interaction terms.  Standard errors are 
clustered by origin state.  All regressions are evaluated at median/modal characteristics and median LMCs.  Full results 
are in Appendix Table A.3.   
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Table 2.6  Logistic Regressions of Household Propensity to Move to Specific States   
 
Dep. Variable:  
Propensity to Move 
to: 
(1) 
 
Indep Var: 
Ln Orig UI Claims 
(2) 
 
 
(SE) 
(3) 
 
Indep Var: 
Ln Dest UI Claims 
(4) 
 
 
(SE) 
California 0.017 (0.028) -0.023 (0.034) 
Colorado 0.039 (0.024) -0.121* (0.059) 
Florida 0.058* (0.023) -.0149* (0.038) 
Georgia  -0.029 (0.035) -0.069 (0.061) 
Illinois -0.065 (0.055) -0.009 (0.057) 
Massachusetts 0.055 (0.055) -0.047 (0.059) 
Nevada 0.100ᶧ (0.056) -0.074ᶧ (0.045) 
North Carolina 0.013 (0.027) -0.053 (0.036) 
Ohio 0.027 (0.046) 0.043 (0.071) 
Pennsylvania 0.061 (0.055) 0.006 (0.068) 
Texas 0.071* (0.025) -0.084* (0.041) 
Virginia 0.027 (0.037) -0.016 (0.099) 
Average 0.031  -0.050  
Results based on household heads aged 18-65 in 1982-2012 March CPS data, excluding 1985 and 1995.  Observations are 
dropped if state of origin is imputed.  Only households from states with at least 20 observed migrants to the destination state 
are considered in each regression.  Additional controls include: four indicators for education, a cubic in age, a cubic in year, 
and indicators for employed, unemployed, female, black, Hispanic, marital status, presence of children, metropolitan status 
and state of origin.  Standard errors are clustered by origin state. 
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Table 2.7  Logistic Regressions of Household Propensity to In-migrate, Pooled Across 
All Potential Destination States 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
State to State Move 
(2) 
State to State Move 
(3) 
State to State Move 
Origin UI Claims 0.052* 0.049* 0.045* 
(SE) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Destination UI Claims -0.073* -0.074*  
(SE) (0.006) (0.006)  
UI Claims (1-1000 mi) -0.009  -0.068* 
(SE) (0.015)  (0.013) 
    
Observations 5,648,008 5,648,008 5,648,008 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.065 0.065 0.064 
Regression pooled across all state regressions listed in Table 2.6.  Unit of observation is the household-potential destination 
state (equals 1 if the household moved to that state).  Results are based on household heads aged 18-65 in 1982-2012 March 
CPS data, excluding 1985 and 1995.  Observations are dropped if state of origin is imputed.  Only households from states with 
at least 20 observed migrants to the destination state are considered in each regression.  Additional controls include: four 
indicators for education, a cubic in age, a cubic in year, and indicators for employed, unemployed, female, black, Hispanic, 
marital status, presence of children, metropolitan status, state of origin, (potential) destination state, and log distance between 
origin and potential destination.  Standard errors are clustered by origin state. 
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1: Migration Rates by Year, 1982-2012 
 
Percentage of households reporting that 12 months ago they lived in a different jurisdiction (county, state, 
non-contiguous state, state more than 500 miles away, or state more than 1000 miles away), 1982-2012. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: U.S. Unemployment Insurance Claims & Interstate Migration Rates, 1982-
2012 
 
U.S. unemployment insurance claims rate and interstate migration rate—the percentage of household heads 
aged 18-65 reporting that 12 months ago they lived in a different jurisdiction, 1982-2012.  UI claims 
represents a two year average including the previous year. 
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Figure 2.3: Origin, Destination and Surrounding Unemployment Insurance Claims Rates 
Relative to U.S., Among Interstate Migrants 
 
Difference between various unemployment insurance claims rates and the U.S. unemployment insurance 
claims rate, among interstate migrants 1982-2012. 
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Figure 2.4: Yearly State UI Claims and Population Growth Scatterplots  
 
Panel A:  State UI Claims and Population Growth (1982-83, 1986-87, 1990-91) 
 
 
Panel B:  State UI Claims and Population Growth (1995-96, 2000-01, 2001-02) 
 
 
Panel C:  State UI Claims and Population Growth, (2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10) 
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Figure 2.5: Correlation between State UI Claims & Population Growth, 1982-2012 
 
Time series of a simple correlation between two-year average of state’s initial unemployment insurance 
claims rate and state’s population growth. 
 
  
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
 
 
52 
 
Figure 2.6: Yearly Normalized State UI Claims and Population Growth Scatterplots  
 
Panel A:  Normalized State UI Claims and Pop. Growth (1982-83, 1986-87, 1990-91) 
    
 
Panel B:  Normalized State UI Claims and Pop. Growth, (1995-96, 2000-01, 2001-02) 
 
 
Panel C:  Normalized State UI Claims and Pop. Growth, (2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10) 
 
State population growth and state UI claims are normalized using that state’s average and standard 
deviation values over the period 1982-2012. 
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Figure 2.7: Correlation between Normalized State UI Claims & Pop. Growth by Year 
 
Time series of a simple correlation between two-year average of state’s initial unemployment insurance 
claims rate and state’s population growth.  State population growth and state UI claims are normalized 
using that state’s average and standard deviation values over the period 1982-2012. 
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Figure 2.8: Responsiveness of Household Migration to Labor Market Differentials by 
Age 
Panel A: Responsiveness of Migration to UI Claims Differentials by Age 
Panel B: Responsiveness of Migration to Unemployment Rate Differentials by Age 
Panel C: Responsiveness of Migration to Employment Growth Differentials by Age 
Based on the interactions of the cubic in age with 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 in Appendix Table A.3.  Semi-
elasticities calculated for median/modal characteristics and median LMCs.  Gray bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals for the age cubic. 
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Figure 2.9: Responsiveness of Household Migration to Labor Market Differentials by 
Year 
 
Panel A: Responsiveness of Migration to UI Claims Differentials, 1982-2012 
 
Panel B: Responsiveness of Migration to Unemployment Rate Differentials, 1982-2012 
 
Panel C: Responsiveness of Migration to Employment Growth Differentials, 1982-2012 
 
Based on the interactions of the cubic in age with 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡 in Appendix Table A.3.  Semi-
elasticities calculated for median characteristics and median LMCs.  Gray bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals for the time cubic. 
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3 GIVE ME YOUR MOTIVATED, RICH, EDUCATED MASSES: BRAIN 
GAIN AND BRAIN DRAIN IN AMERICA  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 With steady population growth and rising educational attainment, both the 
number and the share of educated people are rising in almost all areas of the United 
States.  Artz (2003) points out that the share of residents with college degrees declined in 
only five U.S. counties over the period 1970-2000.  In contrast, skilled worker outflows 
in many developing and less developed countries severely limit their human capital 
development.  In 2000, 44 percent of all working-age (aged 25 and above) individuals 
with a tertiary education who were born in Melanesia had immigrated to an OECD 
nation, compared to just 2.5 percent of those with a secondary education or less 
(Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).  If policymakers in Melanesia, the Caribbean, 
Micronesia, Southeast Asia and much of Africa wish to develop human capital at home, 
they are fighting an uphill battle thanks to the brain drain.31  It is unsurprising, then, that 
the topic of brain gain and brain drain within the United States garners less widespread 
attention than international brain drain does in these nations.  Yet despite almost 
universal growth in human capital in the U.S., there are substantial differences among 
local areas in their ability to attract and retain human capital.  There are winners and 
losers from domestic migration and in some pockets of the U.S., business owners, 
community leaders and policymakers correctly perceive that they are on the wrong end of 
                                                            
31 Such countries on net may benefit from brain drain through remittances and the educational incentives 
that arise from higher international and domestic returns to human capital (Beine et al., 2008; Grubel and 
Scott, 1966).  (Brain drain’s negative effect on the domestic supply of high skill labor increases the returns 
to education.) 
 
 
57 
 
this exchange, lamenting the loss of the best and brightest from their cities and towns.32 33 
34  These cries may spread and grow louder in the future if declining global fertility and 
increasing global income parity limits the extent to which international flows can plug the 
areas of brain drain in the United States.  Slower national population growth inevitably 
means that more cities and towns will face population decline, and the inability to attract 
and retain young educated workers will presage many communities’ gradual demise.   
This chapter will paint a picture of brain gain and brain drain in America, 
describing flows of young high school graduates and young to middle-aged college 
graduates and determining the principal determinants of these flows.  I focus on the effect 
of initial economic conditions and urbanicity (metropolitan status and area density) on 
three measures: absolute gains in the high school-educated, relative gains in the high 
school-educated (compared to high school dropouts) and relative gains in the college-
educated (compared to non-college-educated).  In the previous chapter I showed that the 
migration of well-educated household heads responds more to short-run labor market 
conditions, suggesting a role for labor market conditions in area brain gain and brain 
drain if the response is not transitory.  In fact this chapter shows that the strength of initial 
labor market conditions leads to sizeable positive long-run effects (over a 16 to 20 year 
period) on an area’s stock and share of educated workers.  I also find that 
nonmetropolitan areas struggle to attract and retain educated residents.  Both central 
cities and suburban areas fare well in attracting educated workers, but they apparently 
                                                            
32 Rich Lord, “City Hall Hobbled by Brain Drain,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 5, 2007. 
http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2007/08/05/City-hall-hobbled-by-brain-drain/stories/200708050100 
33 Jennifer Hemmingsen, “Building Blocks for Reversing the Brain Drain,” The Gazette, May 30, 2010. 
http://thegazette.com/2010/05/30/building-blocks-for-reversing-the-brain-drain/ 
34 Tom Still, “Brain Gain is what Wisconsin Needs to Work on,” Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, 
March 22, 2014. http://www.jsonline.com/business/brain-gain-is-what-wisconsin-needs-to-work-on-
b99226633z1-251708091.html 
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appeal to workers at different points of the lifecycle.  Central cities are relatively 
attractive to young educated migrants while suburban areas are more attractive later in 
life. 
Most economists believe that a concentration of human capital in a place leads to 
positive externalities.  Businesses and individuals benefit from proximity to workers, 
from improved networking, and from the development and rapid exchange of ideas 
(Duranton and Puga, 2004).  Public coffers expand due to the affluence of a skilled labor 
force.  Families with children may benefit from lower crime rates (Lochner and Moretti, 
2004) better public schools, and positive peer effects due to the intergenerational 
transmission of education (Burke and Sass, 2013; Choy, 2001).  Perhaps for any of these 
reasons, Whisler et al. (2008) discovered that people are almost universally less likely to 
migrate out of areas with large and growing stocks of human capital.  Such migration 
behavior suggests that the external benefits of human capital are real.  Flows of educated 
workers matter to individuals in both the origin and destination, but perhaps especially to 
the areas negatively affected by brain drain.  For local, state or national policymakers to 
develop informed policy to deal with brain drain, they first must understand who is 
affected and why.  This chapter is one step towards answering these questions.   
 
3.2 Literature Review 
The migration behavior of educated workers is of policy interest in part because 
economists believe that human capital externalities exist.  If neighbors, coworkers, and 
employers of educated individuals benefit from their human capital, flows of human 
capital in and out of cities affect the residents of these cities.  Moretti (2004) provides a 
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thorough account of the state of economic theory and empirical evidence of human 
capital externalities.  Theories abound explaining why human capital spillovers exist.35  
Economists have suggested that a concentration of educated workers increases the 
productivity of other workers in an area by facilitating knowledge transfer (Lucas, 1988; 
Marshall, 1890; Moretti, 2004), by encouraging the development of physical capital and 
skill-intensive technology (Acemoglu, 1996; Acemoglu, 1998).  Others have credited 
increases in educational attainment with reducing criminal activity (Lochner and Moretti, 
2004), encouraging civic involvement (Milligan et al., 2004), and increasing support of 
free speech (Dee, 2004).  Although residents of local areas with high levels of human 
capital benefit from spillovers in aggregate, in some cases residents of an area might 
benefit from marginal outmigration of skilled labor because of reductions in congestion.  
Likewise flows of human capital could lead to net external benefits through improved 
labor market matches, differences across local areas in the complementarity of types of 
labor, or by improved Tiebout sorting.   
Whatever form human capital externalities take, which local attributes cause an 
area to attract or repel the human capital that confers these externalities?  There is little 
research directly addressing how area poverty or labor market conditions influence the 
long-term growth of an area’s more educated and less educated populations through 
migration (though economists have certainly observed that human capital is more 
concentrated in places with strong economic conditions).  Research identifying higher 
migration responsiveness to labor market conditions among more educated individuals 
                                                            
35 Some instead contend that education leads to negative externalities because education increases 
individuals’ wages primarily by signaling to employers that one is a productive worker (rather than causing 
large productivity gains).  Because less educated workers lack the positive signal, their labor market 
outcomes are worse in the presence of a highly educated workforce. 
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provides suggestive evidence that strong labor market conditions cause relative 
population gains among college-educated cohorts, but the aggregate effects on local labor 
markets is unknown.  The second chapter of this dissertation shows that the migration of 
more educated households is particularly responsive to current labor market conditions.  
Looking over a longer time horizon, Wozniak (2010) has similar findings.  Using Census 
microdata, she finds that a positive labor demand shock in a state at the time of labor 
market entry (approximated by the year when age is equal to years of education plus six) 
causes a particularly large increase in college-educated worker’s propensity to reside 
there.  While Wozniak convincingly demonstrates the high responsiveness of college-
graduates’ migration to distant labor market conditions over the medium term, there are 
several ways that data limitations and methodology cause the results to be poorly-suited 
for assessing the extent of local area brain gain and brain drain caused by economic 
conditions. 36  
Given the strong link between educational attainment and income, a positive 
relationship between initial human capital and growth of human capital would suggest 
that brain gain is more prevalent where LMCs are (initially) most favorable.  Waldorf 
(2009) observes that the share of a county’s initial population that is college-educated 
positively predicts the share of a county’s inmigrants that are college-educated.  Note, 
                                                            
36 First, the use of state of birth as a proxy for potential migrants’ initial residence causes moves between 
birth and labor market entry to be confounded with later moves.  Second, since only state-to-state moves 
can be identified, moves between labor markets within states are not captured and heterogeneity of labor 
market conditions within states is ignored.  Third, because labor market entry is based on the Mincer 
formula, any individuals that took time off between high school and college (and any individuals that took 
longer than four years to complete their degree) are assigned initial state labor market conditions that 
coincide with when they were still in college or before they started college.  This leads to some attenuation 
of the estimates of the responsiveness of college graduate’s migration to actual labor market conditions at 
the time of labor market entry.  Fourth, since the unit of observation is the individual, the results reveal 
causes of heterogeneity in the responsiveness of individuals to labor market conditions, but do not reveal 
how other state characteristics (besides initial labor market conditions) affect brain gain. 
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however, that this need not imply that migration leads to growing divergence in county 
educational attainment, since it is probably also true that outmigrants from more educated 
counties are more educated than outmigrants from less educated counties.  However, 
Berry and Glaeser (2005) show that, ceteris paribus, metropolitan areas with large 
proportions of college-educated workers also had higher growth rates of shares of 
college-educated workers in the 1980s and 1990s.37  This evidence of divergence in 
college attainment appears whether shares and growth rates are measured in levels or 
logarithms.  Moretti (2004) shows a similar divergence in city educational attainment in 
the 1990s.  These authors do not seek to explain the initial differences in college 
attainment, though, so it is unclear whether economically-motivated migration or other 
factors cause this divergence.  For that matter, it isn’t clear whether and to what extent 
migration caused this divergence, as a failure of less educated metropolitan areas to 
educate young residents would affect human capital growth just as a failure to attract 
more educated migrants would.   
Along a similar vein, some recent economic literature explores the link between 
where the college-educated received degrees and where they eventually live.  Using the 
NLS72 and the Mellen Foundation’s College and Beyond data, Groen (2004) finds only a 
weak link between where students attended college and where they live and work 15 
years later (controlling for where students applied to college).  Graduates tend to locate 
where income opportunities and amenities are maximized (Borjas 1992; Kennan and 
Walker 2011), which often differs from where they receive their education.  Bound et al. 
(2004) find that at the state level, the elasticity of the stock of BAs with respect to the 
                                                            
37 Note that any potential time-varying measurement error biases estimates towards finding convergence, 
not divergence. 
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number of BAs conferred is less than 0.3 and the number of people with MDs in a state 
has practically zero relationship with the number of MDs conferred.38   
If more affluent individuals tend to migrate toward more affluent areas, this 
would again be suggestive that brain gain would be more likely in areas with strong 
initial economic conditions.  Nord (1998) seeks to determine whether high poverty 
counties attract more impoverished migrants.  He explores this question using five-year 
county-to-county migration data in the 1990 decennial census.  He shows that there was 
net migration of the poor into high poverty counties and net migration of the “nonpoor” 
into low poverty counties.  There is, however, some concern that an individual’s 
migration influences their poverty status (Nord determined poverty based on income after 
any moves had already occurred.)  The differences in net migration of poor and nonpoor 
could therefore be explained if moving from rich counties to poor counties causes 
declines in individual income (perhaps as a tradeoff for better amenities or lower cost of 
living) while moving from poor counties to rich counties causes increases in individual 
income.  Thus the inmigration of initially poor individuals may not have been any higher 
in high poverty counties.  By estimating the effect of area poverty on growth of the 
college-educated, the present paper will similarly address the reinforcement or widening 
of demographic differences between high and low poverty areas, but because educational 
attainment is relatively fixed after a certain age, it is less susceptible to endogeneity. 
In addition to local economic conditions, I also consider the effect of urbanicity 
                                                            
38 The authors of this paper note that these results are consistent with the extent of state subsidization of 
recipients of these degrees.  That is, since recipients of bachelor’s degrees are apparently more likely to end 
up where they received that education, states find it worthwhile to subsidize their education to a large 
degree.  However since doctors operate in a national market, states gain little by subsidizing their education 
(hence states subsidize medical students less.)  If the same rationale is applied to primary and secondary 
educations, one would expect that counties that retain a large proportion of their high school graduates 
would have somewhat higher education expenditures, ceteris paribus.   
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on the migration of the educated.  Waldorf (2008) and others have shown that more 
educated people are more prevalent in metropolitan areas, particularly central cities, and 
that this urban-rural gap has been increasing over time.  Metropolitan wages are about 
one-third higher than nonmetropolitan wages, and about two-thirds of this pay gap cannot 
be explained by differences in skill or cost of living (Glaeser and Mare, 2001).  The 
higher productivity and lower costs possible for firms that locate near a high 
concentration of other related firms are known as urban agglomeration economies or 
simply agglomeration economies.  Economists have suggested that skilled workers 
particularly benefit from the spread of ideas in densely populated areas and other 
advantages of being in close proximity to many firms (Glaeser and Mare, 2001).  
Adamson et al. (2004) posit instead that the concentration of skilled workers results 
primarily from their preference for urban amenities.  Results presented in this chapter 
support the contention that labor markets, not urban amenities, are the primary reason 
educated workers congregate in cities. 
Some recent research examines the effect of urbanicity on the relative growth of 
skilled and unskilled labor.  Artz (2003) uses a shift-share analysis of 1970-2000 Census 
county data to determine the proportion of total population growth (ages 25 and up) over 
that period that was attributable to growth in the share of the county’s college-educated 
population.  Population growth in metropolitan counties, particularly large metropolitan 
areas, was characterized by particularly high growth of the college-educated.  A crucial 
difference between the present chapter and Artz (2003) is that my data follows specific 
age cohorts so I can more closely determine the extent that migration (in key periods of 
the lifecycle) causes this metropolitan human capital growth.  Franklin (2003) found 
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markedly higher rates of inmigration to central cities among single, college-educated 25-
39 year olds compared to the general population.  However, Franklin also found that 
single, non-college-educated 25-39 year olds have a relatively high propensity to migrate 
into central cities, so the effect of college education on the urban-rural migration 
decisions of this cohort is not clearly distinguished from the effect of being young and 
single.  Moreover Franklin considers only inmigration and not outmigration, so the effect 
of urbanicity on net brain gain of young adults remains unclear. 
Even if depressed or rural areas suffer from brain drain, does it make sense to 
attack such a problem, or even to worry about it?  Aren’t regional losses balanced out by 
regional gains elsewhere, so wouldn’t any policies designed to stop such flows amount to 
rent-seeking activity?  These questions tie into the larger discussion of the merits of 
“place-based policies.”  People-based policies are designed to “[improve] the welfare of 
deserving people as individuals, regardless of where they live”, while place-based 
policies are designed to “[improve] the welfare of groups of deserving people defined by 
their spatial proximity in places,” (Bolton 1992).  Some economists have argued that 
place-based policies are at best a zero-sum game, and at worst prolong the structural 
imbalances in the economy that they are meant to improve (Edel, 1980).  Winnick (1966) 
described place-based policies as “clumsy, expensive, and often inequitable devices” for 
redistribution.  Bartik (1991), for one, disputes this notion.  He acknowledges that there 
are winners and losers from local economic development policies, but argues that well-
targeted policies may lead to net societal gains and may be progressive in nature.39  
                                                            
39 Since chronically unemployed people tend to have lower reservation wages, the utility gains that they 
receive from additional employment opportunities are the largest.  Therefore Bartik argues that the benefits 
of regional development policies in depressed regions will greatly outweigh the benefits of similar 
programs enacted in high employment areas.  Because the benefits of place-based policies tend to be largest 
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Bolton (1992) further makes the case for place-based policies by pointing to economic 
evidence that people value “sense of place” as evidenced by sacrifices they make to 
strengthen their local community (e.g. buying local).  Additionally, people seem to place 
either option value or existence value on the sense of place in areas they don’t live, as 
people expend financial and political resources to preserve local landmarks, historical 
sites and so forth to maintain the character of these places.  Bolton thus argues that 
preventing decline in cities and towns with a unique character is a type of public good, 
which will tend to be underprovided by private interests. 
 
3.3 Brain Gain Measures 
The terms brain gain and brain drain most often refer to the international 
outmigration of college-educated (or beyond) individuals from developing countries to 
developed countries, but sometimes they are applied to the growth or loss of educated 
populations in local areas within a developed nation.  International brain drain (gain) is in 
some ways easier to conceptualize than domestic brain drain (gain).  Internationally, 
educated workers flow fairly consistently out of developing nations and to developed 
nations.  Across local areas within the United States, outflows of educated workers from 
a given area are often countered by comparable inflows of educated workers with 
different labor market and life cycle considerations.   
Some areas that attract young high school-educated workers may not attract 
young college-educated workers and some areas that attract young college-educated 
workers may not attract middle-aged college-educated workers, so it is important to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
in distressed areas, Bartik claims the political pressures to enact such policies should also be greater there.  
Given these considerations and some “back of the envelope” calculations, he concludes that sensible 
regional economic development can be simultaneously second-best optimal and progressive.   
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define the type of brain gain or brain drain of interest.  I identify three types (and timings) 
of brain gain in this paper: absolute gain in high school graduates (or “absolute high 
school gain” for short), relative gain in high school graduates (“relative high school 
gain”), and relative gain in college graduates (“relative college gain”).  I briefly describe 
these measures and their relevance in this section, but a more thorough explanation of the 
construction of each of these measures appears in section 3.4.  Roughly speaking, 
absolute high school gain refers to changes in the level of high school-educated workers 
in an area, while relative high school gain and relative college gain refer to changes in the 
share of educated workers in an area.  Changes in levels of educated workers and changes 
in shares of educated workers both matter for the residents of affected areas.  In light of 
the literature on human capital externalities, it is more obvious why shares matter.  If 
receiving an education reduces an individual’s criminal behavior and increases their civic 
participation and other pro-social behaviors, then areas with large shares of educated 
workers should have lower crime rates, better voting outcomes, etc.  Similarly if a highly 
educated workforce encourages investment in physical capital, research and development 
and technology, then the external benefits of education will increase with the share of 
educated workers.   
However, if human capital spillovers occur because interactions with educated 
individuals in related fields lead to diffusion of knowledge, then both shares and levels 
matter.  Shares matter because the average interaction in a more educated city is with a 
more educated worker, hence more knowledge should be diffused with a random 
interaction.  Levels matter because interactions are not generally random.  A pair of 
individuals is more likely to interact if they work in related fields or have knowledge that 
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is valuable to one another.  Cities with a high level of educated workers have more 
diverse skills and knowledge, so it is more likely that an individual will interact with 
someone with knowledge pertinent to them.  Changes in either the level or share of 
educated workers also impacts local areas’ fiscal situations.  An increase in the level of 
educated workers without an increase in the share of educated workers implies local 
population growth.  Population growth leads to higher housing demand, higher property 
values and an expansion of the tax base since local revenues are primarily collected 
through property taxes.  Local property owners also benefit from such shocks.  Though 
each property owner bears a larger tax liability their wealth increases with the increase in 
property values.  On the other hand, an increase in the share of educated workers 
improves a locality’s fiscal situation by reducing the average citizen’s dependence on 
social services and increasing their ability contribute to local taxes.  Thus, both absolute 
brain gain and relative brain gain in a locality may benefit residents. 
I define a locality’s absolute high school gain as the percentage growth in the 
number of high school graduates for a cohort in that locality since the time of that 
cohort’s expected graduation.  If 𝑁𝑟,18
𝐻  describes the total number of high school 
graduates from a specific class residing in 𝑟 in the year of their graduation, and 𝑁𝑟,𝑡2
𝐻  
describes the total number of high school graduates in the same age cohort in some 
subsequent year, then absolute high school gain in locality 𝑟 for this cohort is defined as: 
 𝐴𝐺𝑟,18
𝐻 = ln (𝑁𝑟,𝑡2
𝐻 ) − ln (𝑁𝑟,18
𝐻 )  (3.1) 
Note that changes in the population of high school dropouts within a locality do not affect 
𝐴𝐺𝑟,18
𝐻 .  Absolute high school gain is the only measure used in this paper explicitly 
affected by population growth (or decline) that occurs proportionally by educational 
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attainment.  Indeed area absolute high school gain closely mirrors area population 
growth.   
Second, I define relative high school gain.  Relative high school gain measures 
the percentage growth in the share of an area’s cohort with a high school diploma or 
higher since expected graduation, relative to expected growth (expected growth is based 
on the initial share with a high school diploma.) 
 
𝑅𝐺𝑟,18
𝐻 = ln (
𝑁𝑟,𝑡2
𝐻
𝑁𝑟,𝑡2
𝑇 ) − ln (
𝑁𝑟,18
𝐻
𝑁𝑟,18
𝑇 ) − 𝑅
𝐻∗ ≈ Δ𝐻𝑆% − 𝑅𝐻
∗
  
(3.2) 
Terms in (3.2) with a 𝑇 superscript refer to the total number of people of all education 
levels in the cohort in that period.  The term 𝑅𝐻
∗
 denotes the expected percentage growth 
in a cohort’s share with a high school diploma.  It is determined by performing a simple 
linear regression of area-cohorts’ growth in high school share as a function of their 
graduation rate, then using the coefficient (and constant) to predict areas’ growth in high 
school population (this is explained in more detail in subsection 3.5.1.)  𝑅𝐺𝑟,18
𝐻  increases 
with growth in the high school-educated population and decreases with growth in the 
population of high school dropouts.  This measure should be neutral with respect to 
population growth or decline, but it captures a locality’s ability to attract (or retain) the 
high school-educated relative to its ability to attract (or retain) high school dropouts.   
In some cases relative high school drain may be a transient lifecycle phenomenon.  
The second period in which high school graduates and dropouts are measured (𝑡2) occurs 
when that cohort is in their early to mid-30s.  Some localities that are unattractive to 
young high school graduates (for instance distant suburbs) might be more attractive later 
in life.  The next measure of brain gain considers the relative attractiveness of a locality 
among the college-educated somewhat later in life. 
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Relative college gain measures the percentage growth in the share of an area’s 
cohort with a bachelor’s degree or higher since the cohort was aged 25-34, relative to 
expected growth (expected growth is based on initial college graduate share):   
 
𝑅𝐺𝑟,25
𝐶 = ln (
𝑁𝑟,𝑡2
𝐶
𝑁𝑟,𝑡2
𝑇 ) − ln (
𝑁𝑟,25
𝐶
𝑁𝑟,25
𝑇 ) − 𝑅
𝐶∗ ≈ Δ𝐶𝐺% − 𝑅𝐶
∗
  
(3.3) 
This equation is basically analogous to (3.2), except that it measures college graduates 
(superscript 𝐶) instead of high school graduates and the timing of the population 
measurements differ (the initial measurement of the college-educated in a locality occurs 
when they are between the ages 25 and 34, the subsequent measurement occurs when 
most of the cohort is in their late 40s.)  Since middle-aged, college-educated people are 
among the highest earners, relative college drain—if it represents permanent rather than 
lifecycle changes—may especially harm area productivity.   
 
3.4 Theory and Empirical Model 
Unlike Chapter 2, in this chapter the geographical unit of observation is small 
enough (counties or groups of less populous counties) that many people may live and 
work in observably different geographic areas.  Recent estimates from the Census suggest 
that 27.4 percent of American workers reside in a different county than their place of 
employment.40  Potential migrants must jointly weigh employment prospects in one 
county with the residential opportunities in that county and in a number of nearby 
counties.  I model the expected utility of an individual residing in 𝑟 and working in 𝑠 (𝑟 
may equal 𝑠, but it is not necessary) using a variation on (2.1): 
                                                            
40 https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/2006-10_commuting_flows_paper.pdf 
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 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑟,𝑠 = 𝐸[𝑈(𝑌𝑖,𝑠(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑠, 𝑋𝑖) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑟,𝑠(𝑋𝑖), 𝐴𝑖,𝑟(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑟 , 𝑋𝑖))]  (3.4) 
Again, the utility an individual receives in a locale is a function of the income they can 
receive (less area costs), amenities (amenities are based on the place of residence not the 
place of employment), and heterogeneous individual preferences for income and various 
amenities.41  Area costs, 𝐶𝑖,𝑟,𝑠, are expanded to include both moving costs and commuting 
costs, thus they depend on both the place of residence and the place of employment.  
Equation (3.4) hints at the intricate relationship that exists between local brain gain and 
surrounding labor markets.  On the one hand, strong labor market conditions in nearby 
counties might reduce net migration of a county’s educated population if residents (or 
potential migrants to the county) are persuaded to move to the thriving nearby counties.  
On the other hand, since workers in 𝑠 have the option of residing in 𝑟, a thriving 
metropolitan center’s labor market might cause positive population spillovers, for 
instance, in surrounding suburban counties. 
 The regression models (3.5a-3.5c) estimate growth in a cohort’s educated stock 
(share) as a function of: 1) initial educated stock (share), 2) urbanicity, 3) proximity to a 
four-year state college, 4) other amenities, 5) initial economic conditions, 6) industrial 
composition, 7) region, and 8) share of population that is non-native born:  
 
 
  Δ𝐿𝑛 𝐻𝑆𝑟,𝑡2  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛 𝐻𝑆𝑟,𝑡1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑟,𝑡1  
                                                            
41 Since gross migration between areas within the United States dwarfs net migration, heterogeneous 
individual preferences and heterogeneity in earnings potential across counties are the factors that drive the 
most (gross) migration.  Without such individual heterogeneity, the wide array of city sizes and 
characteristics we observe would probably be impossible.  However, since the results in this chapter focus 
on net changes in the educated and less educated populations, individual heterogeneity mostly cancels itself 
out (except for differences between the preferences of educated and less educated labor).   
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+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 
+𝛽6𝐼𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟,𝑡2 + 𝜖  
(3.5a) 
  
Δ𝐿𝑛 𝐻𝑆%𝑟,𝑡2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛 𝐻𝑆%𝑟,𝑡1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑟,𝑡1 
+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 
+𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟,𝑡2 + 𝜖  
 
 
(3.5b) 
  
Δ𝐿𝑛 𝐶𝐺%𝑟,𝑡2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛 𝐶𝐺%𝑟,𝑡1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑟,𝑡1 
+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 
+𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟,𝑡2 + 𝜖  
 
 
(3.5c) 
Based on (3.4) any characteristic of a local area that generally increases residents’ 
expected incomes, reduces their costs, or adds to their quality of life should, ceteris 
paribus, encourage inmigration (or deter outmigration) and therefore lead to absolute 
high school gain.  So, clearly greater area amenities and area economic opportunities 
should lead to more absolute high school gain.  Economic opportunity for skilled and 
unskilled workers is measured with traditional measures in 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑟,𝑡1 (unemployment rate 
and poverty rate), but also with urbanicity (𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑟,𝑡1) and industrial composition (𝐼𝐶𝑟,𝑡1).  
Given the agglomeration economies that exist in cities, urbanicity should positively affect 
absolute high school gain (at least up to a point) by improving economic opportunity.  It 
is generally expected that a concentration of industries with more educated workers (e.g. 
professional services and information services) will lead to more absolute and relative 
brain gain while concentration of blue-collar industries like forestry and fishing, mining, 
and manufacturing will be associated with less brain gain.  Some standard area amenities 
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are included in 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟 (average July high temperature, average January low temperature, 
an indicator for coastal areas, and the share of compensation in the arts and entertainment 
industry).  Ceteris paribus the attraction of nice weather and culture (proxied by arts and 
entertainment share) should help attract (or retain) high school-educated migrants.  
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 may capture omitted differences in amenities or economic opportunity.  College 
proximity is expected to increase absolute (and relative) high school gain by directly 
leading to the migration of individuals pursuing college degrees.  Although county of 
residence in the latter period is not measured until long after most people go to college 
(age 31-37), there is residential inertia for new college graduates (or college dropouts).  
By attending a college in or near 𝑟, they are more likely to live there when they are in 
their 30s because of the costly nature of migration.  The focus of this chapter is domestic 
migration, so to control for population changes related to immigration, I also include the 
percentage of local area that is foreign-born (in the latter period). 
It is not obvious which direction to expect certain variables to affect relative high 
school gain or relative college gain.  Chapter 2 described how the migration of more 
educated households (and others at low poverty risk) seems to be more responsive to 
labor market conditions, at least in the short run.  To the extent that local labor market 
conditions are persistent, it would follow that long run relative brain gain is also more 
likely to occur where initial labor market conditions are strong.  An urban-rural wage gap 
exists for both educated and uneducated workers, but ceteris paribus this wage gap may 
favor more skilled workers in urban areas because: 1) Their productivity may be 
especially enhanced by the high level of physical capital and technology and 2) The steep 
 
 
73 
 
housing costs in urban areas will swallow a larger share of income for the less affluent.42  
There seems to be increasing consensus that amenities are normal goods (Adamson, et 
al., 2004; Whisler et al., 2008), so it is generally expected that relative brain gain will be 
higher in areas with higher amenity value.  However individuals’ valuation of amenities 
also vary over the lifecycle as the young and single, for example, tend to favor urban 
amenities, while marriage, middle-age, and kids leads people to prefer suburban 
amenities (Whisler et al., 2008).   
I also extend the model to consider: 1) whether there is heterogeneity in the 
determinants of brain gain for central cities, suburban areas, and nonmetropolitan areas 
and 2) whether neighbors’ economic conditions affect brain gain.  I stratify the sample by 
central cities, suburban areas and nonmetropolitan areas, adding an average of the initial 
unemployment rates in adjacent areas as an explanatory variable in (3.5a) - (3.5c).  
Strong labor demand in one county may lead to absolute or relative brain gain for its 
neighbors by attracting educated workers who then opt to reside in surrounding counties.  
Since people are more apt to commute from less densely populated areas to more densely 
populated areas, I expected that proximity to central cities with strong labor market 
conditions might cause positive (educated) population spillovers to suburban areas.  On 
the other hand, to the extent that adjacent areas compete with one another over (educated) 
residents, strong neighboring labor markets may cause brain drain. 
 
                                                            
42 Likewise, if more educated people have stronger preferences for urban amenities, we should expect more 
metropolitan areas to experience relative brain gain (Adamson, et al., 2004).   
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3.5 Data  
3.5.1 Data Collection and Construction 
I use three different datasets to construct the measures of brain gain: two are used 
to estimate initial stocks of educational attainment (The National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Common Core of Data and the 1990 decennial Census) and one provides the 
number and share of people in various age cohorts in the second period with different 
levels of educational attainment (the 2006-2010 American Community Survey).  The 
most basic measure of brain gain I use is absolute high school gain, the percentage 
growth of an area-cohort’s number of high school graduates in approximately sixteen 
years following their graduation.  Using the number of high school diplomas conferred to 
estimate an area-cohort’s initial stock of high school graduates is the ideal way to 
measure gains or losses of the high school-educated, because any measurement of the 
stock of high school graduates in a cohort that isn’t made immediately after high school 
graduation may overlook the many high school graduates who leave their home county 
within months of graduating.  The particular timing of the second measurement (13-19 
years after expected graduation) is the result of data availability, but the timing is suitable 
to identify the areas that benefit from brain gain and those that are harmed by brain drain.  
I assert this because: 1) It is sufficiently long to allow a great deal of intercounty 
migration to occur, particularly given the high migration rates of younger adults, 2) It is 
sufficiently long so that the high school-educated population in the second period are old 
enough (mid-30s) to be important contributors to local economic production and 3) It is a 
short enough period to identify movements within a specific stage of life (young 
adulthood) rather than confounding movements in different stages of life. 
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The Common Core of Data (CCD) reports annual county high school enrollment 
numbers by grade and the number of high school diplomas conferred by county, thus 
providing an estimate of counties’ stock of (public) high school graduates and high 
school dropouts in the graduation year of a given cohort.  The number of high school 
diplomas conferred by schools in a county should fairly accurately measure the number 
of public high school graduates residing in a county upon graduation.  This measure will, 
however, miss any students that graduate from a private high school or from a school in a 
county other than their county of residence.  I estimate the number of high school 
dropouts from the same cohort based on the difference between the cohort’s freshman 
enrollment and the number of high school diplomas conferred to that cohort.  A cohort’s 
estimated number of high school dropouts will fail to capture any students who drop out 
prior to ninth grade.  Estimates of a cohort’s number of dropouts will also fail to account 
for net migration of that cohort between ninth grade and graduation.  To reduce some of 
the noise related to these issues, I use a three-year average of the number of graduates 
and dropouts in each county for the cohorts in the high school graduating classes of 1991, 
1992 and 1993 (I will sometimes refer to these three cohorts as the 1992 cohort for 
short.)43   
Then, to determine the extent of absolute high school gain or drain occurring over 
roughly a 16 year period, I obtain the number of people in a cohort with a high school 
diploma residing in a geographic area (namely Public Use Microdata Areas or PUMAs) 
from the American Community Survey’s (ACS) 5-year (2006-10) 5% Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS).  Unfortunately because this is a five-year data set, even with 
                                                            
43 Likewise, using the 1990 Decennial Census I construct the initial level of all measures of educational 
attainment in 1990. 
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people’s age it is impossible to determine respondents’ high school graduating classes 
precisely.  Since about one-fifth of the ACS respondents were surveyed in each year 
between 2006 and 2010, it is possible to approximate the probability they are members of 
one of the three cohorts.  Table 3.1 illustrates.  For an individual who was 18 in their 
graduating year, this table lists the age they were in each of the ACS survey years.  Based 
on this table, the probability that an individual surveyed in the 2006-10 ACS is in one of 
the three cohorts is 
1
5
 if the individual is 31, 
2
5
 if the individual is 32, 
3
5
 if the individual is 
between 33 and 35, 
2
5
 if the individual is 36, and 
1
5
 if the individual is 37.  Then using the 
2008 population of the PUMA, the proportion of the PUMA’s respondents for each age, 
and applying weights44 (based on the above probabilities) to each age between 31 and 37, 
I estimate the stock of high school graduates and dropouts residing in the PUMA at the 
time of the ACS survey.  Clearly, there is some measurement error in determining the 
stock of graduates and dropouts in the three cohorts, since about half (by weight) of the 
individuals used to determine these stocks actually belong to cohorts other than 1991-93.  
However this measurement error will appear on the left-hand side of the regressions that 
follow, so it will lead to imprecision but not bias in the estimates of the determinants of 
brain drain and brain gain.     
The second brain gain measure, relative high school gain, is constructed using the 
same data (CCD and ACS) and the same weights as absolute high school gain, but 
relative high school gain is based on the percentage change in the share of an area’s 
cohort with at least a high school diploma.  Relative high school gain (along with other 
relative brain gain measures) is then adjusted to account for any reversion to the mean.  
                                                            
44 The weights are 
1
15
 for ages 31 and 37, 
2
15
 for ages 32 and 36, and 
1
5
 for ages 33 to 35. 
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Panel A of Table 3.2 demonstrates the first step in this process.  I perform a simple linear 
regression of growth in the share of a cohort with a high school diploma as a function of 
the natural logarithm of the initial share of the cohort with a high school diploma.  Then, 
based on these regression results, I compute predicted growth in high school share as a 
function of initial share.  The difference between an area’s actual and predicted growth in 
high school share is defined as the relative high school gain.  The timing of an area’s 
relative high school gain is the same as for absolute high school gain (roughly between 
age 18 and age 34).  Table 3.2 shows that areas with higher observed graduation rates 
experience substantially smaller gains in their cohorts’ share of high school graduates.  
There is measurement error associated with all of the brain gain measures, so regression 
to the mean contributes to the negative coefficients in Table 3.2.  Also, if high school 
dropouts are equally likely to obtain a GED regardless of area graduation rates this would 
cause areas with more dropouts to have more growth in the high school share, ceteris 
paribus. 
The third measure of brain gain, relative college gain, is largely analogous to the 
relative high school gain measure, measuring growth between two periods in an area’s 
share of college graduates in a specific cohort.  There are some differences, though, in the 
timing of this growth measure, the cohort being observed, and the data used to measure 
the initial share.  I use the 1990 decennial Census to obtain the initial number of 
individuals in an area’s cohort with and without a college degree.  Clearly it would be 
nonsensical to measure the number of 18 year old college graduates in the initial period; 
instead I use the cohort of 25-34 year olds at the time of the 1990 Census.  I then use the 
2006-2010 ACS to determine growth of the college-educated and non-college-educated 
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within cohorts.  In the initial period (1990) the cohort is aged 25-34, therefore at the time 
of the 2006-2010 ACS, such individuals were between the ages 41-54.  However, 
depending on which year of the ACS a respondent was surveyed, some 41-44 year olds 
and some 51-54 year olds may not have been in the initial 25-34 year old cohort, so I use 
the number of 45-50 year olds in the 2006-2010 ACS to approximate the share of 
college-educated individuals in the cohort in the latter period.  The timing of the surveys 
and age of the cohorts are suitable again because: 1) Most people who obtain college 
degrees do so by age 25 and 2) By the second period (at age 45-50), most college 
graduates are entering the prime earning years of their career.  Otherwise, relative college 
gain is constructed in the same way as relative high school gain, including the adjustment 
for predicted growth.  Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the regression of the growth in the 
share of college graduates as a share of initial college graduate shares.  Relative college 
gain is the difference between an area’s actual growth in college share and its predicted 
growth based on Table 3.2.  Though it is not a focus of the paper, I also construct relative 
growth in graduate degrees for the same cohort (Panel C). 
One difficulty arising from using the ACS’s microdata sample is that its finest 
geographical unit of measurement is the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA); the closest 
geographical unit in the CCD is the county.  State governments draw PUMA boundaries 
so that all PUMAs have sufficiently large populations (100,000 or more persons).  Most 
PUMAs contain one or more undivided counties or are contained entirely within a single 
county (depending on whether county populations in an area tend to be much larger or 
much smaller than 100,000.)  In order to consolidate PUMAs and counties, I reduce both 
data sets to their lowest common denominator.  That is, I construct statistics for the 
 
 
79 
 
smallest geographic units possible in both data sets.  Usually these geographic units are 
either single counties or single PUMAs.45  Hereafter I will refer to these as consolidated 
geographic areas (or CGAs for short).  Data exists for a total of 915 of these CGAs in the 
contiguous United States.46 
 The explanatory variables used in this chapter were obtained from several 
sources.  The county is the unit of observation for all explanatory variables.47  Each of 
these variables was then modified to reflect the sum or population-weighted average of 
all counties within a CGA.  1990 decennial Census data was used to determine counties’ 
initial population and population density of counties.48  I also use 1990 Census estimates 
of county poverty rates in the Census of Population and Housing Poverty Statistics.49  I 
use Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates of 1991-1993 county unemployment rates.50  
The percentage of a CGA’s population that is foreign-born is based on the 2006-10 ACS.  
Counties’ distances from public four-year colleges are based on information in the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, made available by the National Center 
for Education Statistics.51  Maximum July temperatures and minimum January 
temperatures are based on 1990-2010 averages in the North America Land Data 
Assimilation System.52  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines a 
coastal shoreline county as those which are adjacent to an ocean, major estuaries, or the 
Great Lakes.  I create an indicator variable for whether a CGA is coastal based on 
                                                            
45 Occasionally because of the way certain PUMA boundaries are drawn, the smallest geographic unit I can 
construct consists of multiple PUMAs and multiple counties. 
46 Some counties’ high school enrollment and graduation statistics were unavailable for pertinent years in 
the CCD. 
47 In an extension, I test the effect of area wages on brain gain, using PUMA-based wage data. 
48 http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen1990.html 
49 https://usa.ipums.org/usa/voliii/pubdocs/1990/cph-l/cph-l.shtml 
50 http://www.bls.gov/lau/#cntyaa 
51 http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/ 
52 http://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D60a 
 
 
80 
 
whether FEMA classifies any of the counties within the CGA as coastal shoreline 
counties.53  Finally the Bureau of Economic Analysis provides county industrial 
composition data based on NAICS classifications beginning in 1998.54  I use 1998 shares 
of county compensation within two-digit industry codes to describe county industrial 
composition.  In a model extension I also use college graduate and non-college graduate 
earnings data from the 5% percent sample of Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample of 
the 1990 Census.55 56 
 
3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 displays summary statistics.  Absolute high school gain is the first bold 
variable in the table.  Among the 915 CGAs, the average growth in cohorts’ number of 
high school graduates between 1992 and 2008 is 29.5 percent.  This is an overestimate of 
the true average, partly because private high school diplomas conferred between 1991 
and 1993 are not captured in the CCD’s count of initial high school graduates.  The first 
row shows that cohorts averaged a 24.8 percent decline in high school dropouts, pointing 
to one factor working to increase the observed absolute high school gain: delayed 
completion of high school equivalencies (GEDs).  On average CGAs experienced 9.9 
percent growth in the share of their cohorts with a high school diploma.  More growth in 
cohorts’ college shares occurred over the period, with an average 27.5 percent increase 
across CGAs.  Relative high school (college) gain is based on the growth in high school 
                                                            
53 http://coastalsocioeconomics.noaa.gov/coast_defined.html 
54 http://www.bea.gov/regional/ 
55 https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/samples 
56 Individuals’ wages are calculated as their annual earnings divided by the product of weeks worked last 
year and typical hours of work per week.  I aggregate PUMA wages for college graduates and non-college 
graduates based on full year workers (at least 40 weeks) who worked between 35 and 50 hours per week. 
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(college) share, but is adjusted to account for predicted growth based on initial share of 
high school (college) graduates (see equations 3.2 and 3.3).  Thus both of these means 
equal zero.   
 Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 display mean characteristics by quintile of absolute high 
school gain, relative high school gain, and relative college gain, respectively.  These 
tables put in context the stark differences between the characteristics of CGAs that 
experience brain gain and those that experience brain drain.  CGAs in the bottom quintile 
of absolute high school gain began the period with 44% more poverty and 40% more 
unemployment than CGAs in the top quintile.  CGAs in the bottom quintile of relative 
high school gain had about 33% more poverty and 36% more unemployment than those 
in the top quintile.  CGAs in the bottom quintile of relative college gain had 55% more 
poverty and 15% more unemployment.  High brain gain and high brain drain areas 
exhibit similarly glaring differences in metropolitan status and density.  About 72% of 
CGAs in the bottom quintile of absolute high school gain are nonmetropolitan and only 
7% in the top quintile are nonmetropolitan.  Nonmetropolitan CGAs comprise 57% 
(48%) of the bottom quintile of relative high school (college) gain, but these CGAs 
comprise only 18% (27%) of the top quintile of relative high school (college) gain.  All 
categories of metropolitan CGAs (high density, medium density, and low density) are 
noticeably more likely than nonmetropolitan CGAs to experience all types of brain gain.  
High density metropolitan CGAs (more than 400 people per square mile) are especially 
likely to experience absolute high school gain, but lag behind less dense metropolitan 
CGAs in relative college gain. 
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3.6 Spatial Distribution of Brain Gain in United States  
 Figure 3.1A illustrates levels of absolute high school gain with a map of 915 
CGAs in the United States.  Figures 3.2A and 3.2B do the same for relative high school 
gain and relative college gain, respectively.  Each of these maps divides the 915 CGAs 
into five quintiles ranging from the highest levels of brain gain (dark blue) to the highest 
level of brain drain (white).57  (For comparison purposes I also include a map of 
population density in Figures 3.1B and 3.2C.)  While there are some similarities between 
the maps of brain gain, important differences exist between them, exemplifying various 
regional issues.  In this section I discuss the spatial distribution of these three types of 
brain gain in turn. 
 
3.6.1 Absolute High School Brain Gain in U.S. 
Some regional patterns are immediately apparent in the map of absolute high 
school gain (Figure 3.1A) coinciding with well-known regional patterns of overall 
population growth.  The highest rates of absolute high school gain are concentrated in the 
South and also to the west of the Rockies.  The CGAs with the lowest levels of absolute 
high school gain are highly concentrated in the Great Plains.  Table 3.7 shows that when 
CGAs are weighted by population the Mountain, South Atlantic, and Pacific Census 
Divisions all average about 60 percent absolute high school gain.  The Middle Atlantic, 
West North Central, and East North Central Census Divisions all average less than 30 
percent absolute high school gain.58  With some exceptions, state rankings in absolute 
high school gain closely align with state rankings in population growth since the early 
                                                            
57 CGAs in black are missing relevant data (for the relevant years) in the NCES’s Common Core of Data. 
58 Note that weighted averages of states’ absolute high school gain tend to be higher than unweighted 
averages because more populous CGAs typically have higher rates of absolute high school gain. 
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1990s.59  Since more than 85 percent of adults have a high school diploma or equivalent, 
it should be unsurprising that gains in cohorts’ high school graduates resemble overall 
population gains.  The exceptions are instructive.  Several high density states with low 
population growth rank fairly high in absolute high school gain, including the District of 
Columbia, Connecticut, Illinois, and Rhode Island.  On the other hand, low density states 
tend to rank lower in absolute high school gain than their population growth rates would 
suggest, including the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming.  Figure 3.1A also shows this 
tendency of high density areas to attain higher absolute high school gain than low density 
areas; high absolute high school gain is prevalent in eastern and coastal states and low 
absolute high school gain is common in the Midwest.  But a closer look reveals that 
density is also associated with absolute high school gain at a more local level, as absolute 
high school gain is typically higher in major metropolitan areas.  (This can be seen by 
comparing Figure 3.1A with the map of CGA population density in Figure 3.1B.)  These 
are the first of several clues suggesting there are sizeable flows of young high school 
graduates (between graduation and their mid-30s) from low density to high density areas. 
The first column of Table 3.8 lists the percentiles of absolute high school gain for 
the principal counties in the 30 most populous metropolitan areas (as of 1990) for which 
no data is missing.60  The next column shows the absolute high school gain percentile of 
the CGAs adjacent to the principal county (“suburban CGAs” for short).61  Of the 30 
                                                            
59 See https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.pdf for Census estimates of population growth in 
the 1990s and http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf for Census estimates of 
population growth in the 2000s. 
60 Because these are large metropolitan centers, these counties alone compose their CGA.  The only 
exception among these 30 counties is Virginia Beach.  
61 I first determine a weighted average of absolute high school gain for these CGAs.  Then treating this 
weighted average, I determine its percentile relative to the 915 CGAs with available data.  The absolute 
high school gain measure for these areas will be less likely to take extreme values than individuals CGAs 
since averaging multiple CGAs together tends to push their values toward the mean. 
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principal counties, 20 are in the top quintile of absolute high school gain.  Like the maps 
of absolute high school, Table 3.8 shows that counties’ absolute high school gain largely 
reflects the counties’ overall population growth over the period.  The counties 
encompassing San Jose, San Francisco, Phoenix, and Atlanta are all in the 97th percentile 
or above of absolute high school gain.  The counties including New Orleans, Pittsburgh, 
Detroit, and Cleveland are the only large metropolitan centers below the 60th percentile.  
Of the 30 sets of suburban CGAs, only two (the CGAs adjacent to Pittsburgh and 
Cleveland) were below the median level of absolute high school gain.  With a few 
exceptions, the suburban CGAs have slightly lower (but similar) levels of absolute high 
school gain relative to the principal counties they surround, again indicative of a tendency 
of young high school graduates to move to more densely populated CGAs. 
The left side of Table 3.9 lists the largest city in the 30 CGAs with the highest 
absolute high school gain.  If the CGA falls within a Census-designated metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) the second column lists the MSA, along with the driving distance 
(in miles) between the CGA’s largest city and the MSA’s principal city.  This table shows 
that among the areas attracting the most absolute high school gain there is a mix of large 
metropolitan centers, small metropolitan centers, and suburban CGAs (only the CGA 
containing Aspen, Colorado is nonmetropolitan.)  Each of these 30 areas more than 
doubled the size of their high school graduate cohorts (see column 3.)  The right side of 
Table 3.9 shows the largest city in the 30 CGAs experiencing the most severe absolute 
high school drain, each of which saw net declines in their high school graduate cohorts of 
between 27 and 60 percent.  In stark contrast with the high brain gain areas, only one of 
these 30 high brain drain areas (Pine Bluff, AR) is in a metropolitan area.  Moreover, 
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only three of the 30 highest absolute high school gain CGAs have population densities 
below 90 per square mile; all of the 30 highest absolute brain drain CGAs have 
population densities below 90 per square mile.  Again, we see evidence of a flow of high 
school graduates from rural America to urban America.  The table also captures the flow 
of high school graduates out of the Midwest and to the South.  Eighteen Midwestern 
CGAs are among the 30 biggest net senders of high school graduates.  Twenty-three 
Southern CGAs are among the biggest net recipients of high school graduates, including 
20 that are either in Florida, Georgia, Texas, or Virginia.   
 
3.6.2 Relative High School Gain and Relative College Gain in U.S.  
 Patterns of relative high school gain differ considerably from the patterns of 
absolute high school gain just discussed.  The correlation between absolute and relative 
high school gain is just 0.28.  Though there appears to be some positive correlation 
within states, the broad regional patterns visible in the relative high school gain map 
(Figure 3.2A) have little in common with the regional patterns in the absolute high school 
gain map (Figure 3.1A).  A number of areas, in fact, look almost the opposite in the two 
maps.  The Southwestern states of California, Nevada and Arizona (and parts of Texas) 
experienced among the highest rates of absolute high school gain, but these states 
experienced some of the lowest rates of relative high school gain.  Indeed, Table 3.7 
shows that the five states with the lowest relative high school gain are California (8th in 
absolute high school gain), Nevada (1st), Texas (12th), New Mexico (27th), and Arizona 
(3rd).  On the other hand, many northern states including those in New England and 
various states stretching from Montana to Iowa are characterized by low absolute high 
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school gain but high relative high school gain.  An obvious explanation for this set of 
observations is that the high rate of immigration to the Southwest increases the size of 
cohorts of all educational levels, but it causes particularly large increases in the stock of 
high school dropouts (thus leading to relative high school drain).  Northern states which 
receive fewer immigrants have less absolute growth of the high school-educated, but 
attract particularly small numbers of high school dropouts. 
 Figures 3.2A and 3.2B uncover little obvious association between states’ relative 
high school gain and relative college gain; the correlation between the two measures of 
brain gain is not statistically different than zero (-0.03).  In fact, from Figure 3.2B alone 
few states can be identified as high relative college gain or high relative college drain 
states because most states contain numerous CGAs experiencing relative college gain and 
numerous CGAs experiencing relative college drain.62  Table 3.10 shows states ranked by 
their relative college gain (it also shows relative “graduate school gain.”)  This table 
(contrasted with Table 3.7) illustrates a striking difference between relative high school 
gain and relative college gain in the West.  Whereas the Mountain and Pacific Census 
divisions experienced among the lowest relative high school gain (ranked seventh and 
ninth among the nine Census divisions), they experienced the highest relative college 
gain of any of the Census divisions.  As will be further demonstrated, brain gain is not a 
homogenous phenomenon.  Areas or characteristics that tend to attract one group of more 
educated migrants do not necessarily attract other groups of educated migrants.  One 
exception is that metropolitan areas benefit from all measures of brain gain relative to 
nonmetropolitan areas.  The pattern of metropolitan areas experiencing relative college 
                                                            
62 One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals that only 10 percent of variation in relative college gain 
can be explained by state. 
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gain can be observed by comparing the map of relative college gain (3.2B) with the map 
of population density (Figure 3.2C). 
 The last two columns of Table 3.8 confirm the low relative high school gains in 
the Southwest, specifically among the major cities.  Of the 30 largest CGAs, the most 
relative high school drain occurred in the counties containing Riverside, Dallas, Houston, 
Los Angeles, and Phoenix.  With the exception of these and other Southwestern cities, 
the counties containing the 30 largest cities generally experienced high relative high 
school gain.  Fourteen of these 30 counties are in the top quintile of relative high school 
gain, with the District of Columbia, St. Louis, Baltimore, New Orleans, Atlanta, and 
Virginia Beach all at or above the 97th percentile.  The suburban CGAs adjacent to these 
30 principal counties tend to have lower relative high school gain than the populous 
CGAs they surround.  The higher relative high school gain in principal counties 
compared to the surrounding suburbs may reflect at least two things.  First, it may reflect 
rapid attenuation of the positive human capital spillovers associated with urban 
agglomerations as distance from urban centers increases (Rosenthal and Strange, 2008).  
Second, it may reflect life cycle migration of the middle and upper class.  Because of the 
gap in the safety and school quality of suburban areas compared to urban centers, parents 
of school-age children flock to the suburbs if they have the means to do so, suggesting 
freshly-minted high school graduates (and dropouts) will be concentrated in suburban 
areas.  However, while quality public schools tend to be located in suburban areas, 
quality jobs are often concentrated in large cities, attracting young, skilled workers.  
(Recall that in the second period the cohort is between the ages of 31 and 37, so a large 
share of educated households will not yet have school-age children of their own.)   
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   Whereas relative high school gain tends to be somewhat higher in principal 
counties than in suburban CGAs, suburban CGAs have markedly higher relative college 
gain than principal counties.  Table 3.11 lists the relative college gain percentiles for the 
principal counties of the 30 largest MSAs and the adjacent suburban CGAs.  Eighteen of 
the suburban CGAs rank more than 20 percentiles above their corresponding principal 
county in relative college gain, including ten suburban CGAs that are more than 50 
percentiles higher.  No principal counties rank more than 15 percentiles above their 
suburban CGAs.  This apparent outmigration of college-educated people from principal 
counties to the suburbs is likely the corollary of the migration of young high school-
educated people to the principal counties.  Relative college gain tracks the movement of 
the college-educated (initially between the ages of 25-34) over a period of almost two 
decades, putting most of them in their late 40s in the second period.  Just as life-cycle 
considerations lead many young high school graduates (including future college 
graduates) from the suburbs to the principal cities, as they enter mid-life they are 
increasingly drawn to suburban areas (especially those with school age children). 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show the same pattern of relative high school gain 
concentrated in large urban centers and relative college gain concentrated in suburban 
areas.  Low density metropolitan centers and nonmetropolitan areas are 
disproportionately likely to experience the highest rates of relative high school drain and 
relative college drain.  As Table 3.12 shows, many of the 30 CGAs with the most relative 
high school gain are high and medium density metropolitan centers, including the 
counties that include Washington, Baltimore, St. Louis, Norfolk, Virginia Beach, New 
Orleans, Atlanta, and Jacksonville (each of these counties has more than 500 people per 
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square mile.)  On the other hand, the 30 CGAs experiencing the most relative high school 
drain are predominantly less-dense metropolitan centers and rural areas in California and 
Texas (in bold).  Of these 30 areas only Dallas County has a population density above 
300 per square mile.63  As Table 3.13 shows, areas experiencing the most relative college 
gain tend to be suburban.  Among the 30 CGAs with the highest relative college gain, 
only four CGAs are nonmetropolitan, and none of them contain the principal city of the 
MSA.  The remaining 26 CGAs are all suburban.  On the other hand, only three of the 30 
highest relative college drain CGAs could be considered suburban.   
 
3.7 Determinants of Brain Gain and Brain Drain  
 Table 3.14 displays results from ordinary least squares regressions of absolute 
high school gain over the period 1992-2008.  Column 1 displays results of a simple 
growth regression based on the initial stock of high school graduates.  It shows that a 
large number of high school graduates in a CGA are associated with more absolute high 
school gain.  This result is unsurprising if young adults are more likely to move to large 
cities.  Column 2 adds the additional explanatory variables shown in equations (3.5a)-
(3.5c), seeking to determine which local area characteristics contribute to brain gain or to 
brain drain.  Columns 3-5 then estimate the determinants of absolute high school gain 
separately for metropolitan centers, suburban CGAs and nonmetropolitan CGAs, adding 
neighbors’ labor market conditions as an additional explanatory variable.  A CGA is 
                                                            
63 It is also notable that a number of college towns are among the 30 areas with the most relative high 
school gain, including Monroe (LA), Gainesville (FL), and Morgantown (WV).  Of course one would 
expect that these places would especially attract the college-educated (or more accurately the soon-to-be 
college-educated), but the relative college gain measure will not capture such gains because it tracks a 
cohort whose initial age is 25-34 (most of the movement to college towns would occur between the ages 18 
and 25.) 
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classified as a metropolitan center if it contains one or more counties that are included in 
a MSA and no adjacent CGAs have a higher population density.  All other metropolitan 
CGAs are considered suburban in the regressions described in Tables 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16.   
 Column 2 of Table 3.14 shows that, ceteris paribus, nonmetropolitan CGAs 
experienced 10.1 percentage points lower growth rates in their high school-educated 
cohorts than low density CGAs (less than 200 people per square mile).  Nonmetropolitan 
CGAs also experienced 6.4 percentage points lower absolute high school gain than 
medium density (200-400 people per square mile) metropolitan CGAs.  Wages are higher 
in metropolitan areas, and many young high school-educated individuals can benefit from 
this and the diversity of urban employment.  Contrary to the descriptive evidence 
presented in Tables 3.4, 3.8 and 3.9, Table 3.14 suggests that high density of a 
metropolitan CGA reduces absolute high school gain relative to less dense metropolitan 
CGAs, though this particular result seems to arise because the effect of population 
density is confounded with the effect of the initial (log) number of high school 
graduates.64   
As expected, the table also provides evidence that proximity to state universities 
increases growth of the high school-educated.  This seems to be primarily true of 
nonmetropolitan CGAs where remoteness most severely limits access to higher education 
(column 5).  The amenity variables provide evidence that temperate climates and culture 
(as proxied by the size of the arts and entertainment industry) attract young high school 
graduates; these effects are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of alternative amenity 
                                                            
64 In Appendix Table A.4, I show that removing initial (log) number of high school graduates from the 
regression causes the coefficient on “Metro > 400 per square mile” to fall from a very highly significant 
value of -0.147 to a statistically insignificant value of -0.054.  Otherwise the results in Appendix Table A.4 
differ very little relative to Table 3.14. 
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variables.  Amenity variables, especially the size of the arts and entertainment sector, 
primarily affect the absolute high school gain of nonmetropolitan CGAs (column 5).  
Surprisingly coastal CGAs experienced less absolute high school gain, ceteris paribus, 
though this result is not robust to the exclusion of climate or region variables.  There are 
residual regional effects on absolute high school gain, unexplained by the other 
explanatory variables.  Consistent with Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1A, CGAs in the South 
and West tended to experience the most absolute high school gain, ceteris paribus.65   
 Strong local economic conditions, as expected, positively affect growth of high 
school graduates.  Column 2 of Table 3.14 shows that each percentage point increase in 
the local poverty rate is associated with 1.1 percentage points less growth in the local 
high school-educated cohort.  Likewise each percentage point increase in the local 
unemployment rate is associated with 2.1 percentage points less growth in the local high 
school-educated cohort.  This is noteworthy since the regression only included initial 
(1991-1993) poverty and unemployment rates, demonstrating either (or both) the 
persistence of weak local economies or that transient economic downturns negatively 
affect long-term growth of high school graduates.  In either case, local labor market 
conditions have more than a transient effect on absolute high school gain.  CGAs with 
high concentrations of blue-collar industries like mining and manufacturing experienced 
somewhat lower growth of high school graduates.  Conversely a concentration of 
professional, scientific, and technical services positively affects absolute high school gain 
in metropolitan centers (column 3).  Column 4 shows that unemployment in neighboring 
CGAs negatively affects absolute high school gain in suburban CGAs.  Given the extent 
                                                            
65 Unlike the descriptive analysis, the regression shows that, ceteris paribus, CGAs in the South experience 
significantly more absolute high school gain than CGAs in the West.  
 
 
92 
 
that suburban areas depend on the labor markets of the central cities they surround, this 
result is unsurprising. 
Table 3.15 shows how the same explanatory variables affect the relative growth 
of the young high school-educated population compared to young high school dropouts 
(i.e. relative high school gain).  This table displays results from Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions of the growth in the high school-educated population as a share of a cohort’s 
population.  Recall that relative high school gain is the difference between a CGA’s 
actual growth in the share with a high school diploma and their predicted growth based 
on column 1 of this table (equivalent to Panel A of Table 3.2).  When the additional 
covariates in columns 2-4 are added, we explain the deviations between actual and 
predicted high school share growth that I have been referring to as relative high school 
gain.  For a CGA with a high school graduation rate of 80 percent, a coefficient of 0.01 
would imply that each unit change results in 0.8 percent more of the cohort being high 
school-educated in the second period.  Likewise, Table 3.16 shows the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the growth of those with a bachelor’s degree or higher relative 
to the growth of those without a bachelor’s degree (between ages 25-34 and 45-50).  For 
a CGA in which 20 percent of a cohort initially has a college degree, a coefficient of 0.01 
in Table 3.16 would imply that each unit change results in a 0.2 percent higher share of 
the population having a college degree in the latter period.   
In subsection 3.6.2 I noted that relative high school gain appeared to be higher 
among high density counties and relative college gain appeared to be lower among high 
density counties.  I suggested crime, school quality and the prevalence of high-paying 
jobs might explain these stylized facts; as the young and high school-educated set off on 
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their own, the high wages and diverse labor markets of densely populated cities attracts 
them, but as they approach middle age the quality schools, comfort and safety of the 
suburbs attract college-educated individuals with children (less educated individuals tend 
to be less mobile.)  Table 3.15 shows that, ceteris paribus, metropolitan CGAs attract 
relatively more growth of high school-educated workers than nonmetropolitan CGAs.  
Moreover within metropolitan areas, high population density is associated with more 
relative high school gain.  Table 3.16, meanwhile, suggests that a CGA with an initial 
college share of 20 percent would have about one percentage point more expected growth 
in its college share if it was either a low density or medium density CGA (compared to 
either high density CGAs or nonmetropolitan CGAs).   
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 demonstrate some residual regional differences in relative 
high school gain and relative college gain.  Ceteris paribus, CGAs in the West experience 
more relative high school drain and more relative college gain than CGAs in other 
regions.  This could indicate either that the West Region: 1) offers unobserved amenities 
or labor market opportunities that benefit college graduates over those with only a high 
school diploma, 2) offers unobserved amenities or labor market opportunities that 
especially benefit 30 and 40-somethings over younger adults, or 3) offers some 
combination of 1) and 2).  It seems likely, though, that some of the observed relative high 
school drain in the West results from unexplained differences in their propensity to attract 
less educated immigrants.  The share of the population that is foreign-born negatively 
affects relative high school gain, as immigrants are disproportionately likely to have less 
than a high school diploma.  The share of the foreign-born population is, however, an 
imperfect proxy for the effect of immigration on brain gain, as local areas differ in the 
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share of recent immigrants and in the distribution of immigrants’ country of origin, age 
and education level.  The West region dummy likely captures some of these unobserved 
differences, which may partially account for the West region’s observed negative effect 
on relative high school gain.  Nonetheless the size of the West region effect on relative 
high school gain (equivalent to the effect of a 4-5 percentage point increase in the share 
of the population that is foreign-born) suggests that immigration alone does not fully 
account for the relative high school drain in the West.  The reason for the relative college 
gain in the West is not obvious. 66     
With the possible exception of the arts and entertainment industry in 
nonmetropolitan areas, the amenities included in these regressions do not apparently 
attract disproportionately high net migration of more educated individuals (relative to 
their effect on the migration of less educated individuals).  In fact there is more relative 
high school gain, ceteris paribus in colder climates (though this result, too, may 
indirectly stem from unobserved differences in immigration in hot climates).  There is 
also some evidence that proximity to a four year state college positively affects relative 
high school gain, but not relative college gain.  Given the ages of the high school and 
college cohorts, this result is logical, as proximity to colleges should primarily attract 
young migrants who are seeking college degrees, not those who already have them.  
Strong initial economic conditions increase all measures of brain gain (unlike the 
effects of density, amenities, region, and state college proximity).  Consistent with 
                                                            
66 Kodrzycki (2001) similarly finds that Western states experience high rates of domestic net migration of 
young college graduates, though she uses high school location for the state of origin, so it also encompasses 
moves for college.  She argues the domestic migration of college graduates to the West is partly the result 
of the extensive, low-cost state college system of states in the West.  Only 13 percent of young people from 
the West went out of state for college compared to over 35 percent of young people from the Northeast in 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data used by Kodrzycki. 
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Chapter 2, CGAs with strong economies tend to attract disproportionately high growth 
among more educated populations (in addition to the higher absolute high school gain 
discussed above).  Both initial poverty rates and initial unemployment rates negatively 
impact relative high school gain and relative college gain.  Consider a CGA with a 1992 
high school graduation rate of 80% in which 20% of 25-34 year olds had a bachelor’s 
degree or higher in 1990.  Ceteris paribus, if the initial poverty rate and unemployment 
rate in that CGA were each one percentage point higher, by 2008 the expected share of 
the 31-37 year old cohort with a high school diploma would be about 0.4 percentage 
points lower and the expected share of the 45-50 year old cohort with a college degree 
would also be about 0.4 percentage points lower.  Unsurprisingly, like absolute high 
school gain, relative high school gain and relative college gain seem to be more (less) 
prevalent in CGAs whose economies are concentrated in white (blue)-collar industries.  
CGAs with large shares of total compensation for military jobs experience somewhat 
higher relative high school gain, but somewhat lower relative college gain, while other 
public sector employment has an insignificant effect on relative growth of the high school 
or college-educated. 
I consider the effects of labor market conditions in adjacent CGAs on relative 
high school gain and relative college gain in the last three columns of Tables 3.15 and 
3.16.  Recall that strong adjacent labor market conditions led to positive absolute high 
school-educated population spillovers within metropolitan areas (Table 3.14).  Adjacent 
area labor market conditions do not significantly affect relative high school gain (Table 
3.15).  Column 3 of Table 3.16 shows that central metropolitan CGAs experience more 
relative college gain when surrounding CGAs have high unemployment.  On the other 
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hand, neighbors’ unemployment does not significantly affect relative college gain in 
suburban or nonmetropolitan CGAs.  This suggests that central metropolitan CGAs 
largely compete with surrounding CGAs to retain 25-50 year old college graduates rather 
than benefitting from positive spillovers from these areas. 
 Finally in Table 3.17, I estimate an alternative specification which includes 
average log wages of college graduates and average log wages of non-college graduates 
as additional explanatory variables.  Because average wages by educational attainment 
are not available at the county level, and because many PUMA boundaries changed 
between the 1990 decennial Census and the 2006-10 ACS, the geographic unit used for 
the regressions in Table 3.17 is based on Census-defined “Consistent PUMAs” which 
consolidate the two sets of PUMA definitions.  By using broader geographic areas—these 
regressions include 312 observations instead of 915—this table also acts as a sensitivity 
check of the earlier regressions.  Column 1 of Table 3.17 replicates the earlier regression 
of absolute high school gain (column 2 of Table 3.14) using this alternative unit of 
observation.  Likewise columns 3 and 5 replicate the regressions explaining relative high 
school gain and relative college gain (column 2 of Table 3.15 and 3.16, respectively).  
Bold coefficients indicate that the value differs by more than 1.5 standard errors relative 
to the corresponding value in Tables 3.14-3.16.  Italics are used to denote coefficients 
that lose statistical significance when the alternative geographic units are used (from 
significant at the 5% level to insignificant at the 10% level) or coefficients that gain 
statistical significance.   
The results in Table 3.17 largely support the qualitative findings of the previous 
regressions.  Only the regression of absolute high school gain (column 1) shows much 
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sensitivity to using Consistent PUMAs as the unit of analysis.  Most notably, using the 
broader geographic units has large effects on the coefficients on the initial stock of high 
school graduates and on the indicators for high and medium-density metropolitan areas.  
There are two factors that seem to lead to this sensitivity.  First, by combining low 
density and high density PUMAs to form Consistent PUMAs, many areas switch 
metropolitan type (e.g. high density to medium density).  Second, metropolitan density in 
the absolute high school regression—as mentioned earlier—is confounded with the initial 
stock of high school graduates.  (Comparison of Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5 shows that 
the metropolitan density indicators are less sensitive to the change in geographic unit 
when the initial stock of high school graduates is omitted.)   
Given that the change in geographic unit has modest effects, what effect do 
college and non-college wages have on brain gain?  Columns 2 and 4 show that each 
percent increase in (initial) non-college wages leads to 0.5 percent more absolute growth 
in the high school-educated cohort, and 0.15 percent more of the cohort being college-
educated in the latter period. 67  College wages have an insignificant effect in both 
regressions.68  The high school-educated cohorts may be more likely to migrate to areas 
with high wages for unskilled labor—even though a subset of this group is highly 
educated—because the group is also young and relatively unskilled due to their lack of 
work experience.  Inclusion of the wage variables eliminates the effect of the poverty rate 
on each of the brain gain measures, but it strengthens the effect of the unemployment 
rate. 
                                                            
67 This assumes an 80 percent graduation rate. 
68 College wages have a significant positive effect on both absolute high school gain and relative high 
school gain when non-college wages are omitted. 
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Higher college wages lead to higher growth of the share of college-educated in a 
cohort, but higher non-college wages do not reduce the share of college-educated 
individuals.  One percent higher initial college wages are associated with 0.1 percentage 
points higher growth in the college share,69 again demonstrating the high responsiveness 
of college-educated migration to labor market stimuli.   
Finally note that the effect of nonmetropolitan status on relative high school gain 
and relative college disappears with the inclusion of the wage variables.  In fact, when 
wages are included, nonmetropolitan areas and less dense metropolitan areas outperform 
medium density and high density metropolitan areas in terms of relative college gain.  
Since specifically urban and rural amenities are not included in these regressions, this 
result strongly suggests that metropolitan areas’ advantage in attracting educated 
migrants stems primarily from the strength of labor market opportunities, not from 
educated workers having stronger preferences for urban amenities.   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I describe three measures of growth or decline of local educational 
attainment and estimate these measures and their determinants in localities across the 
United States.  Gains in any of these measures potentially benefit public finances, local 
industry, business owners, and others through the positive externalities of human capital.  
Absolute high school gain describes the total growth of the population of the high school-
educated after (expected) graduation.  Rising property values in cities and counties 
experiencing this type of growth strengthens the fiscal position of these localities.  
Relative high school gain and relative college gain—rapid growth of the high school-
                                                            
69 This assumes that 20 percent of the cohort had a bachelor’s degree at the beginning of the period. 
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educated and college-educated compared to the growth of less educated people—
similarly expand local tax bases because of education’s positive effect on earnings. 
Unlike brain gain and brain drain between countries, many places are neither clear 
winners nor clear losers as a result of brain gain and brain drain within the United States.  
Warmer localities tend to attract more absolute high school gain but experience less 
relative high school gain.  Localities in the West attract disproportionate shares of high 
school dropouts, but also attract disproportionate shares of college graduates.  
Immigration explains at least some of this difference as Border States attract more 
population growth because of immigration, but this population growth tends to be less 
educated than the native population.  Some regional brain gain differences, then, partly 
stem from the familiar issue of immigration to the Southwest.  
Within metropolitan areas, this chapter yields mixed evidence about whether high 
density is associated with more brain gain.  Some descriptive evidence suggests that more 
dense metropolitan areas attract more absolute growth of young high school graduates, 
but the regression results suggest that, all else being equal, low density metropolitan 
areas experience at least as much absolute high school gain as high density metropolitan 
areas.  As a share of (25-50 year old) cohort populations, low density metropolitan areas 
experience more growth of college graduates than high density metropolitan areas.  This 
finding partially reflects the lifecycle pattern where more educated (and more mobile) 
populations are especially likely to migrate to more urban areas early in their working 
life, but then flow to suburbs later in life.  No obvious policy implications emerge from 
this type of life-cycle migration, as these differences in migration patterns between young 
and old educated workers reveal differences in preferences and not obvious inefficiencies 
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or major equity concerns between high density and low density metropolitan areas (since 
the flows of educated workers often balance each other).   
There are, however, two area characteristics that cause unambiguously negative 
effects on brain gain: nonmetropolitan status and poor initial labor market conditions.  
Nonmetropolitan areas attract less absolute growth of the high school-educated 
population and the growth they do experience is disproportionately high among young 
high school dropouts and is disproportionately low among young to middle-aged college 
graduates.  The same bleak story is true of localities which began the period with high 
unemployment rates, high poverty rates, or low wages.  Such areas experience lower 
absolute high school gain, lower relative high school gain and lower relative college gain.    
The absolute and relative decline in educated individuals from these areas is large 
enough to be a concern for areas that are rural or economically depressed, but the solution 
to the problem is less obvious.  Informing policy makers of a city with high 
unemployment and poverty that poor economic conditions will have detrimental long-
term effects on their ability to attract educated workers is not particularly helpful, except 
perhaps to add to the urgency to find a solution.  From a federal or state standpoint, it is 
debatable whether lack of growth of educated populations in nonmetropolitan and 
economically depressed areas warrants any action, and if it does, what kind of actions it 
warrants.  Combined with the previous chapter, the results in this essay have some 
bearing on the use of place-based policies in areas with poor labor market conditions.  
Current general economic conditions lead to particularly large changes in the propensity 
of educated individuals to move in or out of an area, and such spatial differences in labor 
market conditions give rise to important differences in net flows of skilled labor.  
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Therefore, depending on the specific nature of a place-based policy (for example the 
extent that development is targeted to blue-collar industries or that the policy targets 
general development), it may lead to substantial net changes in the amount of skilled 
labor, but smaller effects on unskilled labor.  Stanching the outflows of skilled labor from 
depressed areas may limit the demographic shifts that exacerbate economic problems in 
these areas.  The welfare implications of such changes depend on the complementarity of 
skilled and unskilled labor and the nature of human capital spillovers, among other 
things.   Note also that a failure to retain high school graduates in these places causes a 
larger share of the benefits of that education to accrue elsewhere, potentially leading to an 
underinvestment in education.  Therefore a case can also be made for larger subsidies for 
primary and secondary education in nonmetropolitan areas and economically depressed 
areas on both equity and efficiency grounds.    
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Tables 
Table 3.1  Age at Time of ACS Survey, Based on High School Class and Survey Year 
 
HS Class    |    Survey Year 2006 2007 
 
2008 2009 
 
2010 
Class of 1991 33 34 35 36 37 
Class of 1992 32 33 34 35 36 
Class of 1993 31 32 33 34 35 
Age assumes someone was 18 in their expected high school graduating year. 
 
 
Table 3.2  Basic Educational Attainment Growth Regressions 
Panel A 
Growth High School Share Coefficient Standard Error 
Ln(High School Share 1992) -0.720** (0.016) 
Constant -0.071** (0.004) 
   
R-squared = 0.696   
Panel B 
Growth College Share Coefficient Standard Error 
Ln(College Share 1990) -0.176** (0.013) 
Constant -0.050* (0.024) 
   
R-squared = 0.176   
Panel C 
Growth Graduate School Share Coefficient Standard Error 
Ln(Grad School Share 1990) -0.256** (0.016) 
Constant -0.141* (0.055) 
   
R-squared = 0.222   
Initial (1992) high school share is estimated based on an area’s 1991-1993 high school graduates and 1988-1991 
freshmen enrollment, based on the National Center of Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data.  Initial (1990) 
college and graduate school shares are based on 1990 decennial Census estimates of the population of 25-34 year olds 
by educational attainment.  Growth of high school share subtracts the initial high school share from a weighted average 
of the share of 31-37 year old high school graduates in the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the 2006-2010 
American Community Survey.  Growth of college (graduate school) shares subtracts the initial shares from an average 
of the share of 45-50 year old college (graduate school) graduates in the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the 2006-
2010 American Community Survey. Regressions employ Hubert-White robust standard error corrections. 
** Significant at the 1% level 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.3  Summary Statistics  
 
VARIABLES Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Observs. 
Absolute growth dropouts (’92-‘08) -0.248 0.631 -2.633 1.653 915 
Abs. high school gain (’92-‘08) 0.295 0.366 -0.596 1.800 915 
Growth high school share (’92-‘08) 0.099 0.113 -0.260 0.700 915 
Relative high school gain (’92-‘08) 0.000 0.062 -0.361 0.207 915 
Abs. college gain (’90-’08) 0.433 0.372 -1.634 2.803 915 
Growth college share (’90-‘08) 0.275 0.186 -0.494 1.108 915 
Relative college gain (’90-’08) 0.000 0.169 -0.670 0.753 915 
Abs. grad school gain (’90-‘08) 0.894 0.450 -1.116 3.496 915 
Growth grad school share (’90-‘08) 0.737 0.300 -0.230 1.942 915 
Relative grad school gain (’90-‘08) 0.000 0.264 -0.943 0.826 915 
Population 1990 246,012 436,129 57,508 8,863,164 915 
Population 2008 301,559 515,610 92,274 9,862,049 915 
Pop. density (/sq. mile) 1990 404.6 1521.3 1.2 32,633.5 915 
High school grad. rate 1991-93 % 79.6 10.0 42.9 96.0 915 
College enrollment per 100 6.1 5.5 0 36.6 915 
Dist. to four-year state college (miles) 35.4 32.7 0 193.3 915 
Non-native born % 7.1 6.8 44.6 0.5 915 
July average temperature (F) 85.5 6.0 56.8 106.9 915 
January avg. temperature (F)  27.1 11.5 -2.9 59.4 915 
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.134 0.044 0.067 0.373 915 
Poverty Rate (1990) % 14.4 6.6 2.6 44.1 915 
Unemployment Rate (1991-93) 6.7 2.6 2.1 28.4 915 
Forestry and fishing % 0.44 0.93 0 13.36 915 
Mining % 1.18 3.21 0 29.80 915 
Utilities % 9.77 1.36 0 17.92 915 
Construction % 5.78 2.26 0 19.99 915 
Manufacturing % 19.53 10.95 0.58 59.42 915 
Wholesale % 4.31 2.46 0 42.21 915 
Retail % 8.22 1.90 1.16 20.24 915 
Transportation % 3.39 2.94 0 45.87 915 
Information services % 2.10 1.89 0.23 33.65 915 
Finance services % 4.05 2.82 0.78 24.98 915 
Real Estate % 0.89 0.60 0.17 5.81 915 
Professional % 4.08 3.31 0 27.38 915 
Management % 1.36 2.02 0 27.74 915 
Educational services % 0.85 1.04 0 10.66 915 
Administrative % 2.74 1.73 0.45 33.08 915 
Health care services % 9.35 3.74 0 40.26 915 
Arts and entertainment % 0.74 0.90 0.01 9.98 915 
Accommodation services % 3.22 2.33 1.04 33.72 915 
Other services % 3.29 0.79 1.23 10.51 915 
Federal government % 3.04 3.46 0.30 33.76 915 
Military % 1.59 4.69 0.07 54.87 915 
State and local government % 18.88 7.60 4.50 48.82 915 
Initial (1992) high school share is estimated based on an area’s 1991-1993 high school graduates and 1988-1991 
freshmen enrollment, based on the National Center of Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data.  Initial (1990) 
college and graduate school shares are based on 1990 decennial Census estimates of the population of 25-34 year olds 
by educational attainment.  Growth of high school share subtracts the initial high school share from a weighted average 
of the share of 31-37 year old high school graduates in the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the 2006-2010 
American Community Survey.  Growth of college (graduate school) shares subtracts the initial shares from an average 
of the share of 45-50 year old college (graduate school) graduates in the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the 2006-
2010 American Community Survey.  See Section 2.5.1 for sources of explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
Table 3.4  Mean Characteristics by Quintile of Absolute HS Gain (1992-2008) 
 
VARIABLES 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 1 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 2 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 3 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 4 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 5 
Abs. high school brain gain (’92-‘08) % -15.5 7.8 25.5 45.2 84.8 
Rel. high school brain gain (’92-‘08) % -1.7 -0.7 0.3 -0.4 2.4 
Absolute college brain gain (’90-‘08) % 33.9 39.9 39.8 44.1 58.7 
Relative college brain gain (’90-‘08) % -5.9 -3.4 -1.1 2.6 7.8 
Rel. grad school brain gain (’90-‘08) % -8.6 -5.8 0.3 3.7 10.4 
Population 1990 133,626 176,786 210,356 276,670 434,025 
Population 2008 135,384 194,702 237,811 341,770 600,344 
Pop. density (/sq. mile) 1990 63.7 324.4 295.0 437.9 905.1 
Metro > 400 per square mile (dummy) 0.011 0.060 0.153 0.268 0.330 
Metro 200-400 per square mile (dummy) 0.033 0.120 0.180 0.224 0.181 
Metro < 200 per square mile (dummy) 0.240 0.293 0.339 0.339 0.418 
Non-metro (dummy) 0.716 0.527 0.328 0.169 0.071 
College enrollment per 100 5.3 5.4 6.4 6.5 7.0 
Dist. to four-year state college (miles) 54.4 47.6 30.2 23.9 20.9 
Non-native born % 3.5 4.8 6.0 9.2 12.2 
July average temperature (F) 84.3 84.8 85.4 85.5 87.4 
January avg. temperature (F)  20.4 25.7 27.3 29.0 33.0 
Coast (dummy) 0.142 0.174 0.251 0.284 0.324 
Poverty Rate (1990) % 16.8 16.7 14.2 12.7 11.7 
Unemployment Rate (1991-93) % 7.4 7.6 6.6 6.4 5.3 
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.150 0.143 0.133 0.130 0.114 
Forestry and fishing % 0.62 0.59 0.36 0.47 0.19 
Mining % 2.28 1.73 1.01 0.49 0.41 
Utilities % 1.37 1.11 0.73 0.91 0.76 
Construction % 4.68 5.54 5.75 5.92 7.01 
Manufacturing % 22.58 21.90 20.25 18.94 13.94 
Wholesale % 3.94 3.72 4.02 4.47 5.41 
Retail % 8.31 8.21 8.33 8.17 8.06 
Transportation % 3.90 3.39 3.16 3.20 3.29 
Information services % 1.51 1.63 1.89 2.23 3.22 
Finance services % 3.27 3.32 3.64 4.49 5.57 
Real Estate % 0.53 0.74 0.88 0.99 1.31 
Professional % 2.24 2.91 4.09 4.60 6.60 
Management % 0.79 0.90 1.28 1.80 2.03 
Educational services % 1.85 2.25 2.80 3.01 3.79 
Administrative % 0.68 0.77 0.91 0.88 1.00 
Health care services % 9.72 9.35 9.80 9.29 8.55 
Arts and entertainment % 0.51 0.58 0.77 0.75 1.07 
Accommodation services % 2.84 3.20 3.19 3.32 3.58 
Other services % 3.32 3.29 3.33 3.19 3.33 
Federal government % 2.81 3.16 3.07 3.18 2.98 
Military % 0.72 1.40 2.02 1.79 2.03 
State and local government % 21.55 20.33 18.72 17.92 15.88 
Northeast 0.137 0.158 0.180 0.153 0.033 
Midwest 0.546 0.288 0.230 0.219 0.137 
South 0.257 0.418 0.492 0.475 0.665 
West 0.060 0.136 0.098 0.153 0.165 
Initial stock of high school graduates is based on the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, 
1991-1993.  Growth of high school graduate stock is then based on 31-37 year olds in the 2006-2010 5% Public Use 
Microdata Sample of the American Community.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the 
construction of brain gain measures.  See Section 3.5.1 for sources of explanatory variables. 
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Table 3.5  Mean Characteristics by Quintile of Relative High School Gain (1992-2008) 
 
VARIABLES 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 1 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 2 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 3 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 4 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 5 
Abs. high school brain gain (’92-‘08) % 19.9 22.0 26.9 33.4 45.1 
Rel. high school brain gain (’92-‘08) % -9.3 -2.0 1.0 3.3 7.0 
Absolute college brain gain (’90-‘08) % 44.4 45.7 42.6 44.3 39.4 
Relative college brain gain (’90-‘08) % -3.8 -1.0 -0.6 1.9 3.4 
Rel. grad school brain gain (’90-‘08) % -6.7 -3.1 0.1 3.0 6.5 
Population 1990 273,603 207,699 265,042 228,060 255,544 
Population 2008 350,731 257,084 323,223 272,026 304,649 
Pop. density (/sq. mile) 1990 205.1 255.8 353.9 350.5 857.1 
Metro > 400 per square mile (dummy) 0.098 0.110 0.180 0.196 0.235 
Metro 200-400 per square mile (dummy) 0.082 0.132 0.126 0.179 0.219 
Metro < 200 per square mile (dummy) 0.251 0.297 0.361 0.348 0.372 
Non-metro (dummy) 0.568 0.462 0.333 0.277 0.175 
College enrollment per 100 5.1 5.6 5.9 6.1 7.8 
Dist. to four-year state college (miles) 47.3 41.8 33.5 30.2 24.4 
Non-native born % 10.6 6.1 6.6 5.7 6.7 
July average temperature (F) 88.4 85.8 85.0 84.3 84.1 
January avg. temperature (F)  32.0 27.9 25.6 24.2 25.6 
Coast (dummy) 0.219 0.209 0.219 0.239 0.290 
Poverty Rate (1990) % 17.1 15.6 13.5 13.0 12.9 
Unemployment Rate (1991-93) % 8.0 6.9 6.4 6.1 5.9 
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.141 0.143 0.137 0.130 0.119 
Forestry and fishing % 1.02 0.40 0.31 0.25 0.25 
Mining % 1.70 1.33 1.06 0.88 0.95 
Utilities % 1.10 0.92 0.86 1.07 0.94 
Construction % 5.63 5.46 5.49 6.28 6.03 
Manufacturing % 19.32 21.86 20.86 20.34 15.26 
Wholesale % 4.02 3.92 4.26 4.60 4.73 
Retail % 8.39 8.26 8.18 8.18 8.07 
Transportation % 3.51 3.75 3.23 3.24 3.23 
Information services % 1.74 1.83 2.03 2.17 2.70 
Finance services % 3.42 3.47 4.27 4.32 4.79 
Real Estate % 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.89 1.02 
Professional % 3.06 3.56 4.05 4.45 5.30 
Management % 1.04 1.32 1.33 1.38 1.72 
Educational services % 2.50 2.60 2.71 2.94 2.95 
Administrative % 0.56 0.83 0.93 0.82 1.12 
Health care services % 8.71 9.09 9.62 9.58 9.71 
Arts and entertainment % 0.64 0.62 0.79 0.77 0.86 
Accommodation services % 3.25 3.25 3.36 2.97 3.29 
Other services % 3.33 3.32 3.26 3.30 3.26 
Federal government % 3.15 2.87 2.80 2.54 3.83 
Military % 1.45 0.86 1.53 1.51 2.61 
State and local government % 21.61 19.64 18.23 17.53 17.40 
Northeast 0.033 0.143 0.142 0.152 0.191 
Midwest 0.208 0.231 0.344 0.348 0.290 
South 0.481 0.527 0.443 0.429 0.426 
West 0.279 0.099 0.071 0.071 0.093 
Initial share of high school graduates is based on the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, 
1991-1993.  Growth of high school graduate share is then based on 31-37 year olds in the 2006-2010 5% Public Use 
Microdata Sample of the American Community Survey.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the 
construction of brain gain measures.  See Section 3.5.1 for sources of explanatory variables. 
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Table 3.6  Mean Characteristics by Quintile of Relative College Gain (1990-2008) 
 
VARIABLES 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 1 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 2 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 3 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 4 
Brain Gain 
Quintile 5 
Abs. high school brain gain (’92-‘08) % 18.6 20.0 26.2 35.0 47.9 
Rel. high school brain gain (’92-‘08) % -1.3 -0.9 0.9 0.6 0.7 
Absolute college brain gain (’90-‘08) % 9.9 28.3 39.1 49.9 89.6 
Relative college brain gain (’90-‘08) % -22.9 -8.0 -0.2 7.3 23.9 
Rel. grad school brain gain (’90-‘08) % -27.4 -10.5 0.0 12.4 25.8 
Population 1990 176,564 288,493 280,117 268,890 215,301 
Population 2008 196,372 324,842 329,414 352,014 304,785 
Pop. density (/sq. mile) 1990 413.8 648.1 320.3 383.1 254.7 
Metro > 400 per square mile (dummy) 0.120 0.201 0.164 0.223 0.110 
Metro 200-400 per square mile (dummy) 0.109 0.109 0.169 0.163 0.188 
Metro < 200 per square mile (dummy) 0.290 0.288 0.339 0.277 0.436 
Non-metro (dummy) 0.481 0.402 0.328 0.337 0.265 
College enrollment per 100 8.0 6.5 6.5 5.9 3.6 
Dist. to four-year state college (miles) 36.9 34.8 30.5 34.5 40.5 
Non-native born % 5.9 7.0 6.2 8.4 8.2 
July average temperature (F) 87.1 85.4 85.1 85.3 84.6 
January avg. temperature (F)  28.5 26.5 23.8 26.9 29.5 
Coast (dummy) 0.164 0.207 0.191 0.293 0.320 
Poverty Rate (1990) % 18.8 15.2 13.6 12.5 12.1 
Unemployment Rate (1991-93) 7.5 6.9 6.3 6.1 6.5 
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.144 0.138 0.130 0.131 0.126 
Forestry and fishing % 0.64 0.51 0.35 0.27 0.46 
Mining % 1.85 0.90 1.11 1.13 0.93 
Utilities % 0.94 1.15 0.86 0.83 1.11 
Construction % 5.00 5.15 5.79 5.84 7.14 
Manufacturing % 19.73 20.95 19.55 19.83 17.55 
Wholesale % 3.89 4.19 4.41 4.90 4.14 
Retail % 7.88 7.81 8.21 8.27 8.91 
Transportation % 3.99 3.33 3.36 3.15 3.12 
Information services % 1.82 2.00 2.08 2.41 2.17 
Finance services % 3.50 4.27 4.32 4.24 3.94 
Real Estate % 0.76 0.82 0.86 1.01 0.99 
Professional % 3.00 3.90 3.91 4.86 4.76 
Management % 1.00 1.31 1.50 1.51 1.48 
Educational services % 2.31 2.51 2.77 3.07 3.03 
Administrative % 0.78 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.85 
Health care services % 9.66 9.68 9.37 9.22 8.78 
Arts and entertainment % 0.50 0.72 0.69 0.82 0.95 
Accommodation services % 2.91 2.87 3.44 3.25 3.66 
Other services % 3.29 3.25 3.26 3.22 3.44 
Federal government % 3.14 2.90 3.10 2.65 3.42 
Military % 1.78 1.29 1.54 2.11 1.23 
State and local government % 21.64 19.60 18.63 16.61 17.93 
Northeast 0.104 0.196 0.148 0.152 0.061 
Midwest 0.262 0.299 0.350 0.293 0.215 
South 0.579 0.435 0.388 0.435 0.470 
West 0.055 0.071 0.115 0.120 0.254 
Initial share of college graduates is based on 25-34 year olds in the 1990 decennial Census.  Growth of college graduate 
share is then based on 45-50 year olds in the 2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community 
Survey.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the construction of brain gain measures.  See Section 
3.5.1 for sources of explanatory variables. 
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Table 3.7  State Absolute HS and Dropout Gain 1992-2008 (Graduation to Age 31-37) 
 
State 
Rank Abs. 
High School 
Gain 
 
Abs. High 
School Gain 
Rank Abs. 
HS Dropout 
Gain 
Abs. HS 
Dropout 
Gain 
Rank Rel. 
High School 
Gain 
 
Rel. High 
School Gain 
Nevada 1 1.113 1 1.172 46 -0.07 
District of Columbia 2 1.043 43 -1.045 1 0.137 
Arizona 3 0.878 5 0.297 43 -0.026 
Florida 4 0.775 18 -0.183 15 0.025 
Colorado 5 0.705 12 -0.015 24 0.014 
Georgia 6 0.66 19 -0.199 32 0.005 
Delaware 7 0.598 14 -0.056 31 0.007 
California 8 0.563 3 0.453 47 -0.083 
Oregon 9 0.559 23 -0.239 27 0.010 
Maryland 10 0.552 6 0.229 19 0.022 
North Carolina 11 0.55 20 -0.207 40 -0.006 
Texas 12 0.518 15 -0.063 45 -0.056 
Virginia 13 0.50 17 -0.173 13 0.027 
Tennessee 14 0.489 32 -0.431 20 0.020 
Connecticut 15 0.468 35 -0.526 6 0.047 
New Jersey 16 0.459 34 -0.505 35 0.003 
South Carolina 17 0.448 37 -0.653 9 0.033 
Illinois 18 0.43 7 0.088 39 -0.004 
Utah 19 0.406 8 0.04 29 0.010 
Rhode Island 20 0.388 30 -0.41 26 0.012 
Missouri 21 0.383 29 -0.358 18 0.023 
Kentucky 22 0.36 31 -0.422 23 0.016 
Minnesota 23 0.31 11 -0.011 12 0.028 
Louisiana 24 0.306 42 -0.903 8 0.036 
New Hampshire 25 0.306 4 0.383 17 0.024 
Idaho 26 0.303 25 -0.282 38 -0.002 
New Mexico 27 0.303 13 -0.029 44 -0.043 
Pennsylvania 28 0.301 16 -0.141 14 0.027 
Alabama 29 0.288 38 -0.698 22 0.010 
Wisconsin 30 0.288 2 0.494 28 0.018 
Mississippi 31 0.263 40 -0.783 33 0.005 
Indiana 32 0.247 24 -0.258 34 0.003 
Michigan 33 0.231 27 -0.349 11 0.028 
Kansas 34 0.224 21 -0.225 36 0.0 
Ohio 35 0.221 36 -0.618 10 0.032 
Oklahoma 36 0.22 26 -0.292 41 -0.008 
Arkansas 37 0.177 33 -0.46 42 -0.008 
Maine 38 0.164 46 -1.329 2 0.081 
Wyoming 39 0.137 45 -1.319 4 0.008 
Vermont 40 0.128 44 -1.245 5 0.075 
New York 41 0.12 22 -0.239 30 0.010 
Nebraska 42 0.119 9 0.003 37 -0.001 
Iowa 43 0.111 10 0.0 25 0.013 
South Dakota 44 0.085 28 -0.35 16 0.024 
Montana 45 0.074 41 -0.845 7 0.046 
West Virginia 46 -0.021 39 -0.709 21 0.020 
North Dakota 47 -0.043 47 -1.459 3 0.079 
New England 6 0.351 9 -0.564 1 0.046 
Middle Atlantic 8 0.262 3 -0.040 5 0.015 
East North Central 7 0.289 4 -0.195 6 0.015 
West North Central 9 0.25 5 -0.202 2 0.019 
South Atlantic 2 0.593 6 -0.213 2 0.019 
East South Central 5 0.367 8 -0.559 4 0.016 
West South Central 4 0.419 7 -0.258 8 -0.031 
Mountain 1 0.623 2 0.068 7 -0.008 
Pacific 3 0.563 1 0.393 9 -0.075 
State and Census division brain gain based on population-weighted averages of CGAs.  See Table 3.2 and text for details. 
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Table 3.8  High School Gain Percentile for Counties Containing Largest U.S. MSA 
Centers (as of 1990) and Adjacent Areas 
County (City) 
Abs. High 
School Gain  
Percentile 
(MSA Center) 
Abs. High 
School Gain  
Percentile 
(Suburban) 
Rel. High 
School Gain  
Percentile 
(MSA Center) 
Rel. High 
School Gain  
Percentile 
(Suburban) 
Los Angeles (Los Angeles, CA) 81 70 8 4 
Cook (Chicago, IL) 82 70 40 23 
Philadelphia (Philadelphia, PA) 89 67 85 64 
Wayne (Detroit, MI) 58 63 76 73 
District of Columbia (Washington, DC) 95 88 99 27 
Dallas (Dallas, TX) 84 95 3 38 
Harris (Houston, TX) 88 87 7 56 
San Francisco (San Francisco, CA) 99 84 89 29 
Fulton (Atlanta, GA) 97 95 98 43 
Riverside (Riverside, CA) 91 74 2 4 
St. Louis (city), MO  98 48 99 79 
Hennepin (Minneapolis, MN) 85 76 60 63 
San Diego (San Diego, CA) 83 69 28 4 
Allegheny (Pittsburgh, PA) 49 16 81 76 
Baltimore (city), MD 98 80 99 75 
Maricopa (Phoenix, AZ) 96 91 20 38 
Cuyahoga (Cleveland, OH) 59 42 70 78 
Hillsborough (Tampa, FL) 93 86 82 57 
Hamilton (Cincinnai, OH) 68 73 92 72 
Jackson (Kansas City, MO) 72 74 80 66 
Santa Clara (San Jose, CA) 99 81 89 10 
Multnomah (Portland, OR) 94 90 71 63 
Providence (Providence, RI) 71 53 24 87 
Sacramento (Sacramento, CA) 86 72 27 13 
Virginia Beach (city), VA 71 90 97 99 
Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI) 74 51 44 68 
Bexar (San Antonio, TX) 79 57 52 21 
Franklin (Columbus, OH) 87 74 87 63 
Marion (Indianapolis, IN) 82 74 53 74 
Orleans (New Orleans, LA) 40 78 99 71 
Suburbs defined as CGAs that contain at least one county that is adjacent to the central county.   Initial high school graduation 
rate data is unavailable for New York County (New York City), Suffolk County (Boston), King County (Seattle), Denver 
County (Denver), and Miami-Dade County (Miami).  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the 
construction of brain gain measures.   
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Table 3.9  Thirty Areas with Highest and Lowest Absolute High School Gain  
Brain Gain: 
 
Area’s  
Largest City  
MSA  
(Distance to 
Central City)  
 
 
Absolute 
Brain Gain 
Pop. 
Density 
Brain Drain: 
 
Area’s  
Largest City 
Absolute 
Brain Gain 
Pop. 
Density 
Stockbridge, GA Atlanta (21) 1.80 182.0 Andrews, TX -0.60 3.1 
Newport News, VA Va. Beach (40) 1.69 7,266.9 Great Falls, MT -0.56 2.0 
Arlington, VA Washington (6) 1.61 6599.8 Scottsbluff, NE -0.47 4.6 
Denton, TX Dallas (39) 1.54 307.9 Woodward, OK -0.42 7.0 
Cumming, GA Atlanta (39) 1.53 101.6 Caro, MI -0.42 49.9 
Amarillo, TX Amarillo (0) 1.45 98.1 Salina, KS -0.42 6.2 
San Francisco, CA San Francisco (0) 1.45 15,502 Levelland, TX -0.41 11.0 
Woodstock, GA Atlanta (30) 1.44 212.9 Marshall, MN -0.41 22.6 
Las Vegas, NV Las Vegas (0) 1.41 93.7 Aberdeen, SD -0.39 7.7 
Plano, TX Dallas (19) 1.39 311.5 Marquette, MI -0.38 24.1 
Leesburg, VA Washington (40) 1.37 110.9 Jamestown, ND -0.38 6.4 
Delaware, OH Columbus (29) 1.36 151.3 Gladwin, MI -0.37 42.1 
Cartersville, GA Atlanta (43) 1.35 126.1 Presque Isle, ME -0.36 13.2 
San Marcos, TX Austin (31) 1.34 385.1 Forest City, AR -0.35 34.6 
St. Louis, MO St. Louis (0) 1.31 6,408.5 Oil City, PA -0.35 62.1 
Kissimmee, FL Orlando (22) 1.31 81.5 Bluefield, WV -0.35 88.7 
Raleigh, NC Raleigh (0) 1.30 507.7 Houghton, MI -0.35 17.6 
Alabaster, AL Birmingham (24) 1.25 125.0 Fergus Falls, MN -0.35 17.0 
*Ponte Vedra Beach, 
FL 
Jacksonville (22) 
 
1.23 
 
137.7 
 
Fremont, NE 
 
-0.34 
 
19.8 
 
Charlotte, NC Charlotte (0) 1.22 969.7 North Platte, NE -0.33 6.4 
Aspen, CO ------- 1.21 6.7 Macomb, IL -0.32 38.5 
Round Rock, TX Austin (19) 1.20 124.1 Beatrice, NE -0.32 18.4 
Casa Grande, AZ Phoenix (48) 1.18 15.4 Worthington, MN -0.29 22.6 
Atlanta, GA Atlanta (0) 1.16 1227.4 Pampa, TX -0.29 7.7 
Winder, GA Atlanta (50) 1.14 139.0 Carroll, IA -0.29 22.4 
Orlando, FL Orlando (0) 1.13 746.5 Pine Bluff, AR -0.29 48.3 
Port. St. Lucie, FL Port St. Lucie (0) 1.13 262.3 Williamson, WV -0.28 76.8 
New Port Richey, FL Tampa (38) 1.12 377.4 Waverly, IA -0.28 28.8 
Peachtree  
Corners, GA 
Atlanta (20) 
 
1.12 
 
815.2 
 
Sayre, PA 
 
-0.28 
 
39.6 
 
Shakopee, MN Minneapolis (27) 1.09 148.1 Alpena, MI -0.28 25.5 
Initial stock of high school graduates is based on the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, 
1991-1993.  Growth of high school graduate stock is then based on 31-37 year olds in the 2006-2010 5% Public Use 
Microdata Sample of the American Community.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the 
construction of brain gain measures.   
*Unincorporated community 
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Table 3.10  State Relative College Gain (1990-2008), (Between Age 25-34 and 45-50) 
 
State 
Rank Rel. 
Brain Gain  
Some 
College 
 
Rel. Brain 
Gain  
Some Coll. 
Rank Rel. 
Brain Gain  
Bachelor’s 
Rel. Brain 
Gain  
Bachelor’s 
Rank Rel. 
Brain Gain  
Graduate 
School 
Rel. Brain 
Gain 
Grad School 
Vermont 1 0.079 1 0.136 2 0.222 
Colorado 10 0.028 2 0.118 3 0.199 
Utah 18 0.009 3 0.113 1 0.278 
Oregon 2 0.057 4 0.107 4 0.174 
Nevada 25 -0.010 5 0.105 19 0.049 
New Mexico 4 0.042 6 0.100 13 0.093 
Florida 12 0.021 7 0.087 15 0.091 
Montana 3 0.050 8 0.078 10 0.110 
California 24 -0.009 9 0.073 18 0.053 
Arizona 20 0.001 10 0.057 12 0.094 
Idaho 13 0.020 11 0.050 22 0.030 
Virginia 11 0.021 12 0.049 6 0.154 
Georgia 5 0.041 13 0.045 16 0.087 
Minnesota 6 0.035 14 0.045 5 0.156 
New Hampshire 9 0.029 15 0.041 7 0.149 
Nebraska 26 -0.011 16 0.024 23 0.025 
Maryland 16 0.010 17 0.023 8 0.126 
Maine 8 0.034 18 0.020 11 0.105 
Michigan 23 -0.007 19 0.020 20 0.045 
North Carolina 7 0.034 20 0.013 26 -0.011 
South Carolina 15 0.013 21 0.007 34 -0.027 
North Dakota 41 -0.044 22 0.004 45 -0.147 
District of Columbia 43 -0.047 23 -0.008 30 -0.020 
Kentucky 21 -0.001 24 -0.013 38 -0.073 
Connecticut 28 -0.015 25 -0.015 17 0.079 
New York 38 -0.036 26 -0.018 33 -0.026 
New Jersey 35 -0.027 27 -0.021 30 -0.020 
Kansas 22 -0.002 28 -0.022 27 -0.011 
Wyoming 14 0.014 29 -0.025 14 0.092 
South Dakota 30 -0.020 30 -0.026 24 0.018 
Ohio 32 -0.023 31 -0.027 28 -0.012 
Wisconsin 32 -0.023 32 -0.027 28 -0.012 
Missouri 19 0.005 33 -0.029 21 0.040 
Delaware 17 0.010 34 -0.032 9 0.114 
Texas 46 -0.058 35 -0.038 36 -0.058 
Tennessee 31 -0.021 36 -0.046 39 -0.074 
Illinois 34 -0.025 37 -0.048 25 -0.008 
Indiana 36 -0.029 38 -0.051 43 -0.128 
Oklahoma 40 -0.043 39 -0.062 42 -0.126 
Arkansas 27 -0.013 40 -0.063 44 -0.144 
Iowa 29 -0.019 41 -0.064 32 -0.022 
Rhode Island 37 -0.030 42 -0.072 35 -0.041 
Alabama 39 -0.042 43 -0.072 37 -0.063 
Louisiana 47 -0.075 44 -0.075 47 -0.179 
West Virginia 45 -0.056 45 -0.081 46 -0.167 
Pennsylvania 44 -0.048 46 -0.101 40 -0.111 
Mississippi 42 -0.046 47 -0.110 41 -0.112 
New England 3 0.006 4 0.004 2 0.089 
Middle Atlantic 8 -0.038 8 -0.050 7 -0.057 
East North Central 6 -0.014 6 -0.020 6 0.002 
West North Central 4 0.003 5 -0.009 5 0.043 
South Atlantic 1 0.019 3 0.037 3 0.065 
East South Central 7 -0.026 9 -0.056 8 -0.077 
West South Central 9 -0.055 7 -0.049 9 -0.093 
Mountain 2 0.016 1 0.086 1 0.135 
Pacific 5 -0.003 2 0.076 4 0.064 
State and Census division brain gain based on population-weighted averages of CGAs.  See Table 3.2 and text for details. 
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Table 3.11  Relative College and Graduate School Gain Percentile for Counties 
Containing Largest U.S. MSA Centers (as of 1990) and Adjacent Areas 
County (City) 
Rel. College 
Gain  
Percentile 
(MSA Center) 
Rel. College 
Gain  
Percentile 
 (Suburban) 
Rel. Grad 
School Gain  
Percentile 
(MSA Center) 
Rel. Grad 
School Gain  
Percentile 
 (Suburban) 
Los Angeles (Los Angeles, CA) 53 78 28 62 
Cook (Chicago, IL) 24 83 34 74 
Philadelphia (Philadelphia, PA) 0 51 2 63 
Wayne (Detroit, MI) 46 61 35 72 
District of Columbia (Washington, DC) 28 52 45 72 
Dallas (Dallas, TX) 15 59 21 62 
Harris (Houston, TX) 24 87 27 69 
San Francisco (San Francisco, CA) 28 82 61 73 
Fulton (Atlanta, GA) 88 78 81 70 
Riverside (Riverside, CA) 80 72 63 56 
St. Louis (city), MO  0 92 4 84 
Hennepin (Minneapolis, MN) 65 66 75 77 
San Diego (San Diego, CA) 82 83 79 70 
Allegheny (Pittsburgh, PA) 31 59 36 44 
Baltimore (city), MD 0 72 4 78 
Maricopa (Phoenix, AZ) 62 69 62 60 
Cuyahoga (Cleveland, OH) 26 78 43 73 
Hillsborough (Tampa, FL) 70 87 58 69 
Hamilton (Cincinnai, OH) 46 47 40 47 
Jackson (Kansas City, MO) 22 37 50 50 
Santa Clara (San Jose, CA) 28 70 61 59 
Multnomah (Portland, OR) 80 81 84 83 
Providence (Providence, RI) 12 71 22 60 
Sacramento (Sacramento, CA) 39 78 39 63 
Virginia Beach (city), VA 80 70 90 72 
Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI) 42 77 66 78 
Bexar (San Antonio, TX) 57 92 57 95 
Franklin (Columbus, OH) 24 94 31 83 
Marion (Indianapolis, IN) 5 78 16 51 
Orleans (New Orleans, LA) 50 53 52 47 
Suburbs defined as CGAs that contain at least one county that is adjacent to the central county.   Initial high school graduation 
rate data is unavailable for New York County (New York City), Suffolk County (Boston), King County (Seattle), Denver 
County (Denver), and Miami-Dade County (Miami).  Initial share of college graduates is based on 25-34 year olds in the 
1990 decennial Census.  Growth of college graduate share is then based on 45-50 year olds in the 2006-2010 5% Public 
Use Microdata Sample of the American Community Survey.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the 
construction of brain gain measures. 
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Table 3.12  Thirty Areas with Highest and Lowest Relative High School Gain  
Brain Gain:  
 
Area’s Largest  
City 
MSA 
(Distance to 
Central City)  
 
Rel. 
Brain  
Gain 
Area 
Pop. 
Dens. 
Brain Drain:  
 
Area’s Largest 
City 
 
MSA 
(Distance to 
Central City) 
Rel. 
Brain 
Gain 
Area 
Pop. 
Dens. 
St. Marys, PA ------- 0.207 24.9 Madera, CA Madera (0) -0.361 41.2 
Van Wert, OH ------- 0.184 64.7 Garden City, KS ------- -0.339 8.7 
St. Louis, MO St. Louis (0) 0.161 6,409 El Centro, CA El Centro (0) -0.264 26.2 
Washington, DC 
 
Washington 
(0) 
0.137 
 
9,884 
 
Visalia, CA 
 
Visalia (0) -0.263 
 
64.7 
 
Charleston, SC Charleston (0) 0.132 321.6 Merced, CA Merced (0) -0.260 92.5 
Norfolk, VA 
 
Va. Beach 
(18) 
0.128 
 
4,856 
 
Kingsville, TX 
 
------- 
 
-0.252 
 
15.4 
 
New Orleans, LA 
 
New Orleans 
(0) 
0.119 
 
2,752 
 
Hanford, CA 
 
Hanford (0) -0.236 
 
73.0 
 
Jamestown, ND ------- 0.114 6.4 Salinas, CA Salinas (0) -0.231 83.3 
Jacksonville, FL 
 
Jacksonville 
(0) 
0.111 
 
502.9 
 
Bakersfield, CA 
 
Bakersfield (0) -0.226 
 
66.8 
 
Chesapeake, VA 
 
Chesapeake 
(0) 
0.110 
 
446.1 
 
Colusa, CA 
 
------- -0.204 
 
12.1 
 
Norwich, CT Norwich (0) 0.108 382.8 Fresno, CA Fresno (0) -0.186 111.9 
Baltimore, MD Baltimore (0) 0.107 9,109 Clinton, NC ------- -0.186 49.5 
Pearl, MS Jackson (6) 0.104 112.5 McAllen, TX McAllen (0) -0.181 244.4 
Vernon, CT 
 
Hartford (14) 
 
0.101 
 
313.8 
 
Santa Maria, CA 
 
Santa Maria 
(0) 
-0.181 
 
135.0 
 
Gainesville, FL Gainesville (0) 0.101 207.7 Clearlake, CA ------- -0.180 27.5 
Atlanta, GA Atlanta (0) 0.101 1,227 Lamesa, TX ------- -0.179 5.3 
Fargo, ND Fargo (0) 0.099 17.1 Sebring, FL ------- -0.177 34.3 
Skowhegan, ME ------- 0.099 17.1 Lumberton, NC ------- -0.175 110.8 
Va. Beach, VA Va. Beach (0) 0.098 1,583 Gallup, NM ------- -0.169 8.5 
Morgantown, 
WV 
Morgantown 
(0) 
0.097 
 
103.6 
 
Woodward, OK 
 
------- -0.169 
 
7.0 
 
Portsmouth, VA 
 
Va. Beach 
(21) 
0.096 
 
241.8 
 
Napa, CA 
 
Napa (0) -0.157 
 
146.9 
 
*Ponte Vedra 
Beach, FL 
Jacksonville 
(22) 
0.095 
 
137.7 
 
Andrews, TX 
 
------- -0.157 
 
3.1 
 
Burlington, VT Burlington (0) 0.094 140.7 De Queen, AR ------- -0.154 21.4 
Portland, ME Portland (0) 0.093 186.0 Modesto, CA Modesto (0) -0.153 247.9 
Brunswick, OH Cleveland (32) 0.092 290.2 Riverside, CA Riverside (0) -0.152 162.4 
Bangor, ME Bangor (0) 0.092 22.4 Dalton, GA Dalton (0) -0.151 135.1 
Lakeside, FL 
 
Jacksonville 
(28) 
0.091 
 
176.3 
 
Mt. Vernon, OH 
 
------- -0.147 
 
76.4 
 
Huntington, WV 
 
Huntington (0) 
 
0.091 
 
171.0 
 
Brownsville, TX 
 
Brownsville 
(0) 
-0.145 
 
287.2 
 
Davenport, IA Davenport (0) 0.087 329.7 Dallas, TX Dallas (0) -0.141 2,106 
S. Kingstown, RI 
 
Providence 
(32) 
0.087 
 
330.4 
 
Bay City, TX 
 
------- -0.141 
 
27.5 
 
Initial stock and share of high school graduates are based on the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common 
Core of Data, 1991-1993.  Growth of high school graduate stock and share are then based on 31-37 year olds in the 
2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text 
for details of the construction of brain gain measures.   
*Unincorporated community 
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Table 3.13  Thirty Areas with Highest and Lowest Relative College Gain  
Brain Gain: 
  
Area’s Largest  
City 
MSA 
(Distance to 
Central City)  
 
Rel. 
Brain  
Gain 
Pop. 
Dens. 
Brain Drain: 
 
Area’s Largest 
City 
 
MSA 
(Distance to 
Central City) 
Rel. 
Brain 
Gain 
Pop. 
Dens. 
Cumming, GA 
 
Atlanta (39) 
 
0.753 
 
101.6 
 
Colonial Beach, 
VA 
------- -0.670 48.9 
Casa Grande, AZ Phoenix (48) 0.718 15.4 St. Louis, MO St. Louis (0) -0.606 6,408 
Monroe, NC Charlotte (25) 0.622 132.1 Emporia, VA ------- -0.596 34.1 
Hollins, VA Roanoke (5) 0.611 131.5 Clarksdale, MS ------- -0.549 40.7 
New Port Richey, 
FL 
Tampa (38) 
 
0.476 
 
377.4 
 
Columbus, MS ------- -0.546 55.3 
Las Vegas, NM 
 
------- 
 
0.438 
 
5.2 
 
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia 
(0) 
-0.522 11,736 
Delaware, OH Columbus (29) 0.435 151.3 Anniston, AL Anniston (0) -0.495 190.7 
Pt. Charlotte, FL 
 
Punta Gorda 
(4) 
0.434 
 
160 
 
Athens, OH ------- -0.488 67.2 
Manassas, VA 
 
Washington 
(33) 
0.428 
 
715 
 
Jacksonville, TX ------- -0.445 38.5 
Heber City, UT ------- 0.426 3.9 Greeneville, TN ------- -0.436 95.1 
Monroe, GA Atlanta (46) 0.394 55.6 Alice, TX ------- -0.432 16.7 
Kenosha, WI Chicago (64) 0.393 469.9 Enid, OK ------- -0.411 42.8 
Peachtree City, 
GA 
Atlanta (32) 
 
0.392 
 
203.6 
 
Blacksburg, VA Blacksburg (0) -0.405 104.7 
Fairfax, VA 
 
Washington 
(20) 
0.378 
 
110.9 
 
Greenville, MS ------- -0.384 68.6 
Waxahachie, TX Dallas (30) 0.372 90.6 Aberdeen, SD ------- -0.382 7.7 
Stockbridge, GA Atlanta (21) 0.366 182.0 Kirksville, MO ------- -0.375 17.5 
Shakopee, MN 
 
Minneapolis 
(27) 
0.364 
 
148.1 
 
Bastrop, LA ------- -0.367 27.3 
Bentonville, AR 
 
Fayetteville 
(27) 
0.363 
 
115.6 
 
Troy, NY Albany (8) -0.364 236.1 
Port Huron, MI Detroit (63) 0.356 159.8 Huntsville, TX ------- -0.355 30.1 
Washington, MO St. Louis (51) 0.354 65.0 Kingsville, TX ------- -0.347 15.4 
Kalispell, MT ------- 0.352 8.2 Richmond, VA Richmond (0) -0.342 3,379 
Shelbyville, KY Louisville (32) 0.352 87.8 Oil City, PA ------- -0.341 62.1 
Denham Springs, 
LA 
Baton Rouge 
(13) 
0.350 
 
137.0 
 
Sioux City, IA Sioux City (0) -0.337 112.6 
Richmond, KY Lexington (26) 0.349 85.4 Indiana, PA Pittsburgh (58) -0.334 110.2 
Florissant, MO St. Louis (18) 0.347 1,957 Greenville, NC Greenville (0) -0.319 165.6 
*Ponte Vedra 
Beach, FL 
Jacksonville 
(23) 
0.343 
 
137.7 
 
Danville, IL Danville (0) -0.316 48.7 
Palm City, FL 
 
Port St. Lucie 
(13) 
0.343 
 
181.6 
 
Sweetwater, TX ------- -0.311 10.4 
Ashland, VA 
 
Richmond 
(19) 
0.325 
 
91.1 
 
Live Oak, FL ------- -0.309 22.8 
McMinnville, OR Portland (38) 0.320 79.0 Bardstown, KY Louisville (41) -0.307 43.9 
Barre, VT ------- 0.317 42.0 Lafayette, IN Lafayette (0) -0.303 178.6 
Initial share of college graduates is based on 25-34 year olds in the 1990 decennial Census.  Growth of college graduate 
share is then based on 45-50 year olds in the 2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community 
Survey.  See Table 3.2 or Section 3.5.1 of the text for details of the construction of brain gain measures. 
*Unincorporated community 
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Table 3.14  Absolute High School Gain, 1992-2008 (Ordinary Least Squares) 
VARIABLES (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Ln (HS grads (1991-93)) 0.270** 0.144** 0.051 0.164** 0.379** 
(SD) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042) 
Metro > 400 per square mile  -0.147** -0.068 -0.207** -- 
(SD)  (0.034) (0.058) (0.046) -- 
Metro 200-400 per square mile  -0.037 0.007 -0.051 -- 
(SD)  (0.025) (0.043) (0.033) -- 
Non-Metro  -0.101** -- -- -- 
(SD)  (0.020) -- -- -- 
Ln (dist. to four-year state coll.)  -0.015* -0.011 -0.006 -0.047** 
(SD)  (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
July average high temperature (F)  -0.005* -0.004 0.007 -0.012** 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
January avg. low temperature (F)   0.005** 0.005 0.006* 0.012** 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coast dummy  -0.080** -0.043 -0.044 -0.090* 
(SD)  (0.020) (0.053) (0.030) (0.035) 
Poverty rate (1990) %  -0.011** -0.006 -0.016** -0.004 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployment rate (1991-93) %  -0.021** -0.032 -0.023** -0.017** 
(SD)  (0.004) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) 
Neighbors’ unemployment %   -0.017 -0.024* 0.003 
(SD)   (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) 
Mining %  -0.015** -0.019* -0.016** -0.009** 
(SD)  (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
Manufacturing %  -0.004** -0.006* -0.005** 0.000 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Information services %  0.006 -0.012 0.008* 0.030 
(SD)  (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.018) 
Professional %  0.006 0.027** -0.004 0.003 
(SD)  (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
Arts and entertainment %  0.036** 0.007 0.016 0.081** 
(SD)  (0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.019) 
Federal government %  -0.002 -0.001 -0.008* -0.002 
(SD)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Military %  0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.007* 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
State and local government %  0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Midwest  0.099** 0.171** 0.068 0.100* 
(SD)  (0.027) (0.065) (0.038) (0.043) 
South  0.305** 0.306** 0.218** 0.165** 
(SD)  (0.036) (0.086) (0.056) (0.047) 
West  0.159** 0.203* 0.093 0.145** 
(SD)  (0.037) (0.087) (0.051) (0.047) 
Non-Native %  0.008** 0.013** 0.008* 0.004 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -1.788** -0.349 0.351 -1.156** -1.865** 
(SD) (0.118) (0.229) (0.312) (0.376) (0.409) 
Sample 
 
All  
CGAs  
All  
CGAs  
Metro 
Center 
Suburb Non-Metro 
Observations 915 915 203 380 332 
R-squared 0.324 0.614 0.589 0.583 0.646 
Regressions employ Hubert-White robust standard error corrections.  Initial stock of high school graduates is based on 
the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, 1991-1993.  Growth of high school graduates is 
then based on the 2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the ACS.  See Table 3.2 for details.  
** Significant at the 1% level   * Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.15  Growth in High School Share, 1992-2008 (Ordinary Least Squares)   
 
VARIABLES (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Ln(HS grad % (1991-93)) -0.720** -0.864** -0.904** -0.849** -0.871** 
(SD) (0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.031) (0.045) 
Metro > 400 per square mile  0.011* -0.005 0.017* -- 
(SD)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) -- 
Metro 200-400 per square mile  0.003 -0.001 0.006 -- 
(SD)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) -- 
Non-Metro  -0.019** -- -- -- 
(SD)  (0.004) -- -- -- 
Ln (dist. to four-year state coll.)  -0.003* 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
July average high temperature (F)  -0.0018** -0.0036** 0.0000 0.0005 
(SD)  (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
January avg. low temperature (F)   -0.0006* -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0018** 
(SD)  (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Coast dummy  0.005 0.002 0.007 0.008 
(SD)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Poverty rate (1990) %  -0.0013** -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0028** 
(SD)  (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Unemployment rate (1991-93) %  -0.0035** -0.0034** -0.0066** 0.0025 
(SD)  (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0019) 
Neighbors’ unemployment %   -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0011 
(SD)   (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
Mining %  -0.0006 -0.0023* -0.0006 -0.0001 
(SD)  (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Manufacturing %  -0.0010** -0.0013** -0.0010** -0.0006 
(SD)  (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Information services %  0.0036** 0.0029 0.0025** 0.0083** 
(SD)  (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0030) 
Professional %  0.0023** 0.0011 0.0026** 0.0027 
(SD)  (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0016) 
Arts and entertainment %  0.0040 0.0021 0.0050 0.0050 
(SD)  (0.0024) (0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0035) 
Federal government %  0.0000 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0009 
(SD)  (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0012) 
Military %  0.0011** 0.0008 0.0010 0.0019* 
(SD)  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
State and local government %  -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0007 
(SD)  (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Midwest  -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.018 
(SD)  (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) 
South  -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 -0.007 
(SD)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
West  -0.024** -0.026* -0.040** 0.002 
(SD)  (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Non-Native  -0.0047** -0.0032** -0.0042** -0.0101** 
(SD)  (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0012) 
Constant -0.071** 0.167** 0.293** 0.028 -0.001 
(SD) (0.004) (0.039) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) 
Sample 
 All CGAs 
All  
CGAs 
Metro 
Center 
Suburb  Non-Metro 
Observations 915 915 203 380 332 
R-squared 0.696 0.846 0.914 0.833 0.853 
Regressions employ Hubert-White robust standard error corrections.  Initial share of high school graduates is based on 
NCES Common Core of Data, 1991-93.  Growth of high school graduate share is then based on 31-37 year olds in the 
2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community Survey.  See Table 3.2 for details.  
** Significant at the 1% level   * Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.16  Growth in College Share, 1990-2008 (Ordinary Least Squares)  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Ln (college grad % (1990)) -0.176** -0.358** -0.331** -0.383** -0.358** 
(SD) (0.013) (0.023) (0.050) (0.035) (0.045) 
Metro > 400 per square mile  -0.048** -0.035 -0.037 -- 
(SD)  (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) -- 
Metro 200-400 per square mile  0.007 0.005 -0.001 -- 
(SD)  (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) -- 
Non-Metro  -0.044** -- -- -- 
(SD)  (0.013) -- -- -- 
Ln (dist. to four-year state coll.)  0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
(SD)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) 
July average high temperature (F)  -0.004* -0.001 -0.001 -0.005* 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
January avg. low temperature (F)   0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Coast dummy  0.014 -0.030 0.027 -0.028 
(SD)  (0.014) (0.025) (0.018) (0.033) 
Poverty rate (1990) %  -0.009** -0.007** -0.010** -0.006* 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment rate (1991-93) %  -0.013** -0.034** -0.020** -0.006* 
(SD)  (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
Neighbors’ unemployment %   0.024** 0.000 -0.004 
(SD)   (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Mining %  -0.004 -0.001 -0.009** -0.002 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Manufacturing %  -0.003** 0.000 -0.003** -0.002 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Information services %  0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.000 
(SD)  (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) 
Professional %  0.008** 0.005 0.009** 0.006 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
Arts and entertainment %  0.008 -0.011 0.000 0.029 
(SD)  (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) 
Federal government %  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
(SD)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Military %  -0.002* 0.001 -0.004** -0.001 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
State and local government %  -0.001 -0.002* -0.003* -0.001 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Midwest  0.037* 0.050 0.051* 0.036 
(SD)  (0.018) (0.031) (0.025) (0.039) 
South  0.065** 0.074 0.044 0.056 
(SD)  (0.022) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) 
West  0.118** 0.122** 0.086** 0.131** 
(SD)  (0.022) (0.041) (0.029) (0.044) 
Non-Native  0.002 0.004* 0.001 0.003 
(SD)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant -0.050 0.102 -0.105 -0.052 -0.150 
(SD) (0.023) (0.119) (0.182) (0.199) (0.236) 
Sample 
 
All  
CGAs 
All  
CGAs 
Metro  
Center 
Suburb  Non- 
Metro 
Observations 915 915 203 380 332 
R-squared 0.176 0.433 0.552 0.501 0.331 
Regressions employ Hubert-White robust standard error corrections.  Initial share of college graduates is based on 25-
34 year olds in the 1990 decennial Census.  Growth of college graduate share is then based on 45-50 year olds in the 
2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community Survey.  See Table 3.2 for details.  
** Significant at the 1% level   * Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.17  Brain Gain, “Consistent PUMAs” (Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
Abs. HS 
Gain 
Abs. HS 
Gain 
Rel. HS 
Gain 
Rel. HS 
Gain 
Rel. Coll. 
Gain 
Rel. Coll. 
Gain 
Ln (Initial Stock or Share) 0.045* 0.045* -0.834** -0.852** -0.462** -0.478** 
(SD) (0.019) (0.019) (0.037) (0.034) (0.053) (0.048) 
Metro > 400 per square mile 0.078 0.031 0.001 0.016 -0.094* -0.155** 
(SD) (0.061) (0.063) (0.011) (0.011) (0.040) (0.037) 
Metro 200-400 per square mile 0.024 -0.006 -0.002 0.012ᶧ -0.015 -0.065* 
(SD) (0.037) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.030) 
Non-Metro -0.092** -0.067* -0.013ᶧ -0.005 -0.070** -0.011 
(SD) (0.032) (0.032) (0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln (dist. to four-year state coll.) -0.016 -0.010 -0.004ᶧ -0.002 0.006 0.014 
(SD) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) 
July average high temperature (F) -0.006 -0.004 -0.0025** -0.0019* -0.004 -0.002 
(SD) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.003) 
January avg. low temperature (F)  0.008** 0.007* 0.0002 -0.0003 0.002 -0.001 
(SD) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coast dummy -0.065* -0.069* 0.006 0.005 0.049ᶧ 0.037 
(SD) (0.031) (0.031) (0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.024) 
Poverty rate (1990) % -0.005ᶧ 0.000 -0.0011 0.0004 -0.006ᶧ 0.001 
(SD) (0.003) (0.004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.003) (0.004) 
Unemployment rate (1991-93) % -0.028** -0.035** -0.0029 -0.0052** -0.020* -0.033** 
(SD) (0.007) (0.008) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln average college wage (1990)  -0.105  -0.059  0.508** 
(SD)  (0.219)  (0.041)  (0.160) 
Ln avg. non-college wage (1990)  0.502*  0.182**  0.287 
(SD)  0.243  (0.043)  (0.184) 
Mining % -0.012* -0.018** -0.0002 -0.0021ᶧ -0.002 -0.008 
(SD) (0.005) (0.006) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Manufacturing % 0.000 0.000 -0.0007ᶧ -0.0011** -0.002 -0.004** 
(SD) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Information services % 0.026 0.022 0.0060* 0.0046ᶧ 0.005 0.001 
(SD) (0.018) (0.018) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.009) (0.008) 
Professional % 0.008 0.004 0.0017ᶧ 0.0009 0.011* 0.000 
(SD) (0.008) (0.008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Arts and entertainment % 0.023 0.022 0.0041 0.0043 0.018ᶧ 0.012 
(SD) (0.018) (0.018) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.010) (0.010) 
Federal government % 0.001 0.000 0.0006 0.0002 0.002 0.004 
(SD) (0.007) (0.007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Military % 0.006** 0.008** 0.0008 0.0013* -0.003ᶧ -0.002 
(SD) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.002) (0.002) 
State and local government % 0.002 0.001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.003 0.002 
(SD) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Midwest 0.063 0.047 0.003 -0.003 0.058 0.047 
(SD) (0.047) (0.048) (0.008) (0.008) (0.037) (0.036) 
South 0.230** 0.240** -0.002 0.001 0.047 0.044 
(SD) (0.060) (0.061) (0.010) (0.009) (0.043) (0.040) 
West 0.185** 0.177** -0.002 -0.026* 0.069 0.088* 
(SD) (0.065) (0.065) (0.012) (0.012) (0.046) (0.044) 
Non-Native 0.014** 0.014** -0.0040** -0.0037** 0.008** 0.007** 
(SD) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.180 -0.730 0.180 0.093 0.099 -2.308** 
(SD) (0.347) (0.535) (0.069) (0.110) (0.284) (0.484) 
Sample = Consistent PUMAs 
Observations 312 312 312 312 312 312 
R-squared 0.603 0.614 0.869 0.879 0.444 0.524 
Regressions use Hubert-White robust standard error corrections.  Column 1, 3, and 5 are identical to column 2 of Table 
3.14, 3.15, and 3.16, respectively, except the geographic unit is broadened to consolidate 1990 PUMAs with 2005-2010 
PUMAs.  Bold indicates > 1.5 SD difference from Table 3.14, 3.15, or 3.16.  Italics indicate change in significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level   * Significant at the 5% level  ᶧ  Significant at 10% level  
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Figures 
Figure 3.1A: Absolute High School Gain in the United States (1992-2008)  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1B: Population Density in the United States (1990) 
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Figure 3.2A: Relative High School Gain in the United States (1992-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2B: Relative College Gain in the United States (1990-2008)  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2C: Population Density in the United States (1990) 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table A.1  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Origin UI Claims % 0.035* 0.032* 0.035*       
(SE) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)       
UI Claims (1-1000 mi) -0.059* -0.052* -0.016       
(SE) (0.011) (0.010) (0.024)       
Origin Unem Rate %    0.016* 0.015* 0.019*    
(SE)    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Unem. Rate (1-1000 mi)    -0.018* -0.033* 0.061*    
(SE)    (0.009) (0.009) (0.027)    
Origin Emp Growth %       -0.033* -0.031* -0.034* 
(SE)       (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Emp Growth (1-1000 mi)       0.071* 0.057* -0.007 
(SE)       (0.014) (0.013) (0.047) 
Origin Pop Growth %       0.007 0.008 0.009 
(SE)       (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Pop Growth % (1-1000 mi)       -0.064 -0.030 0.011 
(SE)       (0.043) (0.035) (0.049) 
Employed -0.480* -0.481* -0.478* -0.478* -0.480* -0.479* -0.479* -0.481* -0.481* 
(SE) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.03) 
Unemployed 0.225* 0.223* 0.222* 0.223* 0.223* 0.223* 0.228* 0.226* 0.225* 
(SE) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Less than HS -0.097* -0.096* -0.096* -0.096* -0.095* -0.096* -0.096* -0.096* -0.096* 
(SE) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Some College 0.209* 0.210* 0.210* 0.206* 0.210* 0.209* 0.208* 0.210* 0.210* 
(SE) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
College Graduate 0.732* 0.735* 0.732* 0.730* 0.733* 0.732* 0.731* 0.735* 0.735* 
(SE) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Married -0.111* -0.108* -0.107* -0.110* -0.107* -0.107* -0.110* -0.108* -0.107* 
(SE) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Child Present -0.319* -0.318* -0.317* -0.318* -0.317* -0.317* -0.318* -0.318* -0.318* 
(SE) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
(Table Continued Below) 
 
 
   
 
1
2
1
 
Appendix Table A.1 (Continued)  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age -0.118* -0.123* -0.122* -0.118* -0.123* -0.122* -0.119* -0.123* -0.123* 
(SE) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age Squared (× 100) 0.079ᶧ 0.093* 0.092* 0.080ᶧ 0.091* 0.090* 0.082ᶧ 0.092* 0.091* 
(SE) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Age Cubed (× 100,000) -0.085 -0.096 -0.088 0.063 0.100 -0.090 -0.015 -0.101 -0.093 
(SE) (0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.344) (0.344) (0.344) (0.343) (0.344) (0.344) 
Female -0.096* -0.092* -0.091* -0.096* -0.092* -0.091* -0.096* -0.092* -0.091* 
(SE) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Hispanic -0.534* -0.533* -0.530* -0.531* -0.530* -0.529* -0.530* -0.531* -0.530* 
(SE) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Black -0.397* -0.396* -0.394* -0.397* -0.396* -0.395* -0.396* -0.397* -0.396* 
(SE) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Nonmetropolitan 0.281ᶧ 0.283ᶧ 0.280ᶧ 0.278ᶧ 0.281ᶧ 0.278ᶧ 0.279ᶧ 0.282ᶧ 0.281ᶧ 
(SE) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) 
Time -0.003 0.049*  0.011 0.062*  0.007 0.057*  
(SE) (0.008) (0.020)  (0.010) (0.021)  (0.009) (0.020)  
Time Squared (× 100) -0.098* -0.498*  -0.137* -0.580*  -0.118* -0.510*  
(SE) (0.025) (0.146)  (0.031) (0.157)  (0.027) (0.143)  
Time Cubed (× 1,000)  0.083*   0.101*   0.082*  
(SE)  (0.028)   (0.032)   (0.027)  
1983   -0.169*   -0.303*   -0.196* 
(SE)   (0.045)   (0.070)   (0.062) 
1984   -0.113*   -0.348*   -0.116* 
(SE)   (0.054)   (0.104)   (0.050) 
1986   0.026   -0.014   0.039 
(SE)   (0.101)   (0.078)   (0.107) 
1987   -0.033   -0.068   -0.054 
(SE)   (0.096)   (0.076)   (0.084) 
1988   -0.006   -0.008   -0.019 
(SE)   (0.118)   (0.097)   (0.108) 
1989   0.188   0.242*   0.160 
(SE)   (0.133)   (0.108)   (0.111) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Appendix Table A.1 (Continued)  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1990 0.221ᶧ 0.329* 0.200ᶧ 
(SE) (0.137) (0.117) (0.116) 
1991 0.106 0.216* 0.072 
(SE) (0.119) (0.105) (0.094) 
1992 0.011 0.021 -0.066 
(SE) (0.094) (0.083) (0.087) 
1993 0.041 0.004 0.008 
(SE) (0.102) (0.089) (0.089) 
1996 -0.172 -0.077 -0.187 
(SE) (0.133) (0.108) (0.114) 
1997 -0.189ᶧ -0.102 -0.248* 
(SE) (0.117) (0.093) (0.078) 
1998 -0.135 -0.032 -0.173ᶧ 
(SE) (0.134) (0.104) (0.099) 
1999 -0.224 -0.093 -0.283* 
(SE) (0.142) (0.114) (0.088) 
2000 -0.240ᶧ -0.073 -0.307* 
(SE) (0.149) (0.131) (0.099) 
2001 -0.323* -0.150 -0.396* 
(SE) (0.158) (0.135) (0.105) 
2002 -0.357* -0.199 -0.444* 
(SE) (0.146) (0.137) (0.107) 
2003 -0.426* -0.362* -0.530* 
(SE) (0.125) (0.108) (0.106) 
2004 -0.498* -0.446* -0.567* 
(SE) (0.125) (0.110) (0.106) 
2005 -0.480* -0.423* -0.552* 
(SE) (0.138) (0.111) (0.101) 
2006 -0.442* -0.361* -0.518* 
(SE) (0.157) (0.115) (0.099) 
2007 -0.567* -0.445* -0.631* 
(SE) (0.160) (0.120) (0.104) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.1 (Continued)  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
2008   -0.591*   -0.447*   -0.670* 
(SE)   (0.149)   (0.117)   (0.101) 
2009   -0.719*   -0.609*   -0.815* 
(SE)   (0.145)   (0.121)   (0.104) 
2010   -0.873*   -1.019*   -1.012* 
(SE)   (0.096)   (0.084)   (0.130) 
2011   -0.798*   -1.026*   -0.872* 
(SE)   (0.103)   (0.109)   (0.099) 
2012   -0.714*   -0.890*   -0.763* 
(SE)   (0.127)   (0.104)   (0.099) 
NH 0.658 0.656 0.658 0.606 0.606 0.613 0.587 0.586 0.584 
(SE) (1.688) (1.689) (1.681) (1.68) (1.681) (1.678) (1.682) (1.687) (1.685) 
VT -0.445 -0.442 -0.437 -0.371 -0.373 -0.360 -0.393 -0.397 -0.395 
(SE) (1.55) (1.551) (1.543) (1.548) (1.549) (1.546) (1.548) (1.552) (1.551) 
MA 1.164 1.156 1.152 1.169 1.156 1.160 1.145 1.137 1.132 
(SE) (1.569) (1.572) (1.564) (1.565) (1.568) (1.565) (1.566) (1.572) (1.571) 
RI 0.056 0.064 0.061 0.157 0.161 0.161 0.157 0.158 0.156 
(SE) (1.511) (1.513) (1.505) (1.507) (1.508) (1.505) (1.508) (1.512) (1.510) 
CT 1.11 1.112 1.107 1.148 1.148 1.148 1.128 1.130 1.127 
(SE) (1.504) (1.505) (1.497) (1.499) (1.500) (1.497) (1.500) (1.505) (1.503) 
NY 1.078 1.074 1.073 1.036 1.032 1.041 1.035 1.033 1.033 
(SE) (1.473) (1.475) (1.468) (1.466) (1.468) (1.465) (1.467) (1.472) (1.471) 
NJ 0.975 0.974 0.985 1.030 1.022 1.029 1.022 1.013 1.009 
(SE) (1.47) (1.472) (1.464) (1.466) (1.468) (1.465) (1.466) (1.471) (1.469) 
PA 0.88 0.886 0.901 0.976 0.973 0.983 0.984 0.980 0.978 
(SE) (1.453) (1.455) (1.447) (1.447) (1.449) (1.446) (1.448) (1.453) (1.451) 
OH 0.811 0.812 0.831 0.795 0.790 0.806 0.811 0.806 0.804 
(SE) (1.462) (1.463) (1.454) (1.458) (1.46) (1.456) (1.458) (1.463) (1.462) 
IN 1.159 1.170 1.200 1.167 1.171 1.186 1.172 1.173 1.172 
(SE) (1.455) (1.456) (1.444) (1.449) (1.45) (1.447) (1.449) (1.454) (1.452) 
IL 0.99 0.993 1.016 0.984 0.981 0.993 0.998 0.994 0.993 
(SE) (1.458) (1.459) (1.451) (1.450) (1.452) (1.449) (1.451) (1.456) (1.454) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MI 0.549 0.554 0.563 0.651 0.646 0.657 0.683 0.682 0.680 
(SE) (1.443) (1.444) (1.436) (1.443) (1.445) (1.441) (1.448) (1.453) (1.452) 
WI 0.651 0.663 0.684 0.796 0.797 0.809 0.788 0.786 0.785 
(SE) (1.459) (1.460) (1.452) (1.453) (1.454) (1.451) (1.454) (1.458) (1.457) 
MN 1.197 1.203 1.219 1.176 1.180 1.183 1.171 1.174 1.174 
(SE) (1.477) (1.478) (1.468) (1.472) (1.473) (1.470) (1.473) (1.477) (1.476) 
IA 0.854 0.862 0.889 0.902 0.902 0.911 0.888 0.887 0.885 
(SE) (1.463) (1.465) (1.454) (1.460) (1.462) (1.459) (1.459) (1.463) (1.462) 
MO 1.38 1.390 1.422 1.405 1.407 1.417 1.410 1.408 1.406 
(SE) (1.464) (1.466) (1.454) (1.459) (1.46) (1.457) (1.459) (1.464) (1.462) 
ND 0.354 0.353 0.378 0.348 0.347 0.334 0.318 0.318 0.318 
(SE) (1.484) (1.486) (1.477) (1.479) (1.481) (1.478) (1.479) (1.484) (1.482) 
SD 0.135 0.133 0.181 0.059 0.057 0.049 0.031 0.022 0.022 
(SE) (1.479) (1.480) (1.473) (1.472) (1.474) (1.470) (1.470) (1.475) (1.473) 
NE 0.857 0.856 0.898 0.750 0.749 0.745 0.715 0.707 0.704 
(SE) (1.471) (1.473) (1.466) (1.465) (1.466) (1.463) (1.468) (1.473) (1.471) 
KS 0.852 0.857 0.892 0.851 0.852 0.851 0.835 0.828 0.825 
(SE) (1.475) (1.476) (1.465) (1.469) (1.47) (1.468) (1.467) (1.472) (1.471) 
DE -0.238 -0.237 -0.220 -0.223 -0.229 -0.214 -0.236 -0.245 -0.246 
(SE) (1.48) (1.481) (1.473) (1.475) (1.476) (1.473) (1.476) (1.480) (1.479) 
MD 1.411 1.411 1.423 1.357 1.357 1.365 1.346 1.344 1.344 
(SE) (1.482) (1.484) (1.474) (1.475) (1.477) (1.473) (1.476) (1.481) (1.479) 
VA 1.553 1.553 1.563 1.467 1.467 1.473 1.453 1.451 1.450 
(SE) (1.455) (1.456) (1.446) (1.451) (1.452) (1.449) (1.452) (1.456) (1.455) 
WV 0.307 0.316 0.334 0.366 0.367 0.373 0.398 0.397 0.396 
(SE) (1.461) (1.463) (1.455) (1.458) (1.459) (1.456) (1.458) (1.462) (1.460) 
NC 0.75 0.745 0.762 0.803 0.787 0.799 0.796 0.782 0.780 
(SE) (1.467) (1.470) (1.462) (1.461) (1.465) (1.462) (1.464) (1.471) (1.469) 
SC 0.981 0.987 1.011 1.023 1.020 1.029 1.031 1.023 1.020 
(SE) (1.473) (1.475) (1.465) (1.469) (1.470) (1.467) (1.470) (1.474) (1.472) 
GA 1.386 1.394 1.422 1.411 1.411 1.426 1.418 1.414 1.415 
(SE) (1.461) (1.462) (1.452) (1.456) (1.457) (1.454) (1.458) (1.463) (1.461) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FL 1.321 1.320 1.351 1.248 1.242 1.254 1.264 1.250 1.250 
(SE) (1.543) (1.545) (1.534) (1.533) (1.535) (1.532) (1.531) (1.538) (1.538) 
KY 0.772 0.781 0.809 0.817 0.817 0.829 0.840 0.835 0.834 
(SE) (1.464) (1.466) (1.457) (1.460) (1.461) (1.458) (1.461) (1.466) (1.464) 
TN 1.254 1.263 1.290 1.298 1.299 1.311 1.316 1.313 1.311 
(SE) (1.454) (1.455) (1.446) (1.449) (1.45) (1.447) (1.450) (1.454) (1.452) 
AL 0.879 0.890 0.919 0.968 0.971 0.980 0.976 0.974 0.972 
(SE) (1.45) (1.451) (1.443) (1.448) (1.449) (1.446) (1.449) (1.453) (1.451) 
MS 0.650 0.654 0.689 0.672 0.667 0.671 0.703 0.692 0.690 
(SE) (1.462) (1.463) (1.455) (1.457) (1.459) (1.456) (1.457) (1.462) (1.461) 
AR 0.690 0.699 0.733 0.801 0.798 0.804 0.818 0.808 0.806 
(SE) (1.466) (1.467) (1.454) (1.460) (1.462) (1.458) (1.460) (1.465) (1.463) 
LA 1.404 1.414 1.457 1.412 1.417 1.419 1.434 1.429 1.427 
(SE) (1.47) (1.471) (1.461) (1.465) (1.466) (1.463) (1.466) (1.470) (1.468) 
OK 1.084 1.086 1.125 1.028 1.029 1.028 1.021 1.013 1.012 
(SE) (1.479) (1.481) (1.470) (1.472) (1.473) (1.47) (1.472) (1.476) (1.473) 
TX 1.207 1.210 1.262 1.164 1.158 1.177 1.189 1.173 1.173 
(SE) (1.483) (1.484) (1.473) (1.484) (1.486) (1.482) (1.485) (1.490) (1.486) 
MT 0.425 0.426 0.447 0.427 0.426 0.421 0.451 0.425 0.425 
(SE) (1.494) (1.496) (1.488) (1.489) (1.491) (1.488) (1.492) (1.497) (1.494) 
ID 0.553 0.558 0.566 0.658 0.661 0.634 0.697 0.666 0.665 
(SE) (1.475) (1.476) (1.469) (1.472) (1.474) (1.471) (1.469) (1.475) (1.473) 
WY 0.497 0.506 0.546 0.512 0.516 0.522 0.506 0.491 0.493 
(SE) (1.465) (1.466) (1.460) (1.459) (1.460) (1.457) (1.457) (1.461) (1.457) 
CO 1.512 1.519 1.550 1.450 1.458 1.450 1.470 1.457 1.455 
(SE) (1.477) (1.479) (1.468) (1.471) (1.472) (1.469) (1.474) (1.478) (1.475) 
NM 0.671 0.677 0.731 0.634 0.634 0.633 0.666 0.644 0.643 
(SE) (1.477) (1.478) (1.471) (1.468) (1.47) (1.467) (1.470) (1.475) (1.473) 
AZ 1.708 1.717 1.760 1.676 1.681 1.669 1.710 1.686 1.683 
(SE) (1.469) (1.470) (1.467) (1.464) (1.466) (1.462) (1.471) (1.474) (1.470) 
UT 1.072 1.078 1.100 1.032 1.037 1.034 1.054 1.032 1.032 
(SE) (1.485) (1.487) (1.48) (1.479) (1.481) (1.477) (1.488) (1.493) (1.490) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.3 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NV 0.856 0.861 0.859 0.866 0.877 0.832 0.923 0.891 0.887 
(SE) (1.478) (1.480) (1.471) (1.473) (1.475) (1.476) (1.474) (1.477) (1.479) 
WA 1.421 1.427 1.411 1.444 1.459 1.405 1.483 1.461 1.456 
(SE) (1.482) (1.484) (1.478) (1.479) (1.480) (1.481) (1.472) (1.476) (1.471) 
OR 0.963 0.975 0.974 1.062 1.076 1.035 1.116 1.091 1.086 
(SE) (1.475) (1.476) (1.469) (1.467) (1.468) (1.466) (1.464) (1.469) (1.465) 
CA 1.087 1.095 1.121 1.143 1.144 1.141 1.192 1.157 1.154 
(SE) (1.503) (1.504) (1.492) (1.501) (1.503) (1.500) (1.506) (1.512) (1.507) 
Constant -0.553 -0.700 -0.997 -0.849 -0.791 -1.386 -0.807 -0.922 -0.783 
(SE) (1.14) (1.132) (1.136) (1.124) (1.127) (1.128) (1.126) (1.125) (1.133) 
          
Observations = 1,365,067          
Pseudo R-Squared 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 
See Table 2.3 
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Appendix Table A.2  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.4 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Origin UI Claims % 0.032* 0.031* 0.032* 0.036* 
(SE) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
UI Claims (Border) % -0.037*    
(SE) (0.007)    
UI Claims (1-500 mi) %  -0.039*   
(SE)  (0.009)   
UI Claims (1-1000 mi) %   -0.052*  
(SE)   (0.010)  
U.S. UI Claims %    -0.058* 
(SE)    (0.011) 
Employed -0.481* -0.481* -0.481* -0.482* 
(SE) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Unemployed 0.224* 0.224* 0.223* 0.223* 
(SE) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
Less than HS -0.096* -0.096* -0.096* -0.101* 
(SE) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
Some College 0.209* 0.210* 0.210* 0.213* 
(SE) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
College Graduate 0.734* 0.735* 0.735* 0.733* 
(SE) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Married -0.108* -0.108* -0.108* -0.107* 
(SE) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Child Present -0.318* -0.318* -0.318* -0.316* 
(SE) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Age -0.123* -0.124* -0.123* -0.127* 
(SE) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age Squared (× 100) 0.091* 0.092* 0.093* 0.100* 
(SE) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
Age Cubed (× 100,000) -0.094 -0.098 -0.096 -0.167 
(SE) (0.345) (0.345) (0.343) (0.338) 
Female -0.092* -0.092* -0.092* -0.093* 
(SE) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Hispanic -0.533* -0.533* -0.533* -0.530* 
(SE) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Black -0.397* -0.397* -0.396* -0.395* 
(SE) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) 
Nonmetropolitan 0.280 0.282ᶧ 0.283ᶧ 0.275ᶧ 
(SE) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) 
Time 0.060* 0.056* 0.049* 0.047* 
(SE) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Time Squared (× 100) -0.536* -0.518* -0.498* -0.491* 
(SE) (0.144) (0.144) (0.146) (0.149) 
Time Cubed (× 1000) 0.087 0.085* 0.083* 0.081* 
(SE) (0.279) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
NH 0.734 0.644 0.656 0.657 
(SE) (1.690) (1.691) (1.689) (1.694) 
VT -0.392 -0.451 -0.442 -0.451 
(SE) (1.552) (1.553) (1.551) (1.555) 
MA 1.217 1.131 1.156 1.150 
(SE) (1.571) (1.575) (1.572) (1.574) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.2 (Continued)  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.4 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
RI 0.152 0.044 0.064 0.054 
(SE) (1.513) (1.514) (1.513) (1.516) 
CT 1.171 1.089 1.112 1.097 
(SE) (1.504) (1.508) (1.505) (1.508) 
NY 1.191 1.071 1.074 1.070 
(SE) (1.483) (1.476) (1.475) (1.476) 
NJ 1.087 0.971 0.974 0.990 
(SE) (1.469) (1.474) (1.472) (1.473) 
PA 0.973 0.899 0.886 0.908 
(SE) (1.456) (1.457) (1.455) (1.457) 
OH 0.985 0.830 0.812 0.832 
(SE) (1.464) (1.465) (1.463) (1.465) 
IN 1.316 1.218 1.170 1.197 
(SE) (1.457) (1.457) (1.456) (1.457) 
IL 1.112 1.024 0.993 1.021 
(SE) (1.459) (1.461) (1.459) (1.46) 
MI 0.659 0.555 0.554 0.559 
(SE) (1.449) (1.446) (1.444) (1.448) 
WI 0.810 0.690 0.663 0.680 
(SE) (1.459) (1.46) (1.460) (1.462) 
MN 1.340 1.229 1.203 1.219 
(SE) (1.477) (1.478) (1.478) (1.479) 
IA 0.961 0.889 0.862 0.894 
(SE) (1.468) (1.467) (1.465) (1.467) 
MO 1.491 1.414 1.390 1.440 
(SE) (1.466) (1.467) (1.466) (1.467) 
ND 0.387 0.283 0.353 0.388 
(SE) (1.485) (1.486) (1.486) (1.488) 
SD 0.193 0.118 0.133 0.199 
(SE) (1.479) (1.481) (1.480) (1.482) 
NE 0.915 0.848 0.856 0.883 
(SE) (1.474) (1.476) (1.473) (1.473) 
KS 0.885 0.833 0.857 0.888 
(SE) (1.476) (1.478) (1.476) (1.474) 
DE -0.111 -0.245 -0.237 -0.232 
(SE) (1.48) (1.483) (1.481) (1.478) 
MD 1.503 1.418 1.411 1.395 
(SE) (1.485) (1.486) (1.484) (1.486) 
VA 1.633 1.556 1.553 1.570 
(SE) (1.457) (1.458) (1.456) (1.455) 
WV 0.411 0.333 0.316 0.347 
(SE) (1.464) (1.464) (1.463) (1.465) 
NC 0.809 0.748 0.745 0.752 
(SE) (1.468) (1.471) (1.470) (1.471) 
SC 1.101 0.981 0.987 1.026 
(SE) (1.475) (1.476) (1.475) (1.476) 
GA 1.471 1.378 1.394 1.428 
(SE) (1.464) (1.463) (1.462) (1.464) 
FL 1.433 1.337 1.320 1.362 
(SE) (1.536) (1.545) (1.545) (1.544) 
KY 0.872 0.822 0.781 0.822 
(SE) (1.466) (1.468) (1.466) (1.468) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.2 (Continued)  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.4 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
Interstate  
Moves 
TN 1.371 1.277 1.263 1.297 
(SE) (1.455) (1.457) (1.455) (1.457) 
AL 0.946 0.889 0.890 0.928 
(SE) (1.453) (1.453) (1.451) (1.454) 
MS 0.803 0.640 0.654 0.686 
(SE) (1.465) (1.464) (1.463) (1.464) 
AR 0.760 0.691 0.699 0.755 
(SE) (1.465) (1.465) (1.467) (1.469) 
LA 1.458 1.399 1.414 1.473 
(SE) (1.472) (1.473) (1.471) (1.473) 
OK 1.114 1.029 1.086 1.148 
(SE) (1.481) (1.481) (1.481) (1.483) 
TX 1.305 1.225 1.210 1.270 
(SE) (1.481) (1.484) (1.484) (1.483) 
MT 0.508 0.456 0.426 0.436 
(SE) (1.497) (1.498) (1.496) (1.498) 
ID 0.687 0.600 0.558 0.559 
(SE) (1.478) (1.478) (1.476) (1.478) 
WY 0.531 0.454 0.506 0.567 
(SE) (1.466) (1.468) (1.466) (1.469) 
CO 1.521 1.416 1.519 1.569 
(SE) (1.478) (1.481) (1.479) (1.475) 
NM 0.702 0.604 0.677 0.739 
(SE) (1.478) (1.481) (1.478) (1.48) 
AZ 1.854 1.774 1.717 1.776 
(SE) (1.473) (1.470) (1.470) (1.471) 
UT 1.102 1.012 1.078 1.099 
(SE) (1.486) (1.489) (1.487) (1.487) 
NV 0.956 0.857 0.861 0.844 
(SE) (1.478) (1.481) (1.480) (1.481) 
WA 1.607 1.501 1.427 1.400 
(SE) (1.481) (1.484) (1.484) (1.486) 
OR 1.095 1.038 0.975 0.964 
(SE) (1.474) (1.476) (1.476) (1.480) 
CA 1.202 1.042 1.095 1.125 
(SE) (1.509) (1.502) (1.504) (1.508) 
Constant -0.974 -0.831 -0.700 -0.638 
(SE) (1.134) (1.136) (1.132) (1.142) 
     
Observations  1,365,067 1,365,067 1,365,067 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.082 0.082 0.082 
See Table 2.4 
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Table A.3  Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.5 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = UI Claims) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Unemp. Rate) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Employ. 
Growth) 
UI Claims Diff (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡)  0.019*   
(SE) (0.009)   
Unemp. Rate Diff (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡)  0.236ᶧ  
(SE)  (0.140)  
Emp Growth Diff (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡)   -0.658* 
(SE)   (0.178) 
Origin Population Growth     0.911 
(SE)   (1.308) 
Population Growth, 1-1000 mi   -1.126 
(SE)   (3.441) 
Employed -0.475* -0.477* -0.480* 
(SE) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Employed × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 0.039* 0.060* -0.071* 
(SE) (0.007) (0.013) (0.022) 
Unemployed 0.230* 0.229* 0.229* 
(SE) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Unemployed  × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) -0.040* -0.045* 0.125* 
(SE) (0.010) (0.017) (0.027) 
Less than HS -0.096* -0.091* -0.096* 
(SE) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Less than HS × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) -0.008 0.026ᶧ -0.006 
(SE) (0.009) (0.014) (0.028) 
Some College 0.214* 0.213* 0.208* 
(SE) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Some College × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 0.026* 0.035* -0.002 
(SE) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) 
4 Year Degree 0.738* 0.738 0.733* 
(SE) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) 
4 Year Degree × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 0.032* 0.048* -0.008 
(SE) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021) 
Married -0.108* -0.107* -0.108* 
(SE) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Married × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 
(SE) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
Child Present -0.320* -0.317* -0.317* 
(SE) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Child Present × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) -0.021* -0.005 0.030* 
(SE) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) 
Age -0.122* -0.125* -0.123* 
(SE) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 0.005* -0.019ᶧ 0.043* 
(SE) (0.001) (0.011) (0.015) 
Age2 × 100 0.089* 0.095* 0.091* 
(SE) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
Age2 × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) × 100 -0.020* 0.048ᶧ -0.099* 
(SE) (0.005) (0.027) (0.037) 
Age3 × 10,000 -0.006 -0.012 -0.009 
(SE) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) 
Age3 × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) × 10,000 -0.020* -0.037ᶧ 0.072* 
(SE) (0.005) (0.021) (0.030) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.3 (Continued) Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.5 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = UI Claims) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Unemp. Rate) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Employ. 
Growth) 
Female -0.094* -0.092* -0.093* 
(SE) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Female × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡)  -0.006 -0.004 0.0410* 
(SE) (0.006) (0.011) (0.018) 
Hispanic -0.529* -0.528* -0.530* 
(SE) (0.117) (0.113) (0.114) 
Hispanic × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡)  0.044* -0.020 -0.039 
(SE) (0.019) (0.020) (0.034) 
Black -0.400* -0.395* -0.397* 
(SE) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) 
Black × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) 0.045* 0.015 -0.092* 
(SE) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) 
Non-Metro 0.268 0.277ᶧ 0.278ᶧ 
(SE) (0.163) (0.162) (0.161) 
Non-Metro × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡)  -0.069* -0.023 0.129* 
(SE) (0.017) (0.027) (0.032) 
Time 0.048* 0.065* 0.064* 
(SE) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) 
Time × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡)  -0.005 -0.011ᶧ 0.008 
(SE) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Time2 × 100 -0.502 -0.555* -0.548 
(SE) (0.444) (0.154) (0.145) 
Time2 × (𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) × 100   0.027 0.034 0.009 
(SE) (0.036) (0.049) (0.006) 
Time3 × 10,000 0.830 0.894* 0.874* 
(SE) (0.281) (0.287) (0.271) 
Time3×(𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑜,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝐶−𝑜,𝑡) ×10,000   -0.030 0.002 -0.135 
(SE) (0.078) (0.109) (0.133) 
NH 0.614 0.605 0.592 
(SE) (1.688) (1.687) (1.685) 
VT -0.399 -0.409 -0.413 
(SE) (1.545) (1.558) (1.551) 
MA 1.142 1.165 1.153 
(SE) (1.568) (1.572) (1.57) 
RI 0.01 0.150 0.156 
(SE) (1.509) (1.51) (1.511) 
CT 1.076 1.145 1.147 
(SE) (1.501) (1.503) (1.503) 
NY 1.067 1.046 1.044 
(SE) (1.471) (1.471) (1.47) 
NJ 0.936 1.021 1.018 
(SE) (1.467) (1.471) (1.47) 
PA 0.867 0.975 0.99 
(SE) (1.45) (1.452) (1.451) 
OH 0.799 0.787 0.813 
(SE) (1.458) (1.462) (1.461) 
IN 1.146 1.152 1.186 
(SE) (1.452) (1.453) (1.453) 
IL 0.973 0.980 0.998 
(SE) (1.455) (1.455) (1.454) 
MI 0.536 0.652 0.685 
(SE) (1.439) (1.447) (1.451) 
WI 0.656 0.772 0.788 
(SE) (1.453) (1.458) (1.457) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.3 (Continued) Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.5 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = UI Claims) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Unemp. Rate) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Employ. 
Growth) 
MN 1.181 1.173 1.179 
(SE) (1.476) (1.476) (1.476) 
IA 0.86 0.889 0.907 
(SE) (1.458) (1.466) (1.462) 
ND 1.383 1.401 1.413 
(SE) (1.463) (1.463) (1.462) 
SD 0.331 0.335 0.361 
(SE) (1.483) (1.485) (1.482) 
MO 0.007 0.020 0.028 
(SE) (1.484) (1.477) (1.474) 
NE 0.782 0.718 0.721 
(SE) (1.471) (1.469) (1.472) 
KS 0.828 0.838 0.841 
(SE) (1.475) (1.476) (1.47) 
DE -0.248 -0.246 -0.237 
(SE) (1.478) (1.478) (1.479) 
MD 1.444 1.372 1.367 
(SE) (1.481) (1.481) (1.48) 
VA 1.549 1.467 1.465 
(SE) (1.455) (1.457) (1.455) 
WV 0.415 0.439 0.44 
(SE) (1.455) (1.459) (1.46) 
NC 0.741 0.766 0.778 
(SE) (1.466) (1.468) (1.47) 
SC 0.980 1.001 1.027 
(SE) (1.471) (1.472) (1.473) 
GA 1.387 1.403 1.405 
(SE) (1.458) (1.461) (1.463) 
FL 1.325 1.237 1.261 
(SE) (1.539) (1.539) (1.536) 
KY 0.817 0.836 0.858 
(SE) (1.462) (1.465) (1.464) 
TN 1.270 1.292 1.318 
(SE) (1.451) (1.453) (1.453) 
AL 0.910 0.961 0.982 
(SE) (1.446) (1.451) (1.452) 
MS 0.681 0.704 0.718 
(SE) (1.460) (1.465) (1.462) 
AR 0.768 0.813 0.825 
(SE) (1.463) (1.466) (1.465) 
LA 1.398 1.431 1.432 
(SE) (1.468) (1.469) (1.469) 
OK 1.030 1.029 1.035 
(SE) (1.481) (1.476) (1.474) 
TX 1.216 1.180 1.195 
(SE) (1.48) (1.488) (1.489) 
MT 0.415 0.445 0.481 
(SE) (1.493) (1.493) (1.495) 
ID 0.620 0.668 0.671 
(SE) (1.473) (1.477) (1.475) 
WY 0.474 0.498 0.491 
(SE) (1.464) (1.471) (1.462) 
CO 1.521 1.447 1.452 
(SE) (1.475) (1.474) (1.476) 
NM 0.639 0.650 0.647 
(SE) (1.480) (1.473) (1.474) 
AZ 1.710 1.658 1.678 
(SE) (1.467) (1.468) (1.472) 
UT 1.078 1.019 1.037 
(SE) (1.481) (1.484) (1.491) 
(Table Continued Below) 
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Table A.3 (Continued) Complete Results of Logistic Regressions in Table 2.5 
  
VARIABLES 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = UI Claims) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Unemp. Rate) 
Interstate Moves 
(LMC = Employ. 
Growth) 
NV 0.831 0.844 0.888 
(SE) (1.476) (1.478) (1.475) 
WA 1.409 1.439 1.458 
(SE) (1.481) (1.485) (1.474) 
OR 0.952 1.064 1.101 
(SE) (1.474) (1.472) (1.468) 
CA 1.046 1.146 1.156 
(SE) (1.500) (1.505) (1.512) 
Constant -0.687 -0.932 -0.955 
(SE) (1.129) (1.119) (1.122) 
    
Observations 1,365,067 1,365,067 1,365,067 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.083 0.082 0.083 
See Table 1.5 
*  Significant at 5% level 
ᶧ  Significant at 10% level 
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Table A.4: Absolute High School Gain (OLS, Compare to Table 2.14)  
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Metro > 400 per square mile -0.054 -0.037 -0.091* -- 
(SD) (0.033) (0.056) (0.043) -- 
Metro 200-400 per square mile 0.000 0.017 -0.010 -- 
(SD) (0.026) (0.044) (0.035) -- 
Non-Metro -0.124** -- -- -- 
(SD) (0.022) -- -- -- 
Ln (dist. to four-year state coll.) -0.026* -0.014 -0.018 -0.066** 
(SD) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) 
July average temperature (F) -0.003 -0.002 0.010* -0.012** 
(SD) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
January avg. temperature (F)  0.005** 0.004 0.005 0.012** 
(SD) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Coast dummy -0.080** -0.033 -0.059 -0.111** 
(SD) (0.021) (0.053) (0.031) (0.040) 
Poverty rate (1990) % -0.011** -0.006 -0.016** -0.008** 
(SD) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployment rate (1991-93) % -0.021** -0.034 -0.030** -0.009 
(SD) (0.004) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) 
Neighbors’ unemployment %  -0.013 -0.014 -0.001 
(SD)  (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
Mining % -0.015** -0.020* -0.018** -0.008* 
(SD) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Manufacturing % -0.004** -0.006* -0.006** 0.000 
(SD) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Information services % 0.013* -0.006 0.013* 0.033* 
(SD) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.017) 
Professional % 0.010* 0.030** -0.004 0.010 
(SD) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
Arts and entertainment % 0.040** 0.011 0.016 0.096** 
(SD) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.017) 
Federal government % -0.005 -0.002 -0.009* -0.005 
(SD) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Military % 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.010** 
(SD) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
State and local government % -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 
(SD) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Midwest 0.116** 0.172** 0.104 0.124* 
(SD) (0.027) (0.065) (0.039) (0.052) 
South 0.313** 0.289** 0.237** 0.241** 
(SD) (0.037) (0.087) (0.059) (0.054) 
West 0.202** 0.221* 0.142** 0.195** 
(SD) (0.037) (0.088) (0.053) (0.055) 
Non-Native % 0.012** 0.015** 0.014* 0.006 
(SD) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.622** 0.564 -0.129 -0.994** 
(SD) (0.192) (0.300) (0.341) (0.325) 
     
Sample All CGAs Metro Center Suburb Non-Metro 
Observations 915 203 380 332 
R-squared 0.584 0.583 0.543 0.540 
Regressions employ Hubert-White robust standard error corrections.  Initial stock of high school graduates is based on 
the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, 1991-1993.  Growth of high school graduates is 
then based on the 2006-2010 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the ACS.  See Table 3.2 for details.  
** Significant at the 1% level 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Appendix Table A.5:  Absolute High School Gain, “Consistent PUMAs” (OLS) 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Metro > 400 per square mile 0.079 0.033 
(SD) (0.062) (0.063) 
Metro 200-400 per square mile 0.006 -0.026 
(SD) (0.035) (0.036) 
Non-Metro -0.120** -0.092** 
(SD) (0.032) (0.031) 
Ln (dist. to four-year state coll.) -0.013 -0.007 
(SD) (0.011) (0.011) 
July average temperature (F) -0.006 -0.004 
(SD) (0.004) (0.004) 
January avg. temperature (F)  0.007** 0.005 
(SD) (0.003) (0.003) 
Coast dummy -0.042 -0.048ᶧ 
(SD) (0.028) (0.028) 
Poverty rate (1990) % -0.004 0.001 
(SD) (0.003) (0.004) 
Unemployment rate (1991-93) % -0.029** -0.037** 
(SD) (0.007) (0.008) 
Average college wage (1990)  -0.025 
(SD)  (0.226) 
Average non-college wage (1990)  0.451ᶧ 
(SD)  (0.248) 
Mining % -0.013* -0.018** 
(SD) (0.005) (0.005) 
Manufacturing % 0.001 0.000 
(SD) (0.002) (0.002) 
Information services % 0.029ᶧ 0.026 
(SD) (0.017) (0.017) 
Professional % 0.009 0.005 
(SD) (0.008) (0.008) 
Arts and entertainment % 0.026 0.025 
(SD) (0.018) (0.018) 
Federal government % 0.001 0.000 
(SD) (0.007) (0.007) 
Military % 0.006** 0.008** 
(SD) (0.002) (0.002) 
State and local government % 0.001 0.001 
(SD) (0.002) (0.002) 
Midwest 0.065 0.050 
(SD) (0.047) (0.048) 
South 0.245** 0.252** 
(SD) (0.059) (0.060) 
West 0.200** 0.195* 
(SD) (0.066) (0.065) 
Non-Native % 0.015** 0.016** 
(SD) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.491 -0.513 
(SD) (0.319) (0.516) 
Sample = Consistent PUMAs 
Observations 312 312 
R-squared 0.594 0.606 
Regressions use Hubert-White robust standard error corrections.  Column 1 is identical to column 1 of Appendix Table 
A.4 except the geographic unit is broadened to consolidate 1990 PUMAs with 2005-2010 PUMAs.  Bold indicates > 
1.5 SD difference from Appendix Table A.4.  Italics indicate change in significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level   * Significant at the 5% level  ᶧ  Significant at 10% level  
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